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THE VITAL OR SOMATIC INSTINCTS[1]

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Psycho-analytical research has shown from the first in the course of its extensive observations that the causes of neurotic disorders are to be found in emotional conflicts which involve man's greatest interests and most vital needs. No doubt it was the dualism which is a characteristic of every conflict which led Freud to attempt to trace back the number of forces or instincts operative in human beings to the two main needs of hunger and love. In doing so he was, incidentally, following a widely held view.

The vast quantity of data gathered by psycho-analysis, both as regards conscious psychology and the processes and mechanisms of the unconscious, enabled it to reveal a very fundamental character of mental life—that of having a *direction*, of exhibiting impulsions and aims and of giving play to needs. It thus became of great importance for psycho-analysis not only to describe the observed facts but to attempt to make a synthesis of them (of course only a provisional one) and to form some general ideas about them, some working hypotheses, as it were, by means of which to define and classify the forces of the mind.

The two great needs of man, hunger and love, were taken as types of the theoretical concepts of the 'sexual instincts' and the 'ego instincts'. Freud gave to the concept of instinct a new character in that he placed it on the borderline between the organic and the mental

[1] Based upon a paper read before the French Psycho-Analytical Society, May 16, 1939.

spheres.[2] According to him, instinct has its source in organic life. The dynamic power of the latter or its representative in the psyche is what constitutes an instinct ; and the energy belonging to it is libido.[3] Instinct is classed as a stimulus : it is an internal and constant, though sometimes periodical, kind of stimulus.

Let me recall the three aspects which Freud has distinguished in every instinct. There is its *source*, which is organic, and whose need or psychic impetus is called libido ; its *aim*, or in other words the gratification which the psyche strives after in order to satisfy the need ; and its *object*, which, generally speaking, is the means by which that aim of gratification is attained.

This arrangement of the characteristics of instinct fits in very well with the sexual instincts and with those of hunger and thirst. But as far as I know no one has ever tried to apply it to other manifestations of instinctual life, such as those, for instance, which spring from the instinct of self-preservation.

Freud has called the theory of the instincts the mythology of psycho-analysis.[4] But he justifies its introduction on the ground that every science has to form new concepts, and very general ones at that, which are in the nature of working hypotheses, arising, on the one hand, directly from the wealth of observed fact and serving, on the other, to arrange and classify those facts. Freud, and Hartmann as well, admit that psychological observation alone is not enough to found a theory of the instincts, and that a theory of this kind must be based also upon important contributions from the fields of animal psychology and biology. In this connection I feel I ought not to omit to mention an idea put forward by the Russian analyst Vinogradoff at a meeting of the French Psycho-Analytical Society about twelve years ago. He

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[2] Freud, ' Instincts and their Vicissitudes ' (1915), *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV ; H. Hartmann, *Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse*, 1927 ; R. de Saussure, ' L'évolution de la notion d'instinct ', *L'évolution psychiatrique*, T. II, 1927.

[3] [There are indications that the text of this passage in the original French MS. is corrupt, but it has unfortunately been impossible to consult the author. It may be remarked, however, that Freud is usually at pains to distinguish the *Trieb* (the instinct as a psycho-physical borderline concept) from the *Triebrepräsentanz* (what represents or corresponds to the instinct in the purely mental sphere). Moreover the name ' libido ' is, of course, given only to the energy of the *sexual* instinct.—*Ed.*]

[4] Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, 1933, p. 124.

had the intention of making a comparative study of the evolution of the instincts in man and of instinctual behaviour in animals. That he never carried this project into effect was, I imagine, due to circumstances outside his control.

The interest and significance which attach to the theory of the instincts are, in the first instance, undoubtedly of a methodological nature, as Hartmann has pointed out. The psycho-analytical concept of instinct enables us to link it up with other scientific disciplines which are concerned with man. And it reminds us of what medical and psychiatric practice prove every day: that body and mind interact. But over and beyond this, I think that clear-cut general concepts help us to observe facts correctly. Fortunately the platitude that we only see what we already know is not absolutely true; otherwise we should never be able to learn anything new. Nevertheless, however much we keep our observations independent of our theoretical ideas, such ideas do tend to creep in all the time and to order and classify our facts for us. Since this is so, it is better to introduce new general ideas openly as such, for then they will be more likely to help us in our further observations.

I have said all this in order to show why, in my opinion, it is worth our while to return once more to the subject, so often studied and discussed by analysts, of the classification of the instincts. Let us first briefly recapitulate the history of the subject.[5] Freud began, as we have seen, by dividing the instincts into sexual and ego instincts. The latter were presumably so called because they included those forces of which the subject was usually conscious, or to a great extent conscious, and which were not in contradiction to his ego. This is perhaps also why psycho-analysis was inclined to neglect them and to turn its attention at first to the sexual instincts almost exclusively. At any rate I am inclined to believe that this neglect is not unconnected with the choice of the word 'ego instinct'.

Nevertheless, Freud's study of the relationship between instinct and ego, and more particularly his investigations into certain pathological states like the psychoses which involve severe disturbances of the ego, led him to approach the problem of narcissism. We might do worse than take up the concept of narcissism again one day and

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[5] Freud, *New Introductory Lectures*, 1933; Bernfeld, 'Über die Einteilung der Triebe', *Imago*, Bd. XXI, 1935; Bibring, 'Zur Entwicklung und Problematik der Triebtheorie', *Imago*, Bd. XXII, 1936.

examine it, even if it were only because that concept covers a great variety of facts and problems. Thus, for instance, Freud calls ' narcissism ' the early developmental phase of the ego during which the sexual instincts take the ego as their object.[6] Again, the word designates, upon the instinctual level, the libidinal component of egoism.[7] Elsewhere, Freud, speaking of narcissism, says that ' the ego is always the main reservoir of libido, from which libidinal cathexes of objects proceed '. And he adds that since ego libido is continually turning into object libido and *vice versâ*, it is impossible to distinguish between their nature ; so that one might give up the term ' libido ' and replace it by the term ' general psychic energy '.[8] The employment of the concept of narcissism in the theory of the instincts would, in effect, result in an abandonment of that dualistic view of them to which psycho-analysis has so many good reasons for remaining faithful.

Freud revived the idea of instinctual dualism with his theory of the death instincts. I need not recapitulate that theory, since it is familiar to us all. Nevertheless I should like to recall various propositions involved in it which are, in my opinion, of unequal value and which do not form an indivisible whole. They are (1) that the instinct of destruction is an independent instinct opposed to the united sexual and life instincts ; (2) that aggressiveness is the result of a turning outward and projection of the destructive or death instincts ; (3) that these instincts have a close and constant association with the regulative mechanisms, and (4) that there exists a genuine primary self-destructive instinct such as is found in masochism.[9]

Freud has also strongly urged the importance of another point in his theory, namely, the fusion of Eros and the death instinct, and their defusion in pathological phenomena.[10] But, so far as I know, the idea of instinctual defusion has not been made use of by any analyst except Nunberg in one or two chapters of his *Neurosenlehre*.[11] It may be remarked, however, that the concept of instinctual fusion can exist

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[6] Freud, ' Instincts and their Vicissitudes ' (1915), *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, pp. 77–8.

[7] Freud, ' On Narcissism : an Introduction ' (1914), *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 31.

[8] Freud, *New Introductory Lectures*, 1933, p. 133.

[9] Loewenstein, ' L'origine du masochisme et la théorie des pulsions ', *Revue française de psychanalyse*, T. X, 1938, p. 296.

[10] Freud, *New Introductory Lectures*, 1933, p. 139.

[11] Nunberg, *Allgemeine Neurosenlehre*, 1932.

quite independently of the theory of the death instincts. A defusion of instinct leads to the separation of erotic instincts from manifestations of aggressiveness ; but this does not imply anything about the ultimate origin of the latter.

The importance which the aggressive instincts acquired as a result of this new theory of the instincts undoubtedly marked a turning-point in the history of psycho-analysis—and a very welcome one in our view, since it has meant an immense step forward in knowledge. It has greatly enlarged our understanding of many clinical pictures and of the phenomena of collective psychology. It has also added considerably to our therapeutic powers. I need only mention in this connection the clinical importance of aggression turned against the self and of self-punishment.

With regard to the second proposition involved in the theory of the death instincts, according to which aggressiveness proceeds from a supposed instinct of death turned outward, Freud at first considered that proposition as lying not in the realm of psychology but of biology. He associated the extraversion with the coming into existence of multi-cellular organisms, on the hypothesis that an assemblage of cells of this kind neutralize their propensity towards self-destruction and, by turning the instinct outward in the form of aggression, harness it to the creation of a muscular system. Attractive as this supposition is, it seems to have overlooked the fact that all protozoa can be seen to pursue certain forms of behaviour connected with seizing and destroying other organisms, which can legitimately be likened to the aggressive behaviour of multi-cellular organisms. The hypothetical extraversion of the death instincts must therefore have happened still earlier in the course of their evolution.

This theory of the origin of aggressiveness was, however, taken up by several analysts, of whom I will only mention Federn, Nunberg and Weiss, and presented no longer in a biological but in a psychological form. Weiss, though he does not entirely accept the theory of the death instincts, has invented for the destructive energy of man the name ' destrudo ' as a counterpart to libido ; while Federn has preferred to call it ' mortido '.[12] Nunberg and Weiss have attempted to introduce the instinct of destruction to account for certain pathological

[12] Federn, ' Zur Unterscheidung des gesunden und krankhaften Narzissmus ', *Imago*, Bd. XXII, 1936 ; Weiss, ' Todestrieb und Masochismus ', *Imago*, Bd. XXI, 1935.

manifestations and early stages of the development of the mind ; but they have not made it clear whether they are referring to the instinct of aggression in the ordinary sense or to the hypothetical primary instinct of self-destruction. Weiss is aware of the immense difficulties attendant upon his attempt, especially as regards the employment of the death instincts in the service of self-preservation ; whereas Nunberg has not brought out these difficulties. In my opinion, none of these attempts have succeeded in arriving at a satisfactory and convincing solution of the problem.

The transition from a biological view to a psychological application of this hypothesis concerning the origin of aggression arises indirectly from an analogous attempt made by Freud in his ' Economic Problem in Masochism ' (1924),[13] in which he tried to discover in the symptoms of masochism not only the results of a turning against the self of aggressiveness, but evidence of the existence of a primary instinct of self-destruction. I will quote from another work some words in which he sums up this line of thought : ' Let us return to the specific problem which is presented by masochism. If we put its erotic components on one side for a moment, it proves the existence of a tendency which has self-destruction as its aim.' And a little further on : ' Varying quantities of the original destructive instinct may still remain inside the organism ; it seems as though we could only perceive it under two conditions, either when it is bound up with the erotic instincts so as to form masochism, or when it is turned on to the external world . . . in the shape of aggressiveness.' [14] Thus he sees in the seeking out of suffering an indication of a tendency towards the seeking out of death. In my paper on masochism, already referred to, I take a different line : I am inclined to think that the search for suffering is a process designed to mitigate unconscious dangers by eroticizing the alarm-signal attached to them, namely, suffering.

Bibring has followed up Freud's ideas in a noteworthy paper [15] which is devoted to the discussion of various aspects and phases of the theory of the instincts, and which tries to uphold Freud's thesis on methodological grounds. According to Bibring it is as necessary to infer the existence of a primary self-destructive instinct from the numerous manifestations of masochism as it was necessary to infer the

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[13] *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

[14] *New Introductory Lectures*, 1933, p. 136.

[15] Bibring, *op. cit*, *Imago*, Bd. XXII, 1936.

existence of a primary narcissism from all those of its manifestations which were observable and which were therefore called secondary narcissism. He thinks that the theory of the instincts makes it essential to discover a ' biological model ' of the many clinical instances of aggression turned against the self. I do not, for my part, see any such necessity. It may well be that the theoretical postulation of a primary instinct was fruitful for the problem of narcissism. There do, in fact, exist such states as that of the satisfied suckling or of sleep or complete rest which more or less approximate to the idea of primary narcissism. But it is extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to imagine a ' primary destructiveness '. A state of complete rest, for instance, which Bibring proposes to connect with this idea, seems, in fact, to have very little in common with it. Besides, one cannot help wondering why the theory of the instincts should require a ' biological model ' only for aggression turned inward and why the usual kind of aggression directed outward should not need such a model as well.

With regard to the theory of the death instincts Bibring furthermore makes the important statement that, in his view, it is a theory ' of the second order '. It would thus admit of the existence of another theory, side by side with it, more closely related to observable data—such as, for instance, a classification of the instincts into sexual and ego instincts.

In his last discussion of instinctual theory Freud, too, seems not to exclude the possibility of maintaining his original division of the instincts side by side with his new theory. Fenichel, who has also worked on this problem,[16] believes that the older theory lends itself better to the psycho-analytical study of the mind than does the theory of the death instinct ; and Hartmann prefers it from the standpoint of clinical application.[17]

I myself have attempted to deal with the question of the aggressive instincts from two different angles. In the first place I have tried to show that the problems of masochism do not oblige us to postulate a primary death instinct ; they can be explained as an interplay of such forces as sexuality, narcissism, the instincts of self-preservation and aggressiveness. I do not know if I have succeeded in this ; but, in the second place, I have pointed out what seems to me to be a serious methodological drawback in one part at any rate of the theory of the death instincts. This is the complete transformation which such a

[16] Fenichel, ' Zur Kritik des Todestriebes ', *Imago*, Bd. XXI, 1935.

[17] Hartmann, *op. cit.*

theory would effect in our whole concept of instinctual energy. As Bernfeld has rightly remarked,[18] in Freud's new theory instincts have become nothing more than quite general trends—directive principles, as it were, which all living matter has to obey. Bibring, too, has pointed out this change of view. He says : [19] ' The theory of the primal instincts (the instincts of life and death) involves a radical alteration in our notions of what an instinct is. We no longer regard instinct as a tension of energy, emanating from an organic source, which impinges upon the mind . . . but as a " something " which guides the vital processes in a particular direction.' If, as Freud says, the life instincts and Eros tend towards unification and association, and the destructive instincts towards separation and dissociation, such a concept of instinct has no longer anything to do with instinct as originally defined by him. If we now proceed to apply the word ' instinct ' in both these senses indifferently to our psychic material we shall inevitably be led into hopeless confusion. And in fact it seems to me that certain difficulties which have been raised by Nunberg and Weiss are due precisely to a mixture of these two different concepts under the same name of ' instinct '. In this position of affairs we should be obliged either to give up all the knowledge we have gained from the old, energic view of instinct, or (what would seem more reasonable) no longer to speak of ' instincts ' when we are referring to the general trends towards life or death which we call Eros or destruction. The second alternative seems to me all the more preferable since it is difficult for the imagination to conceive such a thing as an instinct of death—such a thing, that is, as an energy whose characteristic it is to strive to destroy the very thing from which it proceeds. It can only have a meaning if it is regarded as a trend towards a lowering of the level of energy, in which case it would fit in with Freud's definition of it as a trend towards reducing life once more to an inorganic state.

Before resuming our discussion of the theory of the instincts, I should like to draw attention to another field of interest upon which psycho-analysis has been engaged of late, and that is the analysis of the ego.[20] For we may obtain fresh light upon the instincts from that

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[18] Bernfeld, *op. cit.*

[19] Bibring, *op. cit.*, S. 172.

[20] See also on this subject Ernest Jones, ' Psycho-Analysis and the Instincts ', *British Journal of Psychology* (*General Section*), Vol. XXVI, 1936.

quarter. It is a remarkable circumstance that the study of the ego should have begun just when the investigation of the aggressive and destructive instincts was being undertaken. From that time onward the idea of the ego took on a different meaning from what it had implicitly had when psycho-analysis spoke of the ego instincts. Thenceforward the ego was regarded from a topographical or structural point of view. It became one of the three institutions of the mind, the other two being the id and the super-ego ; and it took the place of what used to be the system Pcpt.-Cs. in Freud's terminology and what was called the conscious in contradistinction to the unconscious.

The concept of the ego has, moreover, been enriched in a further respect. According to Freud, the ego is ' that part of the id which has been modified by its proximity to the external world and the influence that the latter has had on it,[21] and which serves the purpose of receiving stimuli and protecting the organism from them, like the cortical layer with which a particle of living substance surrounds itself. This relation to the external world is decisive for the ego.' [22] The ego is the intermediary between the id and the external world. It is, as it were, the representative of that world *vis-à-vis* the instincts, and its task is to take cognizance of the latter and control them by synthesizing all the forces in play, whether belonging to the instinctual or to the external world.

In the papers on the concept of the ego read before the recently held Joint Meeting of the French and British Psycho-Analytical Societies, we had the opportunity of hearing Dr. Susan Isaacs and Dr. Nacht give an illuminating account of the rôle played by the ego as a defence against the instincts and discuss in a most instructive way the problem of the strength of the ego and its synthetic function, as well as the significance of the contents of the ego, i.e. of the traces of perceptions both of the internal and external worlds and the way in which they are elaborated. And still other aspects of the ego have been brought out in recent years, as, for instance, by Odier in some of his lectures at the Paris Psycho-Analytical Institute and in a paper read before the French Psycho-Analytical Society, and by Hartmann in a

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[21] Dr. Hartmann pointed out in a recent discussion that it would be more correct not to speak of an ' id ' before this differentiation has occurred but of an undifferentiated stage.

[22] *New Introductory Lectures*, 1933, pp. 100–101.

very important paper which has just appeared [23] on the autonomous ego and the non-conflictual sphere of the ego, in which he traces with great correctness certain structures, functions and maturations of the ego that are to some extent independent of instinctual life.

A moment's reflection will show that these contributions are no longer concerned with the idea of the ego instincts. That idea, in so far as it used to be employed to describe pathological conflicts, has been superseded by the idea of a conflict between the id and the ego in which the latter represents the influences coming from the external world.[24] This applies equally to the accounts of the therapeutic process given, for instance, by Anna Freud and Bibring.[25] Nowhere is there any mention of the ego instincts ; for by tacit agreement the ego now stands for an entity, an institution within the personality, whose main characteristic is that it is situated between the id and the external world.[26]

The idea of the ego has become more and more clearly defined in the literature of psycho-analysis, so that it is difficult to speak any longer of ego instincts. Freud was aware of this, for, after saying that side by side with the sadism of the super-ego there is a masochism of the ego, he corrects himself and adds that this primary masochism is rather to be attributed to the id or to the total personality.[27]

This clarification of the concept of the ego has led to another difficulty—one connected with endopsychic instinctual reactions. When we are describing the ways in which the ego controls and masters the instincts, there is some difficulty, it seems to me, about saying that the ego offers itself to the id as the object of the id's instincts. Nor do I think it easy, in discussing narcissism, to talk of instincts directed towards the ego, as contrasted with instincts directed

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[23] Hartmann, ' Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, Bd. XXIV, 1939. (Abstracted in this JOURNAL, Vol. XXI, 1940, p. 214.)

[24] Freud, *New Introductory Lectures*, 1933, p. 103.

[25] Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, 1937 ; Bibring ' On the Theory of the Therapeutic Results of Psycho-Analysis ', this JOURNAL, Vol. XVIII, 1937.

[26] I am here leaving the super-ego out of account. [We omit at this point a terminological discussion on the use of the French words ' *moi* ' and ' *je* ' as equivalents for the German ' *Ich* '.—*Ed.*]

[27] ' The Economic Problem in Masochism ' (1924), *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 267 ; *New Introductory Lectures*, 1933, p. 136.

towards an external object. The ego we are thinking of when we say this is not the topographical and structural entity which we nowadays mean by that word. The instincts which used to be thought of as turned back towards the ego can now be described as being in some way bound to the interior of the personality. In erotic narcissism the case is different. Where the self is loved in an erotic way a part of the individual is the object of that love.

All this serves to remind us that it is not possible to describe all the data of psychology with reference to any single system of co-ordinates, such as is provided, for instance, by the division of the mind into three institutions. Moreover, the topographical system of reference should, I think, be handled with especial caution in depicting and explaining mental phenomena, precisely on account of its spatial character ; for the fundamental thing about mental events is that they do not exist in space but only in time. Bernfeld once made an amusing remark about this necessity for describing psychological data in terms of more than one system of reference. The human mind, he said, was like an orchestral symphony ; it could not be correctly played unless a great number of instruments were employed, and it was only their ordered harmony which could give a true rendering of what was going on in the mind. I am sure that we do not yet understand the whole musical composition and I am afraid that even the separate instruments are still not completely known to us.

However this may be, in our current formula for a neurotic conflict as a conflict between instinctual demands and the ego as the representative of reality, we put side by side ideas which relate to two different systems of reference. Our old formula was that it was a conflict between two *forces*, the sexual instinct and the ego instinct. But, as we have seen, the latter term has rightly been abolished, since the ego is by definition something opposed to instinct and different from it.

If we look more closely into the idea of an external reality which is prolonged in the ego and which opposes the instincts, we can easily see that it is not a question of merely *any* external reality. What is happening at the antipodes, or even next door, has little effect upon a person's endopsychic conflicts, so long as those events do not concern him directly. The only kind of external reality which counts in the conflict between his ego and his instincts is the kind which relates to his instinctual interests and needs.

All this is self-evident ; but it enables us to see clearly that the old

ego instincts' must be replaced by other instinctual forces. We might call those forces 'instincts of self-preservation' or 'vital instincts' (as distinct from Freud's 'life instincts').

It cannot be denied that if we believe that the theory of the death instinct is not able to give an adequately clear and full picture of the play of mental forces involved, we must range ourselves with those who prefer the older theory, though that theory will, of course, for the reasons already given, have to undergo terminological modification and, above all, completion.

I have been glad to find in the paper by Hartmann which I have already referred to the same view expressed as mine, namely that the self-preservative instincts have hitherto been greatly neglected. I have attempted to give the reason for this in my paper, also mentioned above, on masochism. In the course of it I have remarked that Bernfeld has tried to deny the existence of any such instincts, because, according to him, all psychological manifestations can be traced to the influence of the erotogenic zones. This assertion of his seems to me to be untrue; and, moreover, it betrays the working of the mechanism of scotomization which has led psycho-analysts to overlook the operation of the vital instincts. Thus, for instance, in examining a hysterical paralysis, the analyst will emphasize the effect of sexual factors upon the ordinary muscular activity of the arm and will remove the pathogenic sexual elements by analytic treatment and thus restore the arm to its natural use; but he will forget to mention, as something self-evident, the part played in this restoration of muscular activity by the vital forces of self-preservation.

This omission of all mention of the self-preservative elements is also noticeable in the theory, so fundamental for the pathogenesis of neurosis, which, for instance, attributes a phobia like that of Little Hans to fear of castration.[28]

In describing this neurosis in terms of instinctual theory, Freud speaks of a narcissistic wound. Here we must understand by narcissism the erotic component of egoism, or, as we should prefer to say, of the instinct of self-preservation. What lies at the bottom of fear of castration can, in fact, be regarded as a typical example of an instinctual fusion which is called narcissism. The vital danger in the little boy is dominated by his fear of losing his genital organ. But we know that

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[28] Freud, 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy' (1909), *Collected Papers*, Vol. III; *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926), p. 51.

castration anxiety is a characteristically human form of fear and one which, as Freud showed once again in his last book,[29] is a product of civilization. In man the narcissistic character of a danger may preponderate over its vital one, but the vital danger will exist none the less.

Moreover, the view of anxiety latterly put forward by Freud, according to which it is a signal of alarm, allows us to ascribe to the self-preservative instincts a large share in the ætiology of the neuroses. At any rate it certainly gives them a part in the production of the anxiety that arises from reality (*objective* anxiety); and we have no reason to suppose that the play of forces which evokes the anxiety signal in *neurotic* anxiety is of a totally different kind simply because the anxiety in question is not founded upon external reality. On the contrary, I believe that the play of forces—the mechanism—is the same and that it is merely set going in a different way. It is furthermore possible that in castration anxiety, for instance, it may be the subject's narcissism that decides which situations shall be felt as dangerous. We can therefore contemplate the possibility that the self-preservative forces play a part in the formation of neuroses.

The only attempt which has, as far as I know, been made to introduce the factor of self-preservation into the structure of a neurosis is contained in Marie Bonaparte's theory of frigidity in women.[30] In my tentative explanation of masochism I have assigned a place to the self-preservative instincts. And in his recent paper Hartmann has expressed the hope that his study of the structures of the autonomous ego would enable the question of the ego functions, so unjustly neglected, to be taken up once again.

Apart from these three writers I know of only one other who has laid any strong emphasis—though only in a passing manner—upon the importance of the vital instincts and their relation to sexuality. That writer is Freud. In his 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' he says that the sexual instincts at their first appearance 'support themselves upon the instincts of self-preservation, from which they only gradually detach themselves; in their choice of object also they follow paths indicated by the ego instincts.'[31] As we see, Freud used the terms

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[29] Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, 1939, p. 131.

[30] Marie Bonaparte, 'Passivity, Masochism and Femininity', this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, 1935.

[31] *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 69.

'ego instincts' and 'instincts of self-preservation' alternatively to mean the same thing. It is therefore all the easier for us to choose the one and reject the other as being ambiguous.

There would certainly be no more difficulty with the vital instincts than with the others in describing their source, their aim and their object. But as regards instinctual satisfaction, on the other hand, it would not be so easy to distinguish between the forms of satisfaction arising from the self-preservative and the erotic instincts.

In his 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (p. 81 f.) Freud regards hatred and aggressiveness as functions of the ego. He says, for instance, that at the stage of anal-sadistic organization the sexual function is governed by the ego instincts (or, as we should say, the self-preservative interests). This subordination of sexual to self-preservative instincts has a wider bearing than might at first be thought. I have attempted to give an example of this in the formation of what is called feminine masochism; and the ideas which Nacht has expounded in his paper on masochism can be interpreted in the same sense [32]

Perhaps I may be allowed to adduce in favour of this view an observation made upon the higher monkeys. Zuckerman [33] has shown that among them the principle of dominance obtains, that is, that one animal may adopt an active or a passive—a masculine or a feminine—attitude towards another, irrespective of sex, according to which of the two animals is the dominant one. Thus, when two monkeys are fighting over their food, the one which is beaten will adopt a passive-feminine attitude towards the winner. Here we can see more clearly than with human beings (e.g. between a father and son) that the self-preservative forces can exercise a determining influence upon the manifestations of sexuality.

One of my women patients once expressed the same thing to me, although in more human terms. To 'act the man' played a very important part in her life. She could 'act the man'—on a psychological level, of course—towards men and women equally, in virtue solely of her moral superiority over them. She remembered having, as a child, established a complete hierarchy, beginning at the bottom with her small brother and rising through her sister, herself and her mother successively up to her father. This hierarchy was founded upon

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[32] Nacht, 'Le masochisme', *Revue française de psychanalyse*, T. X, 1938.

[33] Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, 1932.

various considerations, one of them being moral power and another sexual knowledge. Can we not discern here, as in the primates, a sexual hierarchy based upon dominance—a dominance which determines sexual behaviour? In my patient this hierarchy based upon dominance was cut across by a hierarchy based upon the possession of a penis, for the two hierarchies did not by any means coincide. This case also showed how the phallus is all the more readily attributed to the mother if she exhibits traits of dominance—traits which we are apt to call, rather too lightly, perhaps, masculine ones. We have here a combination of two sets of factors, sexual and self-preservative, each of which in turn may come to the top.

It will be evident that I have by implication adopted Freud's older theory, which regards all phenomena of power, domination and aggression as manifestations of the vital functions of self-preservation. Nevertheless, we must not forget that one of the reasons why Freud accorded the aggressive trends a separate status among the instincts was their great importance in the unconscious. It is incumbent upon me, therefore, to give good and sufficient grounds for my return to his older view.

One argument, which seems to me to carry some weight, is of a biological order, although it is based on such general and well-established facts that it may be legitimately adduced here. In the whole living world vegetable life alone can create organic matter out of inorganic matter. Animals cannot do it and have to feed upon plants or other animals in order to live. Thus hunger, the most elementary of all the instincts of self-preservation, obliges them to move about and seize and destroy other living creatures. Does it not follow that the aggressive and destructive instincts of man, too, must be closely bound up with his vital instincts of self-preservation? No doubt in man, as in the animals, aggressiveness is intimately associated with the sexual function, even if this is only because they make use of the same muscular system to catch hold alike of their prey and of their sexual partner. Where social, or rather, civilized, man is concerned, the aggressive instincts seem to have become fairly sharply separated from the need to obtain nourishment [34] and present the appearance of independent instincts. But, according to the view put forward here, their origin is closely connected with the instincts of self-preservation.

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[34] The ease with which modern man can procure food has led to a disturbance in him of the metabolism of aggression.

This argument considerably re-inforces the position of those who, like myself, think it more profitable to study the mental disorders of man according to the theory which divides the instincts as we have done. This method of approach re-establishes the importance of the vital instincts of self-preservation in the structure of the neuroses by emphasizing their association with anxiety and with suffering. We must not forget that the latter element is a decisive factor from the nosographic point of view, just as it is in the process of recovery. Thus the idea of the ' will to recovery ', which has been stressed by Nunberg and taken up again by Laforgue, finds its place in the field of instinctual life.

In my opinion we could, and should, go a step further in the practical conclusions which can be drawn from the theory we have recalled. We ought to ask ourselves whether, contrary to what has hitherto been supposed, there might not be neuroses founded upon disturbances in the sphere of the self-preservative instincts. As soon as we class the aggressive instincts among the latter we have answered the question in the affirmative. Moreover, such a conclusion will not seem nearly so surprising if we recollect how closely the instincts of self-preservation are linked to the ego in the topographical sense. It is precisely those links which have been responsible to a certain extent for the ambiguous term ' ego instincts '. Do not, for instance, traumas having to do with nutrition or the repression of cannibalistic impulses play a part in the neuroses ? And although such impulses are assuredly always very strongly eroticized they are obviously archaic forms of the vital instincts.

The main kind of neurosis of which the origin is not exclusively libidinal is, I think, the traumatic neurosis and, in especial, the war neurosis. In a contribution to a collection of writings on this subject by various analysts which appeared in 1919,[35] Freud attributed these neuroses to the pathogenic rôle played by narcissism, that is, by the fusion of erotic trends and self-preservative instincts. The importance of the aggressive factor escaped him at the time at which he put forward this theory.

In this same collection of papers certain cases, observed and treated by Simmel, are of particular interest from this point of view. These were patients who were subject to post-traumatic attacks. Simmel used to put them into a hypnotic state and then confront them with a

[35] *Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses.*

dummy dressed in enemy uniform. The hypnotized patient would fly into a violent rage and attack and destroy the dummy. These abreactive sessions produced excellent results. It is clear that these neuroses were invariably due to an inhibition of self-preservative reactions—reactions of defending the self by killing the enemy. In my opinion analogous mechanisms which inhibit aggressiveness at its very outset enter into the structure of masochism as well.

I am aware that in all this I have done no more than barely indicate a line of psycho-analytical research, which I hope will lead to much more extensive developments.

I should like now to add a few words about the connections between the vital instincts and the ego. But first let me clear up a point concerning the topographical structure of the mind. It is obvious that the instincts of self-preservation belong to the id, just as the sexual instincts do. For this reason they can be kept away from the ego by means of all the familiar mechanisms of defence. That the ego is often hostile to the aggressive instincts we already know. But the same is true of the egoistic impulses, especially if they are in disharmony with erotic impulses which are admitted by the ego. We have only to remember how difficult it often is in an analysis to bring out from repression desires of a radically egoistic kind even if they are in no way aggressive. Thus it would seem that the ego decrees the repression of representatives of the sexual and the self-preservative instincts impartially. And yet, perhaps, the ego is not quite impartial in its choice; some forms of the instinct of self-preservation may stand closer to the ego than others and may even exert a certain determinative influence upon the evolution of that part of it which Hartmann has called the autonomous ego.

In proposing this return to the view that the vital instincts of self-preservation (among which, in my opinion, aggressiveness is to be reckoned) have an independent existence, I must not be supposed to be regressing to a pre-analytical position. The vital instincts must not be confused with the instinct of self-preservation in its non-analytical sense, in which the quality of being automatic and unalterable is what is most stressed and in which all the fundamental characteristics of an instinct as conceived by Freud have been left out of account. What I mean by the vital instincts is a plurality of instincts which have in common the characteristic of operating as a function of the soma in contradistinction to the germ plasm.

In this sense I should propose to set up as a counterpart to the

sexual instincts the *somatic* instincts. In the multi-cellular organism which is man, with whom we are primarily concerned here, these two sources of instinct are very intimately connected, so that it is easier to understand why instinctual manifestations of somatic origin are constantly fused with those of sexual origin in him. This proposed classification may enable us to overcome one of the difficulties which, as Bibring has pointed out, induced Freud to give up his earlier theory, in which he put the aggressive instincts among the instincts of self-preservation—namely, the difficulty of classing the instincts according to their sources. But if we establish an opposition between the sexual instincts and the somatic instincts, we shall be able not only to discover in the latter the familiar characteristics of source, aim and object but also to form some idea of their physio-chemical basis, as we have done with the sexual instincts. In this way, what we call the vital instincts of self-preservation could quite well be described as tensions of energy arising from somatic sources.

Bibring mentions another difficulty which moved Freud to modify his theory of the instincts. How could one explain by means of the ' aggressiveness of the ego instincts ' [36] the fact that the ego has to defend itself both against sadistic and against masochistic manifestations ? This difficulty is largely due, I think, to the continued use of such a very ambiguous term as ' ego instinct '. The aggressive instincts, whether turned outward or against the self, are entirely disparate from the ego, which is a structural concept. Those instincts can at any moment, like the sexual instincts or the vital ones, either come into collision with the ego and provoke it to defend itself against them by means of energies derived from opposing instinctual components, or gain its approval and seek to obtain their ends in its name.

Both of these instinctual theories (the theory of the life and death instincts and the other, to which I propose to return presently) are alike in having a biological aspect and an energic one. But, as Bibring and Bernfeld have rightly pointed out, there is a profound difference between them—a difference which concerns the very concept of instinct. Bibring states that Freud originally thought of instinct as a certain quantity of energy which impinged upon the mind. The essential part of this conception, which classed instinct as a form of stimulus, was that the mental apparatus responded to these quantities

[36] Bibring, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

of energy by dealing with them according to certain regulative principles, viz., the pleasure principle and the reality principle. The theory of the death instincts brings about an increasingly close approximation between the notions of instinct and regulative principle ; the life and death instincts themselves become the fundamental principles which govern living matter. As Freud has said : ' The *Nirvana* principle expresses the tendency of the death instincts, the *pleasure* principle represents the claims of the libido, and its modification, the *reality* principle, represents the influence of the outer world.' [37]

According to the scheme which opposes the somatic instincts to the sexual ones—an opposition which, ultimately, is derived from a primal opposition between the individual and the species—instinct is conceived as a property of living matter. According to Freud's later theory the instincts govern life and death ; so that life and death are themselves the result of instincts. Though I do not in any way wish to criticize the fundamental grounds for such a concept of instincts, I should like to state emphatically that it is totally different from the old concept. But we shall return to this point shortly.

Let us go back to the energic aspect of the new theory, which approximates the instincts to the principles. In my opinion Freud took this step because he was trying to define instinct in terms of energy alone. He was already pre-occupied with this problem when he said that the difference between the energy belonging to the instincts of self-preservation and the energy belonging to the instincts of sex could not be a qualitative difference but only a quantitative one.[38] This quantitative difference might quite well lie in the two observable methods of discharge of energy, one of which tended towards an increase of tension—i.e. life—and the other towards a decrease of it —i.e. rest and death. It could obviously not be a question here of two *different* energies, for that would pre-suppose a third form of energy in which these increases and decreases of tension would be manifested. There must be a *single* form of energy, whose decrease of tension would be called the instinct of death and whose increase of tension would be called the instinct of life.

The old Freudian concept of pleasure as being connected with

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[37] Freud, ' The Economic Problem in Masochism ' (1924), *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 257.

[38] Freud, ' Instincts and their Vicissitudes ' (1915), *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 66.

decrease of tension was in accordance with most observable facts of psychology (though not, of course, with all), whereas the new concept disagrees with a great many of them ; so much so that Freud himself gave up the purely quantitative view and looked for a solution along qualitative lines. He writes : ' Pleasure and unpleasure cannot, therefore, be referred to a quantitative increase or decrease of something which we call stimulus-tension. . . . It seems as though they do not depend on this quantitative factor, but on some peculiarity in it which we can only describe as qualitative. We should be much farther on with psychology if we knew what this qualitative peculiarity was. Perhaps it is rhythm, the periodical succession of the changes, increases and decreases in the amount of stimulus ; we do not know.' [39]

And the dilemma remains. A quantitative differentiation between the instincts is not enough, at any rate in its present form. A qualitative differentiation has other drawbacks, the main one being that we have not the least idea upon what to base it. Indeed, we cannot even imagine what the ' qualities ' could be which would differentiate a sexual from, say, an aggressive instinct. This, I think, is chiefly because mental energy cannot be expressed in spatial terms, since what is mental exists only in time and not in space.

Thus we are forced to give up these so-called ' qualities ' too, as our differentiating factors, and must look elsewhere for them. We shall find them, I think, in certain distinctive features to which psycho-analysis has had recourse more than once when it has tacitly assumed the existence of a qualitative difference between the instincts. We must remember that the concept of instinct is a purely theoretical one—a working hypothesis—and that all we can actually observe are certain phenomena which we regard as manifestations of an instinct. By describing them as accurately as possible we hope to obtain an increasingly clear idea of what we mean by instinct. Thus any theory about the instincts must be based upon the observation of a number of distinctive features, both quantitative and qualitative, which enables us to set up criteria for the classification and distribution of the instincts. But as to the instincts themselves, as I say, we know nothing whatever about either their quality or quantity.

Now what are the distinctive characteristics upon which we base our classification, distribution and allocation of the instincts ? They

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[39] Freud, ' The Economic Problem in Masochism ' (1924), *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 256.

are the peculiarities of instinctual *manifestations*. Thus, for instance, we know that a given instinctual manifestation is sexual, or of sexual origin, by various indications or modes of perception, not all of equal value, of which the following are a few :

(1) A subjective sensation *sui generis* of excitation or pleasure. This criterion would be one of *aim*.

(2) The fact that certain sensations and situations are accompanied by unmistakably sexual reactions, such as genital excitations.

(3) The fact that certain sorts of behaviour are always found to be part of a general pattern of events which derives from sexual life, as, for instance, some forms of curiosity in children or the rearing of offspring among animals.

(4) The presence of certain forms of human and animal behaviour which can be described as being ' in the service ' of the sexual instinct, e.g. the love of finery in women.[40]

Bernfeld, in his paper on the classification of the instincts, lays stress upon what he calls the psycho-analytical criterion according to which certain phenomena can be allocated to the sexual instinct. This criterion is, I think, nothing else than the discovery of the indications which we have enumerated above, appearing in an unnoticeable or disguised form, or traceable back to other forms of behaviour in which their sexual nature is obvious.

These distinctive indications or criteria coincide, to some extent, with the aims and objects of the instinct as described by Freud. The only indications which are purely hypothetical and cannot be observed are the *origins* of the instinct. For that very reason these last are perhaps best suited to provide a basis for a general classification of the instincts.

There is one further distinctive indication that has served as a basis for their classification, namely their energic aspect, which exhibits certain peculiarities. The establishment of the pleasure principle in its earlier form, to take an example, was based upon observed data ; but it owed its real importance to the fact that it was a general principle and one set up by definition, in the same kind of way as certain working hypotheses which have proved so fruitful in mathematics. In the later form given to it by the theory of regulative principles, however, the notion of increase and decrease of tension is

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[40] Saussure (*op. cit.*) has tried to group the instincts according to the mechanisms which they set in motion or obey.

hampered by the terms ' life instinct ' and ' death instinct ' which have become attached to it. These terms, being qualitative in nature, upset the scheme founded upon energic data ; and the classification which rests upon an energic basis no longer corresponds to the facts when it is employed in a ' qualitative ' system.

But applicability to fact is the sole test of the value of a working hypothesis such as an attempted classification of the instincts. Let me give a few instances in which fact and theory seem to be hopelessly at variance with each other. Nunberg and Bibring [41] mention the need for sleep and rest as an example of the Nirvana principle, which is an expression of the death instinct. But rest and recreative sleep are precisely characteristic of the forces ' in the service ' of life. And we come across similar contradictions when we apply energic concepts of increases and decreases of tension to sexual and aggressive behaviour. A familiar instance of such a contradiction is seen between the decrease of tension following upon sexual gratification and the attribution of that decrease to the death instinct. And here is another instance which has not, I believe, been noticed before. It is characteristic of hatred or aggressiveness to seek to *increase* its determinants and the tension which it represents, in precisely the same way as sexual desire seeks whatever will feed and augment its tension.

No doubt we could at a pinch describe these facts in terms of the theory of the death instincts ; but we could only do this by making our concept of instinct so different from what it was in Freud's first works on the subject that it would be a question of choosing between one concept and the other—between instinct as a tension of energy acting upon the mind and instinct as a ' something ' which governs life and death themselves.[42] These two concepts are radically different and absolutely incompatible. An attempt has been made to meet the difficulty by calling the first ' instincts ' and the second ' primary instincts '. This terminological distinction seems to me inadequate, since instincts are, as we know, derived from primary instincts. I think that the word ' instinct ' ought to be reserved exclusively for the concept which was formulated by Freud in his old theory and to which we have attempted in these pages to add a contribution from a biological and a methodological standpoint ; and that the term ' primary instinct ' could be with advantage replaced by some other term such as ' the

[41] Nunberg, *op. cit.*, S. 35 and 63 ; Bibring, *op. cit.*, S. 175.

[42] Bibring, *op. cit.*, S. 172.

general trend of living matter '. An alteration of this kind in our nomenclature would make it possible for us to undertake a classification of our theoretical hypotheses and would prevent us from falling into certain unnecessary errors.

This conception of vital instincts of self-preservation, or somatic instincts, which I should like to re-introduce into psycho-analytical theory, may lead to certain misunderstandings, although I have done my best to avoid them. I shall therefore endeavour to state my meaning still more clearly upon one point.[43] This is the possibility of a confusion between man's vital self-preservative instincts and his so-called ' instinct of self-preservation '. Psycho-analysis has taught us to examine the sexual instinct irrespectively of the idea of the preservation of the species. Sexual phenomena may or may not subserve the species. In psychology that is not as important a consideration as the discovery of the various sexual forces which are at work and of their influences upon the human mind. The same is true of the instincts of self-preservation. As we all know, the individual sets in motion certain forces which enable him to escape dangers or defend himself against them, to feed himself and even to impose his will upon others and dominate them. Obviously there is no question here, as is sometimes supposed, of an unfailing and automatic reaction. But it is this latter notion which comes to the fore in the term ' instinct of self-preservation '. What interests psychologists is not so much whether such a reaction benefits the individual or not (and, incidentally, self-preservative reactions are clearly often quite unnecessary and sometimes even harmful to him), as the existence in him of certain forces which determine his actions and behaviour and whose aim it is to nourish him, to remove or defend him from danger and to give him power over others. These forces can be called, for want of a better name, ' vital instincts of self-preservation ', or, in conformity with their biological source, ' somatic instincts '. And among these forces may be reckoned, in view of their origin, the aggressive instincts.

These are the forces, too, which are often called ' ego-reactions ' but which, in my opinion, emanate from the id just as much as do the sexual forces. Let me give an illustration of what I mean. In infants the reflex movement of the eye-lid is put into operation by the approach

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[43] In doing so I am following a suggestion made to me by Dr. Hartmann.

of an object. Simply to attribute this reflex action to the instinct of self-preservation is hardly of much help to the psychologist ; but if we say that the reflex action has been set in motion by forces which we call self-preservative or somatic, we may be providing the starting point for a psychological investigation. As Hartmann once very truly said to me in the course of a discussion on the subject, what is of immediate interest to psycho-analysis is not so much the biological problem of the preservation of the self or the species, etc., as the problem of what forces are at work, from a genetic and descriptive point of view, in any given manifestation of the human mind. Discovering, as psycho-analysis seeks to do, the ontogenesis of a play of forces of this kind is not the same thing as answering the biological question as to what category of life function those forces subserve.

Thus, for instance, when in analysis we talk of aggression we are examining certain forces. If we ascribe those forces to the death instincts we are giving a genetic extrapolation to a theory ; if we ascribe them to the somatic instincts we are doing the same thing. But in my view the theory of the death instincts is a much less well-established theory and much more remote from the facts than the other.

The ultimate reason why psycho-analysts have a preference for a dualistic theory of the instincts is because they feel compelled to trace back pathogenic conflicts—that fundamental fact of the human mind —to a conflict between the essential needs of man, between his main instincts. Fenichel has pointed out quite correctly that though Freud's earlier theory did not achieve this purpose, his later one, the theory of the death instincts, did so even less.

The aim of this paper has been to clear up a certain number of terminological obscurities and to endeavour to give the old theory a new value by making a distinction between sexual and somatic instincts. For this purpose some hitherto neglected points of view have been put forward. For it is my belief that, looked upon in this new light, that theory is the better adapted of the two to provide a frame-work for the observed data of psycho-analysis.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF FETISHISM [1]

BY

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The clinical material upon which this paper is based is derived from an analysis which was interrupted by the War. I had hoped to have collected more material and reached more definite conclusions, but there is nothing to be gained now by postponement. In view of the paucity of cases recorded in the analytical literature, publication of my incomplete findings seems justified.

It is not my intention to deal with the literature of fetishism. It is not very extensive on the analytical side ; and on the non-analytical side, although extensive, it is not very illuminating. Freud has expressed his fundamental contributions to the subject with great lucidity, and there is no doubt to my mind that they provide us with the most important line of approach. But I feel sure that he did not mean to suggest that the last word had been said on the matter. Further additions of great value have in fact been made, notably by Sylvia Payne. I should like to thank her both for the help she gave me in the early stages of the analysis and for her very stimulating recent paper on the subject.[2]

It will be remembered that Dr. Payne laid special emphasis on the pregenital components determining fetishism, and on the importance of introjection-projection mechanisms. She said : ' In my opinion the fetish saves the individual from a perverse form of sexuality. The component impulse which would prevail if not placed under special control is the sadistic impulse ' (p. 169). The aim, she said, is to kill the love object. Ample confirmation of these views is to be found in the analysis of my own case.

This brings me to what I conceive to be the crux of the problem of fetishism at the present time, and I want to present it in as lucid a manner as possible, at the risk of appearing elementary and obvious. The problem may be stated thus : Is fetishism primarily a product of castration anxiety, to be related almost exclusively to the phallic phase, and concerned to maintain the existence of a female penis ;

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[1] Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, February 7, 1940.

[2] S. M. Payne, ' Some Observations on the Ego Development of the Fetishist ', this JOURNAL, Vol. XX, 1939.

or does the main dynamic force really come from more primitive levels, which undeniably contribute to give its ultimate form to the fetish ?

Although Freud was the first to draw attention to the scopophilic and coprophilic components in fetishism, he made it quite clear that he regarded it primarily as a method of dealing with castration anxiety and preserving a belief in the phallic mother. At the same time, he says, it saves the patient from the necessity of becoming homosexual, by endowing the woman with the character that makes her tolerable as a sexual object. He admitted that he was unable to say why the castration fear resulting from the sight of the female genital causes some to become homosexual, others fetishists, while the great majority overcome the experience. For the present, he says, we must be content to explain what occurs rather than what does not occur. But this lack of specificity in our ætiology is one of the problems of which we are becoming more and more conscious, and the time seems to have arrived when we must attempt to answer these more searching questions.

According to Freud's conception, then, the castration complex is the alpha and omega of fetishism. I think it would be fair to say that Sylvia Payne's paper, while by no means neglecting the importance of castration anxiety, tended to emphasize the mental mechanisms and psychic layers which the work of Melanie Klein and her followers has brought so much into the foreground of our discussions in recent years.

The fact that my own observations are based on one case only tends to invalidate any generalizations one might be tempted to make ; for clearly it is difficult to be sure which facts are typical of fetishism and which are peculiar to the particular patient, and perhaps have little relation to fetishism as such. But as any one worker is unlikely to have the opportunity of analysing a large number of fetishists, it would seem that the only way we can tackle the problem is by a pooling of our experiences, and the tentative conclusions derived from the study of one case may therefore be of some value. Even though I am thus limited to one case, it will not be possible for me to give anything like a complete case history. The analysis was a fairly lengthy one, covering a period of nearly three years, and the material produced was at all times profuse ; often indeed embarrassingly so.

I propose, therefore, after giving a brief general sketch of the case for purposes of orientation, to concentrate on one particular facet, corresponding approximately to one phase of the analysis. This facet is one which, so far as I know, has not hitherto received much attention from analysts. I refer to the patient's struggles and difficulties in

endeavouring to achieve a full genital potent relationship with a heterosexual love object. That is to say, I propose to examine the problem from the other end, as it were: instead of discussing what makes the patient a fetishist, to consider what kind of difficulties stand in the way of his normal sexual development. It is clear that these difficulties will throw a great deal of light on the factors responsible for fetishism.

The patient, whom I shall call A., when he came to me near the end of 1936, was a young man on the eve of his twenty-first birthday. He had already had a period of some eighteen months analysis with Dr. Eder, towards whom he had developed a very emotional, superficially positive transference. The analysis had been undertaken at his parents' request on account of his masturbatory activities, which were of a fetishistic nature. It had been abruptly cut short by Dr. Eder's death in the spring of 1936. This event had at the time only a superficial effect; but by the time he came to me some eight months later, a very severe reaction taking the form of a hypochondriacal depression had developed, and it was on account of this condition that he was referred to me.

When A., the third and last child, was born in 1916, his father was serving in the War. Hence A. saw little of him until the age of three, and this fact played no small rôle in his psychological development. His parents were again separated when he was twelve; this time it was his mother who went away for a period of about a year to join his older brother in Canada. Such a separation of the parents seems to be a not uncommon finding in fetishism, though I must confess that I am not clear what is its exact ætiological rôle, if any. Younger than the brother, but several years older than A., there was a sister.

A. was fed exclusively on the bottle, a fact with which he was fond of reproaching his mother. According to his account, hers is much the more dominant personality of the two parents. She is a very dynamic woman, much interested in intellectual matters, and for this A. greatly admired her, though analysis revealed underneath this admiration a deep reproach for her lack of a more flesh and blood relationship with him—a relationship which would have been realized had she given him the breast. At the same time, she was vivid and active, virile and virulent, as he expressed it. The father, on the other hand, according to A.'s account, was much more passive and placid. In this way it was possible for A. to become very confused as to the differences

between the sexes. Typically, the thing was worked out on the mental rather than the bodily plane. This tendency to intellectualization is a very characteristic feature in my patient. On the one hand it depends on an identification with the mother and a taking over of her attitude ; but much more important from the dynamic point of view, I think, is its value as a defence mechanism against bodily anxieties. In fact, I came to realize that his intellectualization plays a rôle similar to his fetishism in combating castration and related anxieties. Intellect is something which a woman can have equally with a man ; so that if one concentrates on intellect one can deny the fateful anatomical difference. Similarly, by taking activity as the criterion of maleness, he could demonstrate to his own satisfaction that the female was more male than the male. Besides castration anxiety, however, another very important motive unconsciously underlying the production of this theory was the need to convince himself that the mother was strong enough to be safe against the danger of his own (and also his father's) sadistic attacks, so that she could survive them and still be there at the end of it all. Here again there is a very close connection with the fetish ; if anything was established with certainty about this it was that the fetish serves to protect the loved object from the dangers inherent in the fetishist's sadistic love with its annihilating tendency.

I cannot enter into a detailed life history of this patient, but I must say a word about the development of his fetishism. Apart altogether from reconstructions, it seems first to have become recognizable in the form of a fascinated interest in schoolboys wearing O.T.C. uniforms, at the age of ten or eleven. This interest was felt to be an unhallowed and forbidden one, ostensibly on account of his mother's strongly pacifist views ; and indeed he had had the same feeling at a much earlier age about playing with toy soldiers, an activity which was not forbidden but one nevertheless of which he felt his mother disapproved. A very interesting light was thrown on this when he had a dream about a house with a dark attic, like a lavatory, in which he and his brother found boxes containing amber stones, and later, rifles. They feared an attack by a little miniature man, who was a murderer. There were many other details and associations to this dream, but the point for my present purpose is that after I had interpreted ' attic ' as ' attack ' A. recalled that at the age of eight he remembered seeing an old uniform of his father's in an attic, and his mother saying : ' Take that horrid old uniform

away!' In view of her attachment to the uniformed father during the War, A. seems always to have felt that her attitude towards uniforms and military things was a hypocritical one. The uniform here obviously stands for the father, and it is interesting in connection with the coprophilic significance of the fetish that A. on several occasions likened his mother's attachment to his father to a woman who likes a scent which you can't bear; but she makes such a fuss about not having it that at last for the sake of peace you say: 'Have your beastly scent!'

Beginning about the age of twelve, there developed a great conflict over the possibility of A. himself joining the O.T.C. The conscious attitude was one of horror at the idea and fear that he would be forced to join; and this was rationalized on the basis of pacifism; but unconsciously the determining phantasies were not so much purely aggressive ones as homosexual-sadistic. Being made a soldier meant being made into a woman, paradoxical though it may sound; or perhaps more accurately, being made into a suitable object for the sadistic sexual attentions of the father. The utmost horror was produced when his father actually suggested that it might not be a bad thing for him to join. This found its expression in the transference during a period when he was continually under the compulsion to ask whether I had ever been in an O.T.C.

A. managed to avoid joining the O.T.C., but he compromised by joining the scouts. One day he dressed himself in his scout uniform and tied himself up, but he did not know what to do next; this was at the age of thirteen or fourteen. The idea of tying up had been anticipated at much earlier ages, when he had tied up dolls and also a dog, tying its legs to the legs of a step-ladder and thus stretching them apart.

An emission was consciously produced for the first time at the age of seventeen, when he dressed himself in a black mackintosh and chained himself to a wardrobe. The result was a surprise to him. This experiment led on to more and more complicated and sadistically designed ones, with the use of wires, tight gagging, tying himself up in a sack, etc. He was just beginning to play with the idea of hanging and complete annihilation at the time when he was sent to Dr. Eder for analysis. The further development of the fetishism consisted of various elaborations of similar themes—women, but also occasionally boys, in different varieties of uniform or mackintoshes, and latterly almost exclusively nurses in uniform. There was of course always a

phantasy of a sado-masochistic kind woven round these figures; most commonly of an older woman humiliating and punishing a younger one. During the course of his analysis with Dr. Eder he modified his technique by embodying his phantasies in drawings rather than carrying them out on his own person, though this also continued to some extent. This modification served several purposes —it made it possible for him to bring his masturbation into the analysis, as it were; it represented at a much more unconscious level an invitation to the analyst to treat him as the figures in the drawings were treated; and it also served the purpose of a further line of defence against the anxieties connected with his destructive phantasies—the fact that it was mere drawings that he was dealing with was a reassurance that it was neither his real parents nor himself that were being treated in this way.

When he came to me for treatment, A. was, as I have mentioned, in a very depressed and hypochondriacal state. This was closely connected with the death of Dr. Eder. The hypochondria proved very refractory and continued through a large part of the analysis. Time does not permit me to go into it in any detail, but I should like to make a few remarks about it.

While introjective phantasies were obvious and were interpreted from the outset, it became more and more clear that a very important function of the hypochondriacal complaints was their use as a sadistic weapon against the parents, whom in fact he often reduced to a state of despair verging on breakdown. He used it particularly to disturb them at night. This activity often took the form of demanding that his father should examine him and find something, for example a positive Babinski. Although this 'something' that had to be found was ostensibly of a bad nature, it was evidently not entirely so, and in fact he often used terms of rather ecstatic admiration about his symptoms. They represented both a penis and a baby. His abdominal pains were labour pains, while his two legs with their twitchings and inequality stood for the two parents in intercourse. I want to make it clear that I am not discounting the importance of the introjective mechanisms that were at work, which were very clear at times, as when he said that he felt his body was fragile, like china, and full of blocks of dead things. All I am suggesting is that in a case of hypochondria of this type, introjection is not the whole story, and that interpretation would be inadequate which left out of account the phantasies derived from the phallic level. I have felt for a long time that there are at

least two types of hypochondria, the hysterical and the psychotic. I should regard this case as belonging to the hysterical group.

I should have mentioned earlier that A. was a medical student and when he came to me was just beginning his clinical studies. He was therefore able to elaborate his hypochondriacal ideas with a great wealth of detail, while at the same time he was not embarrassed by too exact a knowledge of clinical and pathological facts. Thus, his ideas about inequality of his legs, to which I have referred, were related to the idea of disseminated sclerosis, to which he clung for a long period. A similar fear was that of secondary carcinoma. In both cases the notion of an infinite and increasing number of bad things disseminated inside was of importance, and this was connected with fears about robbing his mother's inside and the difficulty of putting everything back in order. These phantasies came out in a large number of dreams, which led up to the dream of the attic. The principal object inside the mother towards which these attacks were directed turned out to be the father's penis, and the attacks were chiefly of an oral-sadistic kind. But I think it is a significant fact that it was just the penis against which they were directed. These phantasies were closely related to homosexual ones about sadistic attacks on his own inside by his father's penis, as in a dream about letting a man into the house, knowing the man was going to murder him. This theme appeared also in inverted form in the idea of a woman enticing a penis or a person inside with the object of destroying it there. At the same time he unconsciously regarded his own penis as a kind of breast, much sought after by women, whom he could nourish or frustrate at will, the latter being much the more exciting phantasy.

This combination of the phallic and the oral found a pretty expression in a hypochondriacal preoccupation with his tongue which A. developed later. This symptom was connected not only with phantasies about the hidden female penis but also with oral sadistic phantasies. There were also anal elements—the tongue was dirty. I have to admit, indeed, that the picture I have given so far is misleading in that I have failed to bring out the quite prominent anal and urethral features of the case. They were very obvious and I could say a great deal about them if space allowed; but rightly or wrongly I had the impression that they were of less fundamental importance, probably because they did not lend themselves so readily to assimilation with the rest of the material. Thus it is quite possible

that I have unduly neglected them ; but if so it was not for want of seeing them, for they were manifest on the surface. In connection with the anal material, however, just as with the oral, a close association with phantasies from the phallic level was not far to seek, in as much as the fæces nearly always represented a baby and were connected with a passive homosexual attitude to the father.

All this anal, urethral, and oral material linked up in an intimate way with the mackintosh fetish, for the mackintosh served as a protection for the mother against such assaults. Not only so ; it also seemed to stand for the period of milk feeding, the rubber of the mackintosh being a substitute for the rubber teat. The fetish may thus be regarded, in Freud's phrase, as a memorial not only to castration fear but also to the trauma of weaning.

I pass on now to the other main aspect of the case which I wish to discuss : that is, to the difficulties A. encountered in his efforts to achieve a normal genital relationship. These difficulties may be for convenience divided into two groups : first a series of abortive and relatively short-lived attachments, with which I shall deal quite briefly, and secondly a love affair which occupied the whole of the last year of the analysis, and which still continues.

There do not seem to have been any really early attachments to girls. Up to near the time when his first analysis started, he was occupied principally with what he called the prince and princess phantasy, in which the prince represented himself. The main theme of this phantasy was misunderstanding, resulting in a quarrel and the separation of the prince and princess. This was the climax of the phantasy, and the subsequent reconciliation was relatively devoid of affect. These phantasies started at the age of twelve, at a time when he had been left in a boarding school while his parents made a new home in London—an unhappy period which is associated in his mind with being forced into unpleasant and uncomfortable clothes, such as an Eton jacket and collar ; it left its mark on his masturbation phantasies.

A. translated this phantasy almost word for word into reality in the course of his first attachment, which began about the age of eighteen. He seems to have chosen his partner with almost uncanny skill, and she played her frigid part to perfection. There were constant misunderstandings and quarrels, and she would allow no caress or show of affection, even in words. This type of relationship afforded A. so much satisfaction that he continued it over a long period until

it reached the final conclusion of separation that was inherent in it. It is really inaccurate to say that it continued so long because of the satisfaction it afforded ; it would be truer to say that he clung to this relationship because it gave him just the safeguards he needed ; and one of the chief of these safeguards was just that he should not achieve satisfaction but on the contrary should be frustrated. This is a point to which I shall return later when discussing the last girl. I believe it may almost be described as the keynote of fetishism.

The next girl was semi-Asiatic, and the anal note was dominant. She did in the end come to mean to him merely fæces and he finally expelled her with real relish after having come into conflict with her father. He felt he had killed her by this expulsion, but so far from being troubled with guilt about this, his feeling was one of annoyance when she gave signs of further life.

There followed a fellow medical student, but this attachment never proceeded far. Its end was interesting. He began one hour by saying that he felt marvellously better. Someone had told him that a lady had been ringing for him. At once he thought it was this girl, was overcome with emotion and had a mass peristalsis, as he put it. He then described his latest masturbation. The picture consisted of a nurse in frock and collar but without apron, cuffs or belt ; there was also a fully-dressed nurse and a sister with flowing cap. This phantasy arose out of his excitement in seeing a nurse dressing at a window. It turned out that actually she was undressing, and this was a big disappointment, for the real excitement was in seeing the uniform put on, and the full phantasy would have been of a woman in a beautiful evening dress or nightdress being metamorphosed into a nurse in uniform. Here again we get the theme of satisfaction dependent on frustration, or rather a sort of partial frustration, for while the nurse is not the mother, still in phantasy she is the mother in disguise.

A. then told me that a friend to whom he had confided his passion said : ' Oh yes, she's quite a nice girl, but she does have such a B.O.' All the other men agreed that the girl smelt. It was only then that A. realized that he had known it all along, but didn't mind. The realization that everyone thought this was a tremendous relief. It meant that a pretty girl could smell bad, that fæces could be good. I suggested that another factor in his feeling of relief was due to the consideration that no one would grudge him his girl or try to take her away —for the theme of having his love object taken away was always very strong and prominent in the transference, though in fact the result was

generally engineered by himself. The following day he remarked casually that he had lost interest in this girl—so that again the girl became fæces, and as soon as he was conscious of this it was all over.

It was only three days later that he began to talk of a nurse he was working with who attracted him. He felt he wanted her to be in ordinary clothes and that all the details of uniform, collar stud, etc., which so excited him in his phantasies, repelled and sickened him in her. At the same time, he was continually getting erections when with her, a thing that had never before happened to him by reason of a girl's company. He said that in addition to all the agony from his symptoms there was excitement as well and a feeling of new possibilities in life.

A few days later A. took this nurse, whom I shall call B., to the pictures. He was not to have come to analysis the next day, but he rang up and made a special appointment, because, as he said, he had had such an experience last night as never before. B. was very friendly and cuddly and put her head on his arm. She was so warm, it really got ridiculous and he wanted to laugh. He felt uneasy because her conduct was so unrestrained. In brief, he had managed to get a girl who was warm instead of cold, because she satisfied his ascetic requirements through being a nurse, who was literally constrained by her uniform as well as her discipline. At this time his mother was in hospital, and he felt that she must be got rid of by death in order for him to have B. Later, following a reassuring visit to his mother and the realization that she was not to be castrated or to die, he became depressed, feeling he had no love left for B., for he now felt he had the penis and no longer that she had something he had not. There was a constant recurrence of this anxiety lest he find B. empty and lose all love for her. What he liked most about her and what gave him most confidence was feeling that she was physically strong and so able to withstand his aggression ; and on the other hand her warmth and responsiveness most roused his anxiety. He felt that if he was not thwarted and got all he wanted there would be nothing left. Here again we find this apotheosis of frustration which seems to me so characteristic of fetishism, and which brings it into such close relation to masochism. It results in many of the fetishist's aims being so to speak inverted, as I see it. For instance, his scopophilia is satisfied not by seeing the naked body, which repels him, but rather by the clothes which serve to conceal it and frustrate the primary impulse. For the pleasure in free bodily movement and the sadistic use of the

musculature there is substituted pleasure in bonds and tight lacing. Manual masturbation is taboo, in the sense that it seems not to occur to him as a possibility ; on the contrary, the hands are generally tied. It is therefore no surprise to find that the straightforward genital relationship is also intolerable. It appears to him as something disgusting and dangerous. The underlying phantasies were undoubtedly numerous and complicated, and they aroused powerful resistances which made this perhaps the most difficult part of the analysis. I must content myself with saying that they related chiefly to castration and to incorporation, and more specifically to incorporation by the woman involving castration of the man. Anal features were so strongly interwoven that it appeared likely that an important feature of the operative phantasy consisted of anal incorporation.

Homosexual phantasies, often quite conscious, were always in evidence. One of his first dreams about B. was actually of this nature, representing her as taking the active rôle in anal intercourse with him and causing him to produce a dirty baby.

Another important aspect of his relation to her may be expressed by saying that it was an oral relation to the father's penis. This equation of B. with the penis came out in the most interesting way in connection with one of the masturbation drawings, which represented a cross with the figure of Christ on it. Another cross was marked on the ground, and B. was kneeling on this cross, tied up, and gazing at the crucifix. When A. gave me this drawing, the first thing I noticed was a remarkable hiatus in the figure of Christ, involving all that part in the vicinity of the genitals. The second point was that B.'s position on the other cross corresponded very closely to this gap, so that she appeared to represent a huge erect penis. The conscious idea was that B. was doing penance for having come to A. It appeared from the analysis of this drawing that the sexual object of the phantasy was not just the father's penis, but really the penis plus the mother, or the mother with the father's penis.

There were a number of phantasies of attacks on the interior of the mother's body with a view to finding the penis ; and it was clear that these phantasies were motivated only partially by castration anxiety —another important factor was the phantasy of the penis as a source of food. At about this period, A. spontaneously underwent a period of abstinence from masturbation for the benefit of the analysis. This led to great excitement during several of the analytic sessions, excitement felt largely in the mouth, and combined with phantasies of

nurses in white, stiff, crackly uniform, and so on. The mackintosh was felt to be a protection against the dangers to the object inherent in these phantasies of oral aggression. Unless the woman was protected in this way, he felt unable to imagine a breast except for eating, a vagina except to be ripped open, a woman's neck except to strangle her.

There is another leading feature of this case which I have not sufficiently emphasized, and that is the strong tendency towards the mechanism of the turning of the impulse against the self. This was most conspicuous throughout. Thus, though A. always referred to his phantasies as sadistic ones, they were at least as obviously masochistic, since he was clearly identified with the victim. The same thing applies to the uniform or mackintosh : it is not merely a covering and protection for the sexual object, it also serves the same purpose for himself. Perhaps the climax of all these phantasies as regards intensity of feeling was one which he had in the analysis during the period of abstinence ; essentially it represented himself as a child in a grown-up mackintosh being copulated with in the most marvellous way by his father. A further elaboration of this phantasy was that when in the mackintosh he is really inside his mother's body and is identified with her, and that in this way his father indirectly copulates with him.

He said that the mackintosh is like a wall surrounding a town so that you can't see out. This wall is rotten at its base. He associated to this the idea of a penis dropping off, and fæces. He then had a picture of the anus and genitals, all very dark and shadowy. I interpreted that the rottenness at the base of the wall referred to the possibility of seeing up from underneath—there was much confirmatory material pointing in this direction. A. confirmed this by observing that the mackintosh must be completely buttoned up so that no clothes are visible and it is possible to imagine the body naked underneath, and also by the excitement he obtains by putting on the mackintosh over his naked body. This aspect of the matter is closely in line with Freud's theory about foot fetishism.

As the affair with B. continued, A.'s anxieties relating to his oral and phallic aggression became more acute. He felt that kissing her meant eating her up and feared her excessive kissing. He had by this time become intensely attracted by the idea of the naked female body. He had what he described as terrible erections, but said he ' couldn't press the point '. At last he bought a condom, but was much relieved at B.'s refusal of intercourse. He tried to escape from the situation by excessive masturbation.

One of his deepest fears was of eating up and destroying his object in attempting to gain exclusive possession of it. There was also all along a strong reluctance to commit himself to any love object that was outside or separable from himself. The fetish helped him to avoid the dangers of being dependent on a woman—the danger first of the woman refusing, and secondly, of external forces taking her away. It appeared that the external force was not necessarily the father, but might be the mother herself, the ' woman ' in this case being not the mother as a whole object, but her breast as a part-object. Owing to these fears, for him a goal attained was no satisfaction, but only the struggle for it ; he said : ' It is like following the sun ; you can never reach it, and if you did you would be burnt up.' For him, the *conditio sine qua non* for excitement was inaccessibility.

After some work on this material, A. made two or three abortive attempts at intercourse, but was unable to get or keep an erection at the appropriate moment, in spite of attempts to stimulate himself by phantasy. Once he said he didn't want to get inside B., and proceeded to bite his finger. This led him on to say that a woman in uniform results in masturbation and orgasm ; a woman not in uniform has a quite different effect—she makes his mouth water, his teeth gnash, and he wants to eat her up.

Since the analysis was interrupted, his potency has steadily increased, though the old phantasies have not entirely disappeared.

It is impossible in the space at my disposal to give any more clinical material or to touch on the many other interesting sides of the case, and I must now try briefly to sum up the points which seem to me to emerge.

First, this case once again proves abundantly the over-determination of the fetish. I think it also demonstrates beyond doubt the far-reaching importance of castration anxiety in this connection. Ample confirmation is provided also for Dr. Payne's findings regarding the importance of sadism and of introjection-projection mechanisms.

Here, however, I should like to raise a point which has only to be mentioned to be obvious, and yet I feel it is sometimes neglected : the point namely that introjection need not be an essentially oral process, though I should imagine there must always be what one might describe as an oral flavour about it. Thus, I found again and again in this case that what appeared on the surface to be phantasies based on oral incorporative tendencies turned out to be on another level phantasies

regarding phallic penetration, impregnation, etc. This is all so obvious that I feel ashamed to point it out ; but I am not sure that it always gets the attention it deserves. There is a tendency, I think, to feel that the oral aspect is ' deeper ' and therefore more important, which means presumably more active dynamically in the particular state we are dealing with ; but this is surely by no means axiomatic. Although it is difficult to be sure of one's objectivity in judging such matters, I certainly gained the impression that the superficially obvious oral and anal features were often used as a disguise for more important underlying phallic anxieties ; and yet I would not regard them as a mere disguise—I think they must have considerable significance in their own right. In other words, the fact that the disguise takes that particular form is by no means a matter of chance, but must be intimately connected with the nature of the phantasies that are being repressed and constitute in fact a kind of ' return of the repressed '.

That brings me to a second point which I feel is not only of theoretical but also of practical importance ; I mean the problem of what factors are chiefly responsible for the occurrence of castration anxiety. Are we to regard it as the talion punishment for incestuous phallic wishes directed towards the mother, as Freud appears for the most part to do ? It seemed clear to me, in this case at least, that one very important determinant is to be found in the oral aggressive impulses directed towards the father's penis incorporated in the mother. And yet it is castration anxiety that we are dealing with, not the trauma of weaning or something of that sort. If the oral and anal elements were the essential ones, it would be very difficult to account for the well-known clinical fact that fetishism is a phenomenon found almost exclusively in males.

I would stress the essential part played by masochism, and what I have referred to as the inversion of the sexual aim, for want of a better term. By this I mean that the aim of the component impulse seems to be frustration rather than satisfaction, and indeed a rather unsatisfactory kind of satisfaction is derived from frustration. Obviously this is closely related to masochism, if indeed it can be distinguished from it.

The homosexual element is also much in evidence in this case, which illustrates admirably Freud's statement that the patient is saved by his fetish from homosexuality, and it shows how narrow may be the margin.

Finally, reverting to the problem of phallic *versus* pregenital, I

should like to make the following suggestion with regard to the ætiology of fetishism. May it not be that what we have actually to deal with is neither the one thing nor the other, but a combination of the two? I do not simply mean that I want to have it both ways—what I am suggesting is a specific constellation, to use Dr. Glover's conception. I do feel that there are points about this case which give strong support to this view; in particular, the extraordinary compound (for it is much more than a mere mixture) of phallic, oral and anal aggressive and erotic phantasies.

To put it in another way, I would suggest that fetishism is the result of castration anxiety, but of a specific form of castration anxiety, a form produced by a strong admixture of certain oral and anal trends.

ON THE 'LONGING TO DIE'[1]

BY

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Considering that attempts at suicide are not uncommon during analysis and that they represent a very serious complication, it is rather astonishing that the literature on the subject is not more extensive. I am therefore venturing in the present paper to describe the suicidal mechanism of a single case. I do this only because I am of the opinion that this particular mechanism is not uncommon and often actually results in suicide.

In psycho-analytical literature we find at least two ways of approach to the problem of suicide.

The one, which I shall do no more than mention as it has no actual bearing on the problem which I want to discuss here, is the psycho-analytical interpretation of statistics (19), taking into account different cultures and different circumstances. We know that in certain cultures suicide is considered to be a respectable act and that therefore suicide is not necessarily a sign of illness and we also know that in certain circumstances the number of suicides may suddenly increase and include otherwise healthy people. These considerations have not necessarily any bearing on the mechanism of the suicidal act. The fact that in certain circumstances normal people may commit suicide does not exclude the possibility that under these special conditions mechanisms come into play which in normal circumstances are only to be found in neurotic people.

In order to find out what particular mechanism is involved one has to study the mechanism in any given case, and this is the second way of approach to the problem.

The question which I want to examine is whether the melancholic type of suicide is the basis for every suicide committed or whether there are cases or perhaps a whole group of cases in which other mechanisms are the basis for suicide or attempts at suicide.

Before the publication of 'Mourning and Melancholia' (7) it was assumed that various libidinal impulses may lead to suicide. Ernest Jones (14, 15) emphasized that apart from coprophilic, sadistic and

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[1] Read before the Fifteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Paris, 1938.

incestuous tendencies, certain libidinal phantasies, concerning for instance the anal conception of childbirth, may be acted out in the love-condition of dying together. Jones furthermore expressed the opinion that 'the idea of personal death does not exist for the unconscious, being always replaced by that of sexual communion or of birth'. The question of suicide was also discussed in Vienna in 1910 (25, 5). Various libidinal factors, such as disappointment in love, feelings of guilt, a desire to be punished or revenge, were stated to lead to suicide. Sadger (20) expressed the current opinion very well when he said: 'Nobody will kill himself who has not entirely given up the hope of being loved.' Freud (9) ended the discussion by stating that the main problem had not been solved, namely, what makes it possible for the very strong impulse of self-preservation to be overcome. He was then in doubt whether libidinal disappointment alone would be sufficient to overcome the instinct to live or whether the ego can resign itself out of ego-motives. Freud (7) solved the question two years later in his paper 'Mourning and Melancholia'. The melancholiac who either in reality or in phantasy has suffered the loss of a beloved object is unable to free his libido from the object and its associations. Owing to the prevalent type of narcissistic object-choice, the lost object of the melancholiac becomes introjected. Furthermore, in melancholia regression has taken place to the oral-sadistic phase, so that ambivalence, and with it sadism, are pronounced. The aggression directed against the original object becomes directed against the individual's self or rather against the introjected object. Owing to the severity of the super-ego, in which destructive impulses are prevalent, the patient is forced to destroy himself.

This explanation solved a number of hitherto obscure problems and for years no further advance was made beyond confirmation of the validity of this mode of suicide. Apparently until recently it was assumed that every suicidal act, whether it happens in a melancholic or in a neurotic case, even in hysteria, is based on the same mechanism of aggressions directed against the individual's self and the prevalence of destructive impulses over libidinal ones (2, 3, 4, 13, 17).

In recent years the question has sometimes arisen whether mechanisms other than the melancholic ones may also be responsible for certain types of suicide. Garma (12) stresses the importance of the variable significance of the conception of death in suicide and gives a very valuable scheme in which the libidinal factors involved in suicide are clearly shown. M. Schmideberg (21) emphasizes the importance

of libidinal factors and maintains that it is very often ' not the " death instinct " which drives a person to suicide, but strong emotional disturbances—especially anxiety—which interfere with the self-preserving instinct.' It is not quite clear to me whether she believes that in a melancholic case there is also no genuine wish for death, or whether she means that suicidal mechanisms can be different in different cases. No attempt is made to classify the mechanisms in different cases but the various libidinal impulses which may drive to suicide or to substitutes for suicide are explained.

Zilboorg (24) doubts whether all motivations for suicide are to be explained by the classical formula and describes one mechanism which seems to him to be different and for which he finds parallels in the rites of primitive people : namely, the compulsion to become identified with a dead person who has died before the mechanism of identification is completed. Zilboorg's idea is apparently that apart from the classical melancholic type of suicide there is at least this other type in which the active impulse to die is based on a libidinal impulse.

A clinical classification of suicidal cases has been attempted by Federn (5, 6), who points out that there are two groups of abnormal characters found in patients who attempt or commit suicide : people who are inclined to be depressed and people with an inclination to be addicts. To these two groups belong hysterical, obsessional neurotic and neurasthenic patients or even people with no outspoken neurosis at all. To the group of the addicts belong not only really addicted people, but all people who react in the same particular way. The immediate reaction to a frustration is with this type of person an increase of tension until the tension is unbearable. The addict thinks that it is better to die than to go without the thing for which he craves. The suffering is not fictitious but real ; it leads to an increased want and death seems to be pleasurable in relieving the unbearable tension. The depression of these people is not as deep as in melancholiacs, but this type is less able to stand tension and suffering which the melancholiac at least partly enjoys. Federn (6) states that the melancholiac has to suffer from that which he has lost, whilst the addict has to suffer for that which he cannot get. Federn's idea apparently is that the reason for suicide is different in these two groups, but it is not clear to me whether he means that the suicidal mechanism is in both groups aggression directed against the individual's self. It seems to me that there is a decisive difference between the mechanisms of the two groups : the addict type wants to die because that seems to him to be

more pleasurable than to stand the tension; death is desired in accordance with the pleasure principle.

The case I am going to take has some resemblance to what Federn describes as the addict type. I want to prove that the mechanism which eventually led to the attempts at suicide was due to libidinal impulses.

The patient is a man of twenty-nine years of age in good external circumstances. During the time when the attempts at suicide happened no disturbing external event took place and the patient did not try to give rationalizations in the form of external circumstances as reason for his attempts. He has a masochistic character. The conscious conflict which drives him to attempt suicide is the following. He has a brother who is eight years his senior, and of whom he is jealous: his brother has had so many girls, probably about 200, whilst he, the patient, cannot even get one. His mother therefore respects the elder brother much more than him. He believes that his mother has the same attitude towards him as his brother has: namely, that for him it is not necessary to have a girl. It therefore does not help him just to find a girl, because his brother and his mother would only sneer at him and find the girl not attractive enough. He therefore prefers to stay ill and have no girl at all than to be healthy and be satisfied with a girl who would be inferior to his brother's friends. As he cannot get a girl, he wants to die.

I must point out that behind the Œdipus situation which expresses itself in this conflict lies an oral fixation caused by oral cravings and an oral disappointment in his mother. Hatred against mother and brother are openly expressed with phantasies about their death without any conscious feeling of guilt. The feeling of guilt is compensated by oral and anal frustrations which the patient imposes upon himself. He is extremely ascetic in his food, although he can experience pleasure from eating, and he does not allow himself to spend a penny on pleasurable things. But he gives comparatively large sums of money to a charity, which, interestingly enough, is for buying milk for poor children.

His sexual activities are somewhat limited. He has masturbated since he was fourteen, at times with homosexual and beating phantasies. Occasionally he visits prostitutes.

His first attempt at suicide was, as he called it himself, a staging of a suicide. He closed the windows and door of his room and turned on the gas stove. He had heard that on breathing in gas one becomes

drowsy and sleepy, and he intended to go on until he became drowsy and then wanted to stop it. The smell of the gas was noticed by his landlady and he had to interrupt his performance.

Some time later he began to be interested in veronal, as he had heard that it was a drug which could induce sleep without bad after-effects. He studied the action and dosage of the drug carefully from books on pharmacology. He then bought a large amount of it in France, where he could get it cheap and without a prescription. He had read that 40–50 grs., that is 3–4 grm., was the lethal dose. One day he took 28 grs., that is 2 grm., in broad daylight when he was sitting in the park. He did not feel any effect from it. He then took 36 grs., that is 2·5 grm., a little less than what he considered to be the lethal dose. He slept for two days with interruption and felt the after-effects for nearly a week. Some months later he again took 36 grs., that is 2·5 grm., in two doses each of six tablets. Apart from these two serious attempts, he twice took 18 grs., that is, 1·3 grm., in order to sleep over the week-end. Ordinarily he never takes any drugs at all.

The occasions on which he attempted suicide were very similar. The first attempt happened one week-end ; the two serious attempts happened at Christmas and at Easter when he would not be coming to analysis for four days. At the same time his brother was away, once on a visit to his mother who lives twelve hours' distance away, and once on a visit to a couple, where the wife was interested in his brother and the patient was slightly interested in her too. On other occasions, when the brother was away on business or I was away on holidays, he did not make any attempt and the thought of suicide did not occur to him.

The psychic situation which induces the patient to make the attempt is in every case the same. Consciously he cannot bear the thought of the time which is in front of him, each time four days, without a girl. The thought of the brother makes him furious and the only way out seems to be for him to go to sleep. He desires to sleep for four days without interruption. He has no conscious thought then that he wants to end his life by taking the drug and actually takes a little less than what is considered to be the lethal dose. He has a vague idea that afterwards everything will be perfectly all right. He has no anxiety and no doubt as to how the drug is going to act. Everything is engulfed in the craving for the drug which will make him sleep and in dwelling on how pleasurable that will be.

Analysis reveals the various mechanisms involved in this attempt at suicide :

(1) By killing himself he can take revenge on his brother, his mother and his analyst. His brother will feel guilty because he has left him alone. His mother, who in reality only cares for his bodily welfare and not for his happiness, will be terribly upset about his death. He can prove by his death to what it is that analysis really leads.

(2) He is able to satisfy his intense oral craving only if it results in death, that is, if he pays for it with his death. The mode of his attempts, namely that he takes drugs, is here significant. His description of his longing to take the drug in this particular situation is very similar to that of an addict.

(3) The act is also a phantasy that by going to sleep he becomes united with his brother as well as with his mother. Probably this union occurs by way of introjection, as various oral phantasies seem to prove.

(4) When he was very small, probably under two years of age, he used sometimes to cry helplessly for his mother to come back, until he fell asleep. When he woke up, his mother was there. This phantasy also shows clearly that what he really wants is not to die but to sleep in order to find his mother when he wakes up again. That is why it is so important to him to take a large amount of the drug and not simply two tablets morning and night. He does not wish to wake up at all during the four days before he can come to analysis again.

(5) There are various phantasies which show that he has great pleasure in imagining what his brother and mother will say when he is dead. Then they will appreciate how much he has suffered and how badly they have treated him. It is significant that at that time he did not want to have a certain amount of money in his name. In case he should commit suicide he does not want his brother and his mother to pay death duties and for that reason to be sorry about his death. He wants to be mourned because mother and brother loved him and for that reason only.

To sum up, the factors involved in this suicidal mechanism are revenge, satisfaction of his strong oral desires, and the phantasy of being saved by his loving mother. As a phantasy, these factors, which are without doubt derived from libidinal impulses only, are by no means rare ; on the contrary these elements or some of them, such as taking revenge or the wish to be saved from a dangerous situation, are

most common. But patients who very often express such suicidal phantasies may never actually attempt suicide, especially if they become conscious of their libidinal wishes.

The question which has to be solved is, therefore: What special forces are working in this case so that the phantasy is acted out in this dangerous way? In trying to solve the problem which I raised at the beginning, we have to ask the question: Are the forces which drive the man to commit suicide derived from destructive impulses? —which means: Are they aggressions directed against his own self? Does he really want to kill introjected objects or is another mechanism at work?

The patient's aggressions are openly directed against his real love objects, his brother and his mother, and are expressed in many ways. As I have mentioned before, his feelings of guilt are compensated in such a way that he is able to express his hatred against his love objects in phantasy as well as in reality. The patient has no inclination to reproach himself and he does not do so; he does not believe himself to be inferior and therefore not worthy to live. In his moods of depression he reproaches the world and especially his love objects and is waiting for them to give him what he wants. The patient is entirely fixated to his infantile objects, but not only in phantasy. His only real object-relations to-day are those with his relatives, his brother and his mother. Of course both of them have infantile traces and he does not see them as they really are. But it is not only the infantile imago of these people that exists in him; on the contrary, he is still attracted to the living persons. It is significant that he can only have a sexual relationship if his brother and mother are in another town, the further away the better. Apparently he is then able to shift some of his object libido on to other objects.

Furthermore I think it is clear that the patient's ultimate aim is not to destroy himself. He merely wants to sleep in order to wake up to a better life in which all his wishes are fulfilled. Nor does he want to destroy his brother and his mother, since before his attempt at suicide these objects are not introjected, but exist for him in the outside world. In the act of taking in the drug he introjects his beloved objects, but this introjection serves a libidinal aim, namely, union with his mother and not her destruction. Here we see some resemblance between this mechanism and the mechanism of the ecstatic suicide, in which the aim is to be united with the dead lover or with God.

So it seems to be that the force which drives the patient to act out

his phantasy is not derived from destructive impulses. To express it in a simpler way, the patient does not want to destroy himself. Actually his attempts at suicide are very pleasurable and when he comes to his analyst after such an attempt he is elated, like somebody who has achieved what he wants and not as if he has failed. If he really wanted to die he would have failed in his purpose.

Nevertheless his attempts are very serious and self-destruction might easily be the result. The astonishing fact is that, although the patient clearly does not want to die, he makes his attempts in a rather dangerous way. He takes a large amount of the drug, which might kill him, especially as he is living alone and might stay in his room for days without being missed.

The question arises why the patient does not take more precautions against dying if it is true that he does not want his attempt to succeed. And now we see the interesting fact that he does take precautions but that these precautions are not sufficient. He takes a little less than the lethal dose. If the lethal dose is 40 grs., he takes 36 grs. He leaves the window open because his mother told him once that fresh air is healthy. When he wakes up after two days he rings up either myself or his medical practitioner. These precautions seem to be and really are childish and incompatible with the high intelligence of the patient. But this strange behaviour becomes clearer if one is aware of the fact that somehow the patient has a conviction that whatever he does his mother is sure to save him. This conviction is so strong that it severely disturbs his sense of reality, and this disturbance of his sense of reality is the one factor which lets the patient act out his phantasy in such a dangerous way. Instead of facing reality he still has an infantile belief in the omnipotence of his parents. The important thing is not what he himself does but what he expects to be his mother's wish.

With this consideration the mechanism of his attempt at suicide becomes clearer; what we see here is a '*Kinderselbstmord*', the attempt at suicide of a child. In the suicidal phantasies of children the same libidinal factors are at work as we have seen in this case. If we take as an example the suicidal phantasy of Tom Sawyer which was described analytically by Schneider (22), we see that Tom and his friends want to die because they have experienced a disappointment in love. They want to take revenge and are very much interested in the mourning of the grown-ups, who will at last understand what good boys they are. The whole procedure of being alone on the island

and having the whole town looking for them is filled with a great amount of libidinal satisfaction. By means of the phantasy of death the lost love relationship is restored again: afterwards everything will be all right. The same mechanism is at the basis of the usual suicidal phantasies of children and also, as we have seen, at the basis of the phantasy of this patient. By means of his death everything will come all right again—of course he will be alive to enjoy it afterwards. Actual suicide in children before puberty is extremely rare. Probably one of the most important reasons for this is not that children do not make attempts at suicide, but that these attempts are such that they do not lead to death, because children are unable to obtain adequate means for it and also because they are looked after and prevented from doing dangerous things. The attempts at suicide made by children usually appear to be in play.

The patient whose attempts at suicide I have described acts out the suicide of a child. As he is grown up, he has adequate means at hand for committing suicide. As his sense of reality is disturbed on account of the fact that he still has an infantile belief that whatever happens his mother will save him, the precautions which he takes are inadequate. His fixation to his strong oral desires, which lead him to this particular mode of suicide, also work in the direction of making the attempts more dangerous.

In summarizing, let me state that, in this particular case, the answer to the problem I raised at the beginning is the following: the ' longing to die ' does not express the patient's wish to destroy himself, but serves as the expression of a libidinal phantasy. As mentioned above, the occurrence of such libidinal phantasies has been described by various writers, such as Jones (14, 15), Garma (12), Chadwick (4), M. Schmideberg (21), Bischler (2), Sterba (23). No attempt has so far been made to confront the recognized conception of suicide as the acting out of a libidinal phantasy with the recognized conception of suicide as a depressive mechanism. The mechanism of suicide in melancholia is such that the patient wants to destroy himself because the object with which he is at war is introjected and represented by his own super-ego. Therefore only self-destruction can serve the aim of the melancholiac. In the case which I have described, and also in children who have suicidal phantasies, the conflict lies not with the super-ego but with objects in the outside world. Therefore the aim is not self-destruction, but libidinal gratification by those objects by way of an attempt at suicide. Self-destruction may be the result in

the child because it is not yet able to judge reality and in the adult on account of a severe disturbance of his sense of reality.

In my opinion the mechanism I have described is a mechanism not only in one particular case but one which lies at the basis of quite a number of others. The importance of an attempt to classify the various mechanisms of suicide which we meet in our patients is perhaps not so much of theoretical as of clinical interest, since the attitude of the analyst to an attempt at suicide by a patient has to vary according to the mechanism which is at the basis of the given case.

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TIME AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

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Time in Childhood

Even if we disregard the case of the newly born infant in whom a sense of time does not as yet exist, the days of childhood seem to succeed one another in a world untroubled by our ideas of time. These early days—as each one of us may recall—seem very much like an eternity to the child, and this applies with even greater force to the weeks, months and years that extend into the future. Children wake from their slumbers, get up, run about, eat, play, laugh and cry in a ' time ' whose sweep is of a very different order from that of the brief, pathetic time enjoyed by adults. ' Time ' in childhood is in a way incommensurate with our own.

To be sure, the grown-ups who are responsible for the child's upbringing rigorously insist on his observing the conventions of their particular variety of time, with the sub-divisions which this entails for them. They take away his playthings at a certain hour, and fix the times at which he is to be allowed to eat, or worse still, must go to bed each evening when he would prefer to continue enjoying himself or to remain up in the company of those admired and envied persons. But in spite of this the child's inner sense of ' time ' remains unshaken until he arrives at the physiological age at which the nature of this time is destined to undergo a change ; he simply regards the attempt made by adults to impose their ' time ' upon his, still in its essence of virtually infinite duration, as an intrusion on the part of a strange and hostile world. Perhaps the vital urge which causes him to grow, as it causes the plants to grow from the soil, and which will one day impel him in his turn to transmit life to an unbroken line of descendants, is already making itself obscurely felt from the depths of his being and is to be regarded as the factor which thus informs the child's sense of ' time ' with a prescience of eternity.

It is usual to speak, and not among poets alone, of the ' paradise ' of childhood. This glorification of an age in which the little creature suffers year in year out from the tormenting knowledge that he is so small and from his ambition to grow up is rightly interpreted by Freud as an *ex post facto* idealization, largely determined by the amnesia which shrouds from each one of us the experiences and emotions of

childhood. There is nevertheless an element of truth in the popular conception. Most of us have cast over the memories we have preserved of our childhood a veil of enchantment which envelops as though in some ethereal gauze the morning of our life and suffuses with its unreal, fairy-like brilliance even the misfortunes, the sacrifices and the torments which we then endured. But over and above the idealization effected by memory, or rather by forgetfulness, this impression must owe something to the difference in the web of time upon which our life embroidered then and embroiders now.

Clocks as our Teachers

However, as the child's perception of objects in the outside world, at first vague and all-embracing, constantly gains in precision, he becomes better able to situate objects in time. He is obliged to reckon with this master and from this standpoint it marks an important date in his young life when he has learnt to understand the language spoken by watches and clocks and in former times, no doubt, by sun-dials and hour-glasses.

Sooner, or later, according to circumstances, there comes a time when the child learns to read the hands of the clock. As a rule the big hand with its more rapid and obvious movement is learned first, and then the little hand. He discovers that his hours of play and his bed-time are regulated by these implacable mechanisms. The clocks in his home teach the child some of his most terrible lessons.

How much more fortunate are those more humble occupants of the home, the cat and the dog, who cannot read what the hands say as they move round the dial and for whom the ticking of the clock is but a meaningless noise.

But in spite of clocks, the child long retains his sense of a ' time ' of infinite duration. Even when he has learned to tell the hours from the face of the clock, they will still seem to him to pass more slowly than they will in later years.

Perhaps only very old people, who have more or less relapsed into childhood, recover something of the child's infinite time and sometimes succeed in living only in the present. One would say that Nature was being merciful to the aged, so close to death.

Time in Adolescence

However, even the onset of puberty, which effects a revolution in the young organism and forms a more or less violent transition to

adult life, fails to endow him with an adult's sense of time. Too many instincts are in ferment, too many day-dreams taking shape. Powerful currents rise up from the organic depths of his being. In spite of the development of his brain, the adolescent remains a prey to his instinctual life. But the *élan* derived from Eros which now takes possession of him partakes of infinity both in its essence and its aim, and something of this essence and this aim seems to invest the adolescent's sense of time. Life seems to spread out before him in a limitless expanse, and if he dreams of death, he does so without really believing in it and with a confused imagination which belies it. Even if the youthful creature now loses his religious faith, death signifies for him a transition to some coveted state of immortality, perhaps in the form of a union or losing of his personality in Nature, our greater mother. That is no doubt the reason why adolescents and young men find it easier to face death than does the adult of more advanced years : at heart they do not believe in it.

Time in Adult Life

After surmounting the storms of puberty, the individual finds himself invested with a character which will persist unchanged in its main outlines throughout his life. It is at this stage that the feeling which is to represent his adult sense of time can begin to establish itself. Except in certain circumstances which we shall presently consider, and which correspond to special physio-psychological conditions, the adult is able to observe the passage of time. The days, weeks, months and years possess for him clearly defined limits ; he even descries the point at the end of the road where his own life ends. And so he is possessed by a double attitude towards time. On the one hand he is overwhelmed by the idea of a time of infinite duration forming part of a world outside him ; he feels like a tiny speck in all that vast immensity. On the other hand he sees himself confined within his short allotted span ; at either extremity of his life, as well at that marked by his birth as by his death, lie the barriers which so abruptly challenge his assertive will to live. He has found it easier to reconcile himself to the limitation set to his existence by the past, by life before birth. But the frontier imposed by the future, by the life after death, seems more truly intolerable. Is it then to be wondered at that man, always victorious in his dreams, so often precipitates himself across this frontier and imagines his survival in various representations of the Hereafter ?

Space, the Atmosphere we Breathe

Current theories of relativity have abandoned the distinction between space and time and are only prepared to recognize a ' space-time ', this last term constituting a fourth dimension in the calculations involved. But popular sentiment will continue to differentiate between space and time and to regard them as separate entities.

Now, whereas our life unfolds or rather is consumed in time, which brings us to ashes, we are but localized in space. Space does not, by the mere fact of its existence, destroy us as time does. On the contrary, it can be not unlike a friend, it forms as it were the atmosphere in which we breathe, move, and journey far and wide. We grow intoxicated with the paltry measure of space, girdling this tiny planet, which has been allotted to us.

But if we are denied the space we need, we suffer, whether in prison or hovel or cramped dwelling-house. I believe that the same is true of every living thing, of a plant growing in too small a pot or a bird confined in a cage. Moreover everything that draws breath tends to annex to itself the maximum possible amount of space. Hence the struggle for existence: the mighty oak-tree spreads its foliage to receive the sun and kills the grass beneath it ; the great conqueror, be he Napoleon or Alexander, marches forth and destroys all who oppose his expansion, while the rest of the world submits. And modern man, thanks to the machines he has constructed with his own hands, has by the power of speed (which also enables him to economize time) pursued ever farther his conquest of space and has even begun to make himself master of the air.

But to enjoy space, man does not always need to possess it in a material sense. To look is to touch from a distance and many individuals are happily endowed with a faculty for contemplation which permits them to enjoy the simple contemplation of space without its actual possession. Hence the pleasure to be derived from vast expanses, from the prospects revealed from the heights of a mountain, the edge of the sea or the deck of a ship. Hence too the ecstasy we experience before the firmament, an azure sky by day or (more eloquent of space) a night spangled with stars.

The heavenly immensity of our nights can clearly be a source of sublime felicity to a Giordano Bruno or of mortal terror to a Blaise Pascal. But perhaps it is not without significance that time forms an element in Pascal's terror of space. He is terrified by ' the . . . silence of those boundless spaces ' but he does not omit to qualify their silence as ' eternal '.

For if space as an abstract conception is terrifying in its immensity, resembling a boundless ocean in which we are lost and shall some day be engulfed for ever more, yet presented in this form it is too remote from our experience, too unlike the familiar space in which we pursue our daily rounds to be a constant source of dread to us. While we are here we are protected by a sort of planetary security against the infinity of space ; our presence on this earth gives us a feeling like that which we have when, returning in the evening, we reach home and safety from the inclemencies of the elements.

It is very different with time. Time retains its frightening qualities, time which seems to pass more quickly with each successive day as we grow older. And how shall we find in it a haven ? One cannot make a house or garden to serve as a refuge from the infinity of time, or confine oneself within the limits of a single day. The sun has no sooner reached its meridian than it begins to sink towards the horizon, a crimson sunset is followed by night which is the death of day.

We destroy time from the moment we begin to use it. To be master of one's time can only refer to time which lies before one, which has not yet done service, which one has not yet enjoyed. For in living our time we die of it.

The Flight from Time into Dreams

We see then that the individual is unable to offer any really effective resistance in a struggle against time ; ineluctably it passes, minute upon minute, year after year, bringing us ever nearer to death, sometimes but not always after a period of old age. Nevertheless the creatures of the earth have undertaken this struggle according to their lights, especially man himself who of all living creatures most concerns us here.

In his struggle with time man exploits first of all the power of illusion. The pleasure principle which holds sway in the depths of the unconscious knows nothing of the exigencies or even the existence of time. At night when, wearied by the day's activities, we close our eyes and yield to the gentle embrace of sleep, not only does it seem as if, in virtue of the physiological process of sleep, time ceases to exist so long as sleep continues, but wherever a part of our consciousness remains awake and breaks through in our dreams, time no longer presents the same appearance as it does in our waking life. A strangely unreal atmosphere permeates our dreams at night. Our wishes secure fulfilment, triumphing over the limitations imposed by space and

time : the woman we love, no longer distant or aloof, throws herself into our arms, if we are sick we are restored to health, if old we become children again. Ali Baba's magic carpet transports us through the realms of space ; the sun or the stars are our chariot ; we remain eternally young. Even in our most frightful nightmares the silvery radiance which plays upon our dreams is never wholly absent.

If in the course of our waking life we encountered the ghost of one who was near to us, breathing vengeance and threats, its skeleton grinning beneath the emaciated and decomposing flesh, is there one of us, however brave, who would not feel a chill of mortal terror in his heart ? If we knew, as we sometimes do in a nightmare, that we had been condemned to die and were already on the scaffold, the knife gleaming above us against the morning sky, should we not faint from horror ? But in our dreams a ghost is no more incongruous than we are ourselves ; although we are afraid, our fear, our terror even, is not past bearing. One might really suppose that a veil of enchantment had been cast over it. So too with the dream of execution. We are trembling and before the knife falls we wake up feeling oppressed, miserable, our nerves on edge ; and yet the same veil of enchantment seems to shroud the scene and transpose it into a different key from that of harsh reality.

But whether one awakens from a wonderful dream or rouses oneself from an appalling nightmare, the feeling of release one experiences is not the same as that which comes simply from sleep. For the dream is not only the ' guardian of sleep ' ; it is also the guardian of the lost illusions of childhood, including the most fundamental of them all, that relating to time. That atmosphere of enchantment which envelops our most marvellous dreams and even our nightmares is nothing less than the web of time peculiar to our early years which we recover after having lost it as we grew up. While we sleep we are immersed once more in the nebulous, almost infinite time we knew in childhood and that is no doubt a primary reason why everything seems transfigured in this atmosphere of paradise regained.

The Flight from Time into Day-Dreams

But one cannot always sleep and dream. And so man has allowed himself the pleasure of dreaming while awake. Numerous myths and legends have thus come down to us from the dawn of humanity and, reduced as they often are to the level of the nursery tale, continue to beguile the early years of our children.

'In fairy-tales', as Ferenczi[1] so well expressed it, 'phantasies of omnipotence are and remain the dominating ones. Just where we have most humbly to bow before the forces of Nature, the fairy-tale comes to our aid with its typical themes. In reality we are weak, hence the heroes of fairy-tales are strong and unconquerable; in our activities and our knowledge we are cramped and hindered by time and space, hence in fairy-tales one is immortal, is in a hundred places at the same time, sees into the future and knows the past. The ponderousness, the solidity, and the impenetrability of matter obstruct our way every moment: in the fairy-tale, however, man has wings, his eyes pierce the walls, his magic wand opens all doors.' I need only amplify this account in its bearing upon time by observing that as well in fairy-tales as in dreams time is no longer irreversible and man acquires the power to retrace his footsteps into the past.

However, not only do stories which have been transmitted to us down the ages serve to beguile our children: there are others which children have created for themselves, reflecting their individual desires. These imaginary phantasies exude the same atmosphere in which space and time seem out of focus, all the more readily owing to the greater extent to which the child's mind is permeated by the timeless unconscious.

Moreover it is not in childhood only that we dream but even more perhaps during adolescence. And at every age of life our reveries orchestrate a theme transfigured by its emancipation from the yoke of time, like our dreams at night; this has rightly earned them their title of 'day-dreams'.

At a later stage, as his mind consolidates its positions, man harnesses his incorrigible tendency to take flight from reality into the world of dreams to the creation of works of literature, of all his visions the most magnificent. These works of art, like the phantasies to which they owe their existence, seem always to have their setting in a world that lies beyond our categories of space and time, a world in which we can breathe more freely. They do not help us to rise above the turmoil of our passions, as Schopenhauer says of art, but enable us to transcend duration and the limitations which it imposes.

It is surely no accident that one of the greatest masterpieces of literature, Goethe's *Faust*, has as one of its principal themes this very

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[1] 'Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality' (1913), *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 238–9.

desire by which man is possessed in his declining years to recover his youth with its capacity for passion unimpaired, and to abrogate old age, that is to say, to undo the terrible effects of time on mortals like ourselves.

The Flight from Time into the Intoxication of Love

But time lies waiting to renew its claims on him as he emerges from his sleeping or waking dreams. As the sleeper awakes and opens his eyes he consults his watch or the clock : he must rise and be about his lawful pursuits, generally his work, less frequently his pleasure.

Once again he is caught up in the stream of time. Once again life and time have claimed him as their own. Remorselessly the chimes of the clock give the signal for work to begin and we are left to wait until, indifferent to the impatience in our hearts, they strike again to tell us that our labours are ended. Time, marked off into hours, albeit an interminable series of hours, has resumed its sway.

And so many vexations and disappointments strew our path as the hours and days pass by. Oppressed in spirit we would fain escape. There are several ways that lie open to us. We have already spoken of the first, and that most constantly favoured, which becomes available to us each night as we sink to rest upon the pillow, namely sleep, the gentle sleep of which Shakespeare wrote, sleep punctuated by our dreams, to be deprived of which is one of the worst forms of torture. The second outlet is the day-dream.

But we cannot always be sleeping or dreaming. And so, poor mortal creatures that we are, we set about discovering states of mind analogous to those of our dream life even in our waking hours.

And it so happens that Nature sometimes allows us, even when awake, to breathe the enchanted atmosphere of the dream. In its power to evoke this lies the greatness of love. The desire to experience it afresh was largely at the root of Faust's wish to recover his youth. Every lover, however wretched his condition may otherwise be, finds himself transported into fairy-land.

I appeal to my readers to judge for themselves. Does not a loss of the sense of time, a return to the childhood illusion that for us time knows no bounds, form the very atmosphere that love breathes. When a man is expecting his beloved, when he holds her in his arms, covers her with kisses or surrenders to the ecstasy of possessing her, are these not the supreme moments in which time, and the need to grow old, are really forgotten. That is why every lover swears eternal love.

Assuredly Eros who at these times holds us in thrall is right to implant in the human breast his immortal song, for the aim of the sexual act must be to attain through and beyond the ephemeral individual the substance of life that is in a sense immortal.

But it is the intoxication inherent in love, irrespective of its procreative functions, which renders its pursuit so compelling for certain types and makes it so difficult for them to foreswear passion in their lives. It is true that man is by nature more liberally endowed than any other living creature with libido and so with the intoxication of love. And yet he feels dissatisfied with his lot. We cannot fall in love as easily as we fall asleep every night on our pillow. Love entails disappointments, the loved one holds aloof or proves unfaithful, and loneliness once more casts its shadow upon us. But above all, love, even as it exists in the human race, which knows no rutting season, is from a biological point of view confined to one period of life : in childhood we hanker after love but are not yet ripe for it ; in old age we are no longer equal to it and have only our regrets. And so in his plight man has frequently had recourse to other modes of intoxication.

Flight from Time into Intoxication from Drink and Drugs

Even before his meeting with Gretchen, Faust had been to visit the Auerbach tavern. Human resourcefulness has succeeded in making the plants of the soil yield up magical substances which induce states of intoxication and oblivion similar to those experienced by lovers. It is so much easier to empty a glass, smoke a pipe, inhale a powder or chew a paste than to court, win and keep the man or woman one loves. Intoxication from drugs or drinks is always ready to one's hand, one can procure its pleasures at any hour of the day or night. And so alcohol, opium, cocaine, mescal and hashish transpose and efface life's realities, and the whole world ceases to present any further obstacles to the individual's pleasure principle.

It is popularly supposed that, with the help of their poisons, addicts are permitted to enjoy enthralling dreams and visions of paradise. And this is certainly true of some cases. But many an opium addict has declared that the exhilaration he feels is not to be ascribed to these visions. It consists rather in a supreme euphoria, analogous to that which succeeds complete orgastic satisfaction in love, with the added advantage that one loses the sensation of one's own weight. One feels as though one were floating through space ; the sense of space remains, but it has become enormously exaggerated. The sense of time on the

other hand does seem to have been really eliminated (another way of securing eternity). We are all familiar with the instances mentioned by De Quincey [2] and Baudelaire [3] in which a few minutes of intoxication from hashish seem to the dreamer on awakening to have lasted an eternity. And this escape from the restraints imposed upon us by the limitations of space and time, the latter especially, must constitute the ultimate source of the psycho-toxic euphoria. For to lose one's sense of time is to forget the existence of death, which casts its dark shadow over all human joys.

I shall perhaps be accused of paying an undeserved compliment to the ecstasies to be obtained from drugs by regarding them as comparable with those of love. But the widespread, universal incidence of drug addictions speaks in favour of this classification and also of the doubtless well-founded assumption that there exists a genetic relationship between the two.

Flight from Time into Mystical Ecstasy

Passing now from the lowest extremity of the scale to the highest, we must refer to a third form of intoxication—the mystical experience of ecstasy.

The ascetic who seeks to arrive at a state of ecstasy achieves his aim by methods which bear a more or less uniform character in all religions, consisting of similar forms of mortification of the flesh: vigils, fasting, self-inflicted chastisement enfeeble the body, to the advantage of the nervous system. And, as an accompanying psycho-physiological development, earthly love is suppressed in favour of divine love, that is to say, an exalted chastity appears side by side with an impassioned love of some divinity.

Then sometimes these exhausted bodies in which the nervous system and an exacerbated sexuality alone remain active, are filled with ecstasy, a state of radiant beatitude, the very antithesis of the endless ' dark night ' of which all mystics complain. Now, according to the accounts which they have given us of their experiences, these states of ecstasy bear a close resemblance to the ecstasies of the lover and the addict.

Freud has compared sexual manifestations, which might be regarded as intoxication by means of erotogenic endocrine secretions, with the phenomena of gratification and abstinence observable in

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[2] *Confessions of an English Opium Eater.*

[3] *Les paradis artificiels.*

drug-addictions and has advanced the hypothesis that both originate in similar biochemical processes. In all probability similar factors are at work in mystics, in their ' dark night ' or ecstasy, according as the various physio-chemical substances in their organism, the product of self-inflicted physiological sufferings, fasten upon their nervous system.

However, we are not so much interested in these hypothetical physio-chemical mechanisms themselves as in the mystical ecstasy which is their psychical consequence. Whether the devotee achieves this state by ' Dionysic ' movement, like the Khlysti in Russia or the Aïssa in Africa, or by the opposite cult of immobility, like the monks and nuns of Christian and Buddhist convents, one result is the same : there ensues a loss of a sense of reality, brought about by a weakening of the conscious, of reason, by a collapse of the inhibitions which oppose an irruption into the mind of the forces of the unconscious. Then ecstasy recreates the paradise of our childhood or of our dreams, in which space has cast aside the limitations of a rational world and in which, above all, we are no longer aware of time. And the mystic proudly projects this subjective feeling of eternity, which others experience only at the supreme moments of intoxication or of earthly love, and in his imagination ascribes to it an objective existence. It is thus that he assures himself of everlasting life, in some unearthly paradise, in beatific union with his god, a union which will bring such ecstasy that what we experience at moments here is by comparison but a miserable foretaste.

Even in our own time we find that the philosopher of intuitionism can write : ' Mystic intuition . . . is presumably a participation in the divine essence. Can the after-life which is apparently assured to our soul by the simple fact that, even here below, a great part of this activity is independent of the body, be identical with the life into which, even here below, certain privileged souls insert themselves ? ' [4] —in other words, with the life of those great dreamers, the great mystics, who, like the philosopher in question, mistake a subjective state of intoxication for the recognition of an objective reality.

Time and the Unconscious

If the various states of intoxication or ecstasy all succeed in destroying the subject's sense of time, it is because their effect, or rather their essential nature, is to unlock the floodgates of the unconscious, which in normal and so-called reasonable people remain more

[4] Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.*

or less safely closed under the conditions of waking life. And Freud has repeatedly reminded us of the discovery made by psycho-analysis that the unconscious is timeless.

But before we proceed further, we must try to define the various meanings which can attach to this proposition.

The statement that the unconscious is timeless may mean that the unconscious has no *knowledge* of time, that time as an intellectual concept does not exist for it. But to say this is to state a truism. The unconscious, the primitive reservoir of our instincts and our will to live, knows nothing of any concept ; these are later acquisitions of the intellect. Consequently, it can no more have knowledge of the concept of time than of any other concept.

But the statement may also imply that the unconscious—or at any rate the phenomena which occur in it and which are all we are in a position to infer—remains unaffected by the process of time, is not subject to its jurisdiction. Presented in this form the proposition strikes one as unacceptable on *a priori* grounds and certain analysts have accordingly challenged the assumption of a timeless unconscious. For one can scarcely imagine any living thing, or for that matter anything at all, being immune from the effects of time. The unconscious then, the nucleus of our psyche, must itself be subject to them in some way, although in a very different way and by an incomparably slower process than our conscious mind. The whole field of psychopathology affords confirmation of this, with the picture it presents of unconscious pathogenic memories preserved intact in spite of the passing of the years, and of ideas and emotions appropriate to childhood actively influencing a man of fifty years as if time had remained stationary. We may here adopt a simile favoured by Freud, who is fond of comparing the past, relegated by repression to the unconscious, with Pompeii engulfed beneath the ashes of Vesuvius, a fate which has preserved—almost in the quick—the life of the ancient city. But even the walls of the buildings with their paintings, no less than the dead bodies, were no longer exactly the same, when they once more saw the light of day, as they had been at the time of their disappearance ; while it is true that beneath the layers of ashes they enjoyed an unwonted degree of preservation, they also underwent a certain change, although an infinitely slower one than they would have if the sun had continued to shine on them. Similarly, on the humbler scale afforded by our own brief lives, the contents which emerge from the unconscious after having been consigned to it during

our early childhood, there to unite with our primitive, instinctual heritage, seem to remain eternally unchanged. This explains why Freud, in his paper on ' The Unconscious ' [5] (1915), was able to write : ' The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless ; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time, in fact bear no relation to time at all. The time-relation also is bound up with the work of the system Cs.' But it also explains why he slightly modified this general conception in a later work [6] (1926) when he wrote : ' Since the differentiation of the ego and the id, our interest in the problems of repression cannot fail to have received a fresh impetus. Up till then we had been content to confine our interest to those aspects of repression which concerned the ego—the keeping away from consciousness and motility, and the formation of substitutes (symptoms). With regard to the instinctual impulses themselves, we assumed that they remained unaltered in the unconscious for an indefinite length of time. But now our interest is turned to the vicissitudes of the repressed and we begin to suspect that it is not self-evident, perhaps not even the usual thing, that those impulses should remain unaltered and unalterable in this way. There is no doubt that the original impulses have been inhibited and deflected from their aim through repression.'

Thus even Freud is prepared to admit that repressed psychic content undergoes *some* modification, however unalterable it may appear to our conscious minds, subject as they are to such immeasurably swifter attrition.

We have now to consider a third acceptation of the proposition in question. To say that the unconscious is timeless may mean that the unconscious fails to *perceive* time, that it receives absolutely no impression of it whatsoever. This seems extremely likely, as far as one can be positive concerning a field which remains wholly inaccessible to direct knowledge and about which we can only make inferences. In the unconscious the past seems to intermingle with the present, older experiences with current ones, and traces of former events with the happenings of to-day. Our dreams, our experiences of delirium and intoxication all combine to prove it. In these exceptional states the dreamer, or the victim of delirium or intoxication, is no longer conscious of the limitations of space and time, especially the latter, which imprison us all : it is as if the sense of time had crumbled away.

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[5] *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 119.

[6] *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, p. 116 (footnote).

But even apart from these exceptional states, a perfect expression of the perceptual timelessness of the unconscious is to be seen in the psychological fact that we do not *feel* ourselves growing old. So long as our health is not affected, the years may pass and white hair and wrinkles make their appearance without anything occurring within us to register the fact. The philosopher Mach claims that we feel the approach of old age in our vitals. I do not believe it; our entire psychological experience runs counter to this assumption which was invented simply to bolster up a particular theory. While we remain in good health, we do not experience the advance of old age either in our vitals or in the unconscious, in short, in anything which forms part of our organic life or of whatever is closely related to this. What we do perceive is certain effects of this process. We become a shade more easily tired—but there have always been times in the past when we have felt tired. We are no longer so susceptible to passion—but we have simply become colder and more sensible. We are not inwardly aware that we have grown older. The profound and mysterious refrain, we might call it a pæan to the life of our flesh and of our blood, which from morning till night never ceases to make itself heard in the depths of our being, sustains us almost unfailingly from the cradle to the grave. It is the unconscious which sustains us with this profound refrain and it is thus that it demonstrates even at the most prosaic moments of our lives and without having recourse to dreams or states of intoxication, that despite the passing of the years it remains primitively timeless.

I remember hearing an analyst who disputed the theory of a timeless unconscious raise the following objection to it. He said that when we go to sleep and fall once more under the sway of the unconscious it is nevertheless possible to retain a sense of time, so much so that some sleepers are able to wake up of their own accord at a predetermined hour. From this he drew the conclusion that the unconscious perceives the passage of time. But in the first place I would point out that we generally sleep rather badly when we are obliged to rise at a certain hour, waking up several times during the night for fear of sleeping beyond it. This correspondingly reduces the ascendancy which the unconscious has over the sleeper—a simple observation, but one which points the way to the real answer to the argument of our opponent. The capacity to rouse oneself from sleep at a given moment must be ascribed to something emanating, not from the unconscious, but from the preconscious, which has remained awake even during our

sleep. This portion of the preconscious remains dimly aware of the passage of time ; it is, moreover, this same preconscious which, never falling altogether asleep within us, maintains the moral dream-censorship even when we sleep most soundly, takes advantage of the disguise offered by displacement to cloak our deep-seated tendencies towards evil and in particular brings it to pass that many of us, children of civilization that we are, have never, despite our violent unconscious homicidal impulses, been directly responsible for killing anyone even in our dreams.

A further objection to the concept of a timeless unconscious in the perceptual sense might be exemplified by the dream itself. The argument would run as follows : ' Even the dream, which Freud has called the royal road to the unconscious, is unable to dispense with space or time. As regards space this is glaringly obvious : thus most dreams are presented visually and dream-images are projected in space. We admit that spatial limitations are often obliterated in dreams. The magic carpet is a part of their world. But space is always present, a setting for the most unrelated images. And contrary to the views which you sustain, time also continues to play a part in dreams. Once more we will admit that it is most often a distorted caricature of time that we find, whose course may be retraced or reversed at will. Its decrees seem valid no longer ; the years may shrink almost to vanishing point ; the old become children again. Above all the dream progresses without any regard for actual time, in a series of images merely standing in juxtaposition, as at the cinema. Moreover we know from the famous example of Maury's guillotine dream that one can live through a whole series of adventures in a second of real time. (In the case in question the dream related to a trial under the Revolution followed by an execution, in short, to events which would have extended over a period of hours or days.) But however far-reaching the distortion of time in dreams, it still preserves its character of time. It is therefore unthinkable that any psychic institution, even the unconscious, should forgo those inevitable forms of our perception, space and time. The dream, which according to your own views is steeped in the unconscious, seems to prove that this is indeed the case.'

The answer to this objection is that it is true that perception can never dispense with space or time. Derivatives from the unconscious, on emerging from that obscure institution, are obliged to borrow these forms of our perception. The dream itself, from the moment it confronts us with its sensory imagery, from the moment, in short, it

becomes accessible to consciousness, can form no exception to this law.

The principal objection to be advanced against the contentions of our imaginary opponent is that he confuses the dream with the unconscious. The true unconscious can never be directly apprehended, as Freud has frequently insisted ; the dream merely contains offshoots from this, which must perforce accept our perceptual categories. But from the deeper levels which constitute the source of our emotions, the residues from our whole past of which our dreams are fashioned, something intervenes to colour these inevitable forms of our perception, time as well as space. That is why—and I know of no other plausible explanation—spatial and temporal limitations, particularly the latter, cease in our dreams to exist. The psychic institutions effect an exchange : the perceptual forms of the preconscious are made available to the deep instinctual feelings, charged with unconscious memory-traces ; the unconscious exhales from its depths, like the vapour which ascended to the Pythian priestess at Delphi, sudden gusts from its timeless and spaceless world which then proceed to confuse and disorganize in our dreams our perceptions of space and still more of time.

However, the confusion which these irruptions from a timeless world introduce into our thought is perhaps nowhere so clearly marked as in that intellectual neurosis familiar to us as the obsessional neurosis.

We know that these intellectual neurotics commonly evince a most peculiar reaction towards time. They at the same time want to know and want not to know time and its exigencies. They have a horror of clocks, but at the same time they labour under a compulsion to take note of the most minute details concerning the hours, minutes and seconds. The flight of time is especially horrifying to them : they would gladly forget or deny its reality if they could but do so.

I am indebted to Freud for the realization that this strange and inconsistent attitude must be determined by a development of the ego in the obsessional neurotic outstripping that of his libido. Those who exhibit a predisposition to obsessional neurosis have come, prematurely as it were, into the possession of their ego, and with it, of a sense of the flight of time. They have been allowed to experience time, as the almost boundless void which it appears in childhood, for a shorter period than their fellow-creatures, with the result that their unconscious instinctual life has risen in revolt. Throughout their whole life it will continue to exhale gusts of timelessness which will affect even their adult sense of time. Freud reminded me in this connection of

the quantum theory in physics. In an analogous fashion, psychical quanta may be formed in the unconscious, and, after attaining their efficient limit, penetrate into the preconscious and there in a greater or less measure operate to disturb the subject's sense of time.

The circumstance that the sense of time is far more profoundly affected in the psychoses, especially in cases of schizophrenia where the whole psychic apparatus appears to be subject to some process of disintegration, is no doubt due to the fact that the collapse and breach of the barriers which maintain the unconscious in a state of repression are of a more far-reaching nature in the case of the psychotic, as opposed to the neurotic. The existence of the unconscious is the sole hypothesis which can account for the phenomenon of an apparently total loss of the sense of time in certain psychopaths, such as those whom Janet [7] describes and finds so bewildering. He quotes the following illustrative material from one of his patients: 'It is very odd, but the days no longer seem to last. . . . Every time I observe that it is evening or that the clock points to a certain hour, I am surprised because there has been no interval of time since the morning. It is time to go to bed? But we have only just got up. You say that a week has elapsed but there has been no change in the position. We are a week ago, there has been no time since.' The barriers between the preconscious and the unconscious must, in this person, have been so far demolished that there could emerge from the depths of the unconscious a wave of timelessness sufficient almost wholly to submerge the sense of duration and time.

On the other hand, the obsessional neurotic, whose ego possesses quite a different degree of stability in spite of the gusts of timelessness which emerge from the unconscious to trouble his sense of time, retains an intense awareness and anxiety in relation to time. The conflict between these irruptions of timelessness and his acute sense of universal change is invested with a poignant quality. It becomes one of the bases of the conflict-ridden disposition which characterizes the obsessional neurotic.

And since the premature consolidation of the obsessional neurotic's ego takes place at a time when the anal-sadistic stage of libidinal development is in full swing, and throughout his life he is burdened by a powerful but strongly repressed sadism, he is haunted not only by time, but no less, as a rule, by death.

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[7] *L'évolution de la mémoire et de la notion du temps*, Chap. II, 'Le sentiment de la durée'.

Time, Death and the Unconscious

There must exist in animals a sense of time, bound up in the same way as our own with their perception of reality. Freud holds that the power of speech only develops on the level of the preconscious, a self-evident proposition, seeing that the unconscious knows nothing of any concept. But this is a necessary condition, not a sufficient cause, and it does not follow that because animals are without the faculty of speech, they do not possess conscious and preconscious mental systems and, by the same token, a sense of time.[8] To be sure, duration as understood by a dog, bird, frog, spider, mollusc, or infusorian and still more by a tree or plant must differ enormously from my own experience of it, and must be the more deeply rooted in timelessness, the less the animal has evolved towards a state of consciousness. Even among different races of human beings we discover quite considerable variations in their way of experiencing of time. The Hindu and the Chinese seem to live in a more timeless world than the more rational and dynamic Westerner, in a relative timelessness which is no doubt responsible for their greater apathy towards death and the hereafter.

But, whatever may be the precise extent of the differences among human beings in respect of their perception of time, there is one point which they seem all to have in common and which distinguishes them from the animals. Alone among the animals man knows that he must die ; he alone has framed the classic syllogism : All men (all living things would be more apt) are mortal ; I am a man : therefore I am mortal.

And in truth the idea of death seems to be peculiar to man ; animals apparently have no premonition or understanding of death, or at any rate of their own death. Admittedly it is in their nature to kill and they do so according to their own lights, as effectively as human beings and without scruple, whether it be for food or in self-defence or for sheer pleasure, as a cat will kill a mouse and not always eat it. But animals do not by reason of such activities acquire any general conception of death ; they must feel that their own existence will never reach its end even if at times they fear that they are in danger and take to flight or stand their ground as circumstances dictate.

It is moreover this same illusion of immortality, springing from the animal unconscious which lies buried in us all, which in periods of

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[8] I gathered from a conversation with Freud that these views on animal psychology are in agreement with his own.

regression conditioned by a state of war makes of every army a people of heroes. For all that the soldier may know that he is vulnerable and sometimes tremble at the thought, in the depths of his being he believes in an immortal life, even on this earth. It is this blind animal call from the depths of the unconscious, with its affirmation of life, which enables the soldier to sally forth from the trenches to charge the enemy in the belief that he at any rate will survive the shells, grenades and bullets which will destroy the enemy and even his comrades in arms. It is the same feeling which caused a little Jewish boy of four, who had been forced to flee from Vienna with his parents when the city was invaded by Hitler's hordes, to announce on his arrival in Paris: 'When I grow up, I shall go back to Vienna, and if there are still any German soldiers in the streets I shall kill every single one of them.'

Thus negation and in particular the negation of one's own existence, has no meaning for that reservoir of our primitive instincts, the unconscious. Life can only visualize itself in terms of living; in the unconscious of each individual it is depicted as outside time, which does not exist for the unconscious, and without limitations of any kind. It has required all the power of abstraction and generalization of which the conscious human mind is capable to evolve a conception so opposed to life as the idea that death awaits all living things and to enable man to recognize that one day he himself must die.

When does this disagreeable notion, the special privilege of mankind, begin to develop in a rudimentary form in children? According to some observers, at a very early age. I myself had an opportunity of observing a child younger than the little hero previously mentioned, a small boy two and a half years old, who said of a beautiful dog to whom he was very much attached: 'He mustn't go out in the street by himself. He'd be run over and killed and then we should never see him again.' Naturally the child's idea of death must have differed from my own or that of my readers; nevertheless he had already arrived at a conception which could never have any meaning for his friend the dog.

There is no more tangible proof of the importance, the vital, or rather lethal significance which time possesses for humanity than the fact that, while man has never personified Space, the element in which we move and have our being, which unfolds before our eyes its boundless horizons of blue sky and starry night, Space, our environment and, for all its immensity, our friend, Time is, in most mythologies, invested with human (and malevolent) attributes. Confining myself to the

civilizations which directly influence us, I need only mention the aged Greek god, Chronos, who devoured his own children. And the universally familiar mythological figure of Time with his long white beard —for *he* endures—and his scythe, which spares no living thing. Another figure, of Christian mythology, also wields a scythe, the grinning skeleton which represents Death. The identity of the emblem which these two figures carry reflects the identity of the destructive functions which the human imagination attributes to Time and Death alike. Death, the daughter of Time, mows us down ; when Time has passed, Death comes upon us.

This kinship was likewise expressed in the famous inscription found on ancient sun-dials : *Una ex his ultima.*

But even before Time claims me as his own, I have seen how, all about me, his scythe has fallen unceasingly on the procession of the days and on all the things, within each day and year, which lie nearest to my heart.

Lamartine's work nowadays often strikes us as more or less outmoded, but if one poem at least, ' Le Lac ', retains its immortal splendour, it is because it expresses so magnificently man's eternal anguish on contemplating the flight of time.

' O temps, suspends ton vol ! . . .'

But Time remains deaf to human entreaty :

' Mais je demande en vain quelques moments encore,
Le temps m'échappe et fuit ;
Je dis à cette nuit : " Sois plus lente " ; et l'aurore
Va dissiper la nuit.'

And the poet expresses his sorrow at finding himself alone in the very places where he had once known happiness :

' O lac ! l'année à peine a fini sa carrière,
Et près des flots chéris qu'elle devait revoir
Regarde ! je viens seul m'asseoir sur cette pierre
Où tu la vis s'asseoir ! '

For Time had triumphed and Elvire was dead. But we cannot help feeling that if she had lived, it would have made no difference to the flight of time and that the lake, a year later, would no longer have seemed the same as the lake where dawn surprised Lamartine's loves.

Aggrieved by the ravages of time, man forgets that it has also brought him happiness and even life itself, just as one is inclined to forget past benefits and to feel especially contemptuous of those which have soon to be restored to one's benefactor.

Filled with despair as he recalls those moments of intoxication when ' l'amour à longs flots nous verse le bonheur ', the poet of ' Le Lac ' exclaims :

> ' Quoi ! passés pour jamais ? quoi ! tout entiers perdus ?
> Ce temps qui les donna, ce temps qui les efface,
> Ne nous les rendra plus ? '

' Ce temps qui les donna . . .' For a moment the poet acknowledges his indebtedness to Time, as an adolescent might do in his triumph at having finally achieved the manhood to which he had so long aspired. But the emphasis rests on ' ce temps qui les efface '.

For a benefit conferred and afterwards withdrawn is no longer a benefit at all, and few are found who follow Job's example and submit to God's will—or to the effects of Time.

We do not say, when speaking of our happiness : ' Time gave, and Time hath taken away ; blessed be the name of Time.' We are far more likely to exclaim : ' Cursed be the name of Time.'

For by whatever feat of legerdemain religion and philosophy may try to conceal or deny the fact, ' it is a terrible thing ', as Pascal remarks in his severely simple style, ' to feel everything that one has slipping away '.

The Struggle of Medicine, Works and Faith against Time and Death

From primordial times man, like every other creature, has sought to prolong Nature's allotted span, that is to say, to persevere with living as long as possible.

We are told that originally, in primitive societies still regulated by magic, death is invariably regarded as the work of some maleficent outside agency. The need is therefore to charm it away. And thus magical practices, inspired by human desires, among which self-preservation is the most fundamental, grew and multiplied, as witness the amulets still worn by many tribes and even to this day displayed by Italians to ward off the evil eye.

White magic, which aims at preserving our own life and property and those of our loved ones, finds a counterpart in the development of black magic, where the aim is to injure or destroy one's enemy—a way of remaining in undisputed possession of the field and of time, after he has departed, preferably to another world.

Abundant harvests, healthy and prolific flocks, love—these are the things which we desire, but we are above all eager for life and for the

time in which to enjoy these blessings. For this reason the magician in primitive tribes always fulfils the rôle of medicine-man as well.

In the course of centuries the medicine-man has undergone an evolution, and while certain of the attributes of his authority have devolved on our political leaders, his most sacred function, the preservation of life, has finally become incarnated, after many avatars, in the physician of our times.

If to-day the members of the medical profession form a powerful closed corporation, if they enjoy the especial esteem of society, it is not simply on the strength of an often sure scientific knowledge, of the real power which science gives them of averting illness and death; it is also because in the depths of our being an archaic unconscious endows them with the mysterious magical powers of the primitive medicine-man.

However, even the most up-to-date and effective medical services, with modern hygiene, asepsis, vaccines and serums cannot preserve man, who in this respect resembles the humblest animal species, from a knowledge that the duration of his existence is limited—no longer by accidents, whether occurring by pure chance or brought about by malevolent design (with which Nature has filled every part of the world for him and for all other living creatures alike), but by the processes of decay inherent in his own body, a mechanism which is wound up only for a limited time.

I recall an impression from my childhood years. I was perhaps eight years old at the time and was thus still possessed by the more or less shadowy notions of time characteristic of childhood. I had been taken on a visit to the mother of my father's secretary, who had expressed a desire to see me. She had just completed her hundredth year. I see her to this day, covered with wrinkles, her skin shrivelled and her eyes without lustre, holding out to me her little emaciated hands and I seem still to experience the mingled feelings of terror and respect which she inspired in me then. My mother had died in the full bloom of her youth in giving birth to me: accident! evil design! But here I was confronted with the opposite extreme, a complete contrast in the procedure of dying. To be sure, a hundred years seemed to me an eternity, but I had after all been told that I should have to make haste to go and see the old lady as she was very soon going to die. At that moment I acquired a fully developed sense of death as a natural and inevitable consequence of old age and decay, of the dread inexorable law that we must die.

Man too has acquired this conception in the course of his development, notwithstanding his persistent belief in maleficent magic as a cause of death. And the certain knowledge that he is to die has made him aspire to eternal life. On the one hand, he postulates a continued existence for his soul in the hereafter, in its various forms, this being his original reaction of defence against the certainty of dying and still the most universal ; and, on the other, a survival in this world through his children and, as a later reaction always confined to a small élite, through his work.

We shall proceed now to a brief examination of this latter mode of reaction, the idea of worldly survival, postponing any discussion of the more primitive, widespread and important reaction of belief in a life after death to the end of this section.

The normal way in which a mother may ensure her survival in this world is by perpetuating herself in her children. A father is in a somewhat different position. It is true that many men share the mother's feelings to some extent, but this reaction combines with a very different one. The father knows that his son will soon become his triumphant rival : triumphant in love and triumphant too in the no less momentous sphere of masculine social ambition.

And so men, and sometimes even women, finding that they are unable really to identify themselves with their children, feeling themselves fettered by the bonds of a limited and mortal existence, aspire to exceed it in space and time by creating some work which will outlive them. Whatever immediate practical purpose the various technical achievements of mankind may have been designed to promote originally, the feeling that they could bestow some measure of immortality must one day have sprung to life in the human heart.

The writings on the stone obelisks have preserved for us the history of the Pharaohs, and the pyramids, towering above the desert, have triumphed over a period of more than forty centuries.

India, China, Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance have bequeathed to us their monuments, thus perpetuating down to our own times the ideas of their creators.

Thus the poet was able to write :

' Tout passe.—L'art robuste
Seul a l'éternité
Le buste
Survit à la cité,

Et la médaille austère
Que trouve un laboureur
Sous terre
Révèle un empereur.'

Moreover the technical methods of preserving the memory of things past, vision and sound, have been making continued headway during the last century. Not only has man taken advantage of the rapid transmission of waves of electricity to abolish distance and communicate from continent to continent in the twinkling of an eye, not only has he contrived to increase the speed with which he can travel from one place to another and so to economize time and conquer space, but he has even sought to record, in vision and in sound, the actual passage of events in time. The cinema gives an illusion of life to those who are no longer with us ; the gramophone enables us to hear their voices from beyond the grave. A melancholy resurrection admittedly, but at the same time a victory over the destructive power of time.

However, in the struggle to overcome the ravages of time by means of man's creative work in this world, a special position has always and will always be accorded to thought expressed in writing. No doubt man originally had recourse to the written word to promote immediate practical ends, to transmit instructions for future action, but there must soon have come a time when he began to use it as a vehicle for his day-dreams. In this realm, comprising myths, legends, and fairy-tales we have seen that man has freed himself from time and its impositions and even from those of the space he inhabits. But his escape was no more than a phantasy, comparable with the unreal dreams which haunt us at night.

But here we find that the fairy-tale, having secured a victory over time in the realm of the imagination, is about to prove victorious a second time in the world of reality, especially if it is written down and is infused with that spirit of universality which will cause it to be handed down by word of mouth and in writing from generation to generation. And so once again art, begotten of our dreams, finds a way back to reality through the response it awakens in the hearts of other men, and this time really transcends time, over which it had hitherto been able to triumph only in imagination.

Thus to-day as in the past, and in spite of the cinema and photography, those new methods of rescuing the past from oblivion, art in the proper sense of the term retains its exalted position. For true art, the art which strikes a note of eternal and universal humanity, can

alone create for us an illusion of immortality. Whether it be plastic art or music, sculpture, painting, literature or harmony, and whatever temporal forms it may assume, art seems always in a greater or less degree to speak of eternity.

It is this which inspires many who find themselves haunted in a particularly distressing fashion by their sense of time to eschew history with its precise records, its atmosphere of finality and completion, of decay and death, its *memento mori* inscribed on every page, and to prefer instead the seemingly timeless enchantments of art.

The power to survive their authors is not confined to works of art. It belongs equally to the works of legislators, founders of religion, moralists, philosophers and lastly to those men who discover fragments of reality in the universe, whom we call scientists. If I have here dealt principally with works of art, it is because they afford an unusually striking example of the process by which, in creating them, their author effects an imaginary projection of his narcissism, always so powerful in the artist, into a future when he himself will have ceased to exist.

Nevertheless, in the struggle which he wages in this world against the ravages of time, man must ultimately acknowledge defeat. Not only is medical science powerless to arrest the gradual deterioration of our organs, which finally proves fatal, but the finest work in the world is liable to perish. The transitoriness of all things applies as much to the work we leave as to ourselves. How many masterpieces have disappeared without leaving a trace! How many manuscripts have crumbled into dust, taking with them their supposedly immortal secrets!

And even if the creations of our hands or our brain were to endure for ever, the small part of ourselves which survives in them does so only in virtue of an imaginary delegation of ourselves. An aged philosopher of my acquaintance once said to me, as he lay ill, in a moment of despair: 'I would rather have a cigarette while I am alive than a monument when I am dead.'

Since in spite of all my illusions my work is not a living extension of myself, since the child that is my issue is a separate individual and no longer a part of me, since the only life which can fully satisfy me is my own and death must eventually bring that to a close, since 'le dernier acte est sanglant, quelque soit la comédie en tout le reste'— it was inevitable that man, with his unconquerable will to live, to live for ever, should vault the barriers of death and prolong his earthly existence in an imaginary world beyond the grave.

This solution moreover is capable of satisfying a number of deeply ingrained human tendencies both low and high, our desires and our moral urges. In the hereafter, the wicked rich man is punished, and the good poor man rewarded ; the inequalities of this world are not merely removed but reversed : the last shall be first. And Paradise, as it is represented in the different systems of religion, holds out to unhappy mortals the promise of the things they have most yearned for in this life : to the Arabs of the desert it offers fresh fountains and houris eternally young ; to the Greek philosopher, eternal, ethereal converse in Elysian fields of asphodel (although the Greek sense of realism has made the shade of Achilles express regret for the irreplaceable terrestrial splendour of the sun) ; to the Hindu, wearied by an oppressive climate, Paradise appears as the peace of Nirvana. But human beings, hungry for life in spite of all their sufferings in this world, all alike ascribe to the life after death a fundamental quality, one overriding all moral questions, all idea of punishment or reward for one's earthly labours ; time no longer proves fatal, no longer destroys us, and eternal life is assured.

Even such religions as those of India which profess a belief in reincarnation and consequently allow death to play a part in the hereafter, treat death in this version of the beyond as an episode not possessing any fateful significance but simply as holding out to the soul the prospect of ever higher reincarnations, finally leading to a state of eternal beatific repose.

The Trobriand Islanders, of whom Malinowski has written, depart after death to the island of Tuma, which their imagination has converted into a paradise, and each people, each tribe, with few if any exceptions, dreams of a world in which life may continue in despite of death. So resistant in the unconscious is the determination to live, a determination which makes the possibility of eternal damnation seem preferable to the idea of extinction. For one may suffer in Hell but at least one continues to live.

Moreover a curious parallelism has come to exist in the imagination of the human race between the body in death and the soul after death, whence is derived the almost universal custom, so well described by Robert Hertz,[9] of a second funeral. At first the soul continues to hover around the body ; it does not immediately lose contact with the

[9] ' Etude sur la représentation de la mort ', in *Mélanges de sociologie religieuse et folklore*, 1928.

physical organism which gave it its temporal habitation, but remains for some days or months half bound to a terrestrial existence until, with the decomposition of the last remnants of flesh, it reaches its final and eternal resting-place. These beliefs are held by a majority of the peoples of this earth, whence the practice has arisen of performing two funeral ceremonies, one for the body, and, after a certain interval of time, one for the fleshless bones which are disinterred for the purpose.

Of course, as religious systems evolve towards higher levels, this custom loses more and more of its primitive aspects. It is hard to discern in the Mass held at the end of the Catholic year, in the orthodox conception of Lent, an echo of the double funeral rites of the Dayaks. The inspiration however remains the same and Hertz seems to be justified in his conclusion that the Egyptian custom of embalming the dead and the Greek practice of cremation, although apparently the complete reverse of each other, must both have fulfilled the same function of assisting the dead body, and with it the soul, as early as possible to some final condition of eternal repose.

For in all religions man has sought to escape the fatal passage of time which sets a term to his life. In the various forms of intoxication, he drowns his sense of time by unlocking the floodgates of the timeless unconscious. In his religious faith, whatever be its gods or vision of Paradise, he projects this same timeless unconscious into the infinite, and, in this grandiose projection, proceeds in turn to install himself in the bosom of God, essence and apotheosis of what is eternal.

Attempts to Resolve the Enigma of Time

The contributions of philosophy to the subject of time have multiplied since Kant presented time and space as forms of our intuition or perception (*Anschauungsformen*).

It is no part of my purpose here to embark on a critical examination of all the theories which have been evolved to explain the nature of time ; a task of such magnitude would lie beyond the scope of this work, which is concerned exclusively with the relations subsisting between the unconscious and time as it presents itself to our lives and conscious thought, or rather those gusts or waves of timelessness which here and there emerge to trouble it. Above all I have been anxious to stress the deep conative element derived from the vital unconscious which I regard as the source of all attempts to escape into a timeless world and of every effort to resist the destructive onslaughts of time.

In a course of lectures delivered at the Collège de France on *The*

Evolution of Memory and of the Concept of Time,[10] Pierre Janet, discussing the problem of time, observed : ' Generally speaking, it inspires little enough affection in men's hearts, but philosophers regard it with particular loathing : they have done their very best to suppress it altogether. In this connection I should like to refer you to the fine contributions contained in Bergson's *Creative Evolution* in which he shows that Greek philosophy and later the philosophy of the Middle Ages and of Descartes' school possessed without knowing it a singular ideal : the destruction and suppression of time. To contrive its disappearance, to refrain from mentioning it, so far as possible to avoid acknowledging its existence, represented the ideal of a whole epoch in the history of philosophy. Time is evil, let us therefore not speak of it ; it upsets everything. That is what our philosophers have tried to do. Read through Meyerson's volumes on *Identity and Reality* and consider the suppression of differences, especially the suppression of temporal differences, identification. We are not surprised to find that even to-day there are patients who have a horror of time. The philosophers themselves felt the same.'

We who are psycho-analysts will feel even less surprise than Pierre Janet. In the passage quoted above he establishes a parallel between the horror of time manifested by his patients and the corresponding attitude displayed by philosophers. We consider that both are to be correlated with the horror of time which, whether latent or manifest, is deeply ingrained in all human hearts, with the vital protest of the timeless unconscious against the time-ridden conscious mind.

Again in the same course of lectures, which makes such stimulating reading for the light which it throws on the different possible conceptions of time, Pierre Janet distinguishes, from the point of view of human consciousness, three varieties of time. If we leave on one side the conceptions of time entertained by the physicists and mathematicians, from Newton to Einstein, Janet suggests that the time in which we live may assume three distinct aspects in man's eyes : the destructive, the conservative and the creative.

I must confess that I find some difficulty in accepting time in its conservative aspect or rather as an element in which are preserved all the traces of a past wherein are presented the laws found operating in this world. Janet identifies it with time as understood by the historian, a time which preserves the traces of everything that has

[10] Lecture of February 20, 1928 : ' Le temps des philosophes '.

been. But it seems merely an abuse of language to call this the conservative aspect of time. If the past is preserved, it is in despite of time; admittedly it is seen and apprehended *in* time but it is not preserved *by* time. It is rather as if one were to say, in making preserves of vegetables or fruit, that their preservation would be secured by time and not by the culinary and hygienic measures designed to counteract the effects of time.

All that exists in time as we know it seems destined to pass away, although in accordance with a rhythm that is sometimes slow and sometimes rapid; clearly the sun does not grow old in the same rhythm as I myself, or an ephemera. But the legend of the aged Heraclites weeping by the bank of his river over the thought that one cannot bathe twice in the same waters retains its value; in our eyes time passes away, constantly bringing and taking with it all that forms part of life and of the universe.

It is moreover the fact that time *takes away* all that we love or regret which makes the deepest impression upon us, and which I have lately been deploring in company with Lamartine. As an individual I do not very much mind whether time creates other creatures, since I myself am already created and time can do nothing for me but bring me daily nearer to destruction, to my appointed end. And so creative time, which we shall discuss more fully later, is only seldom represented in myths, while art offers few parallels to the conception of Time presiding over births, which is seen in Maeterlinck's *Blue Bird*. In Greek mythology, however, Chronos begets his children before eating them, thus uniting in his person the two functions, the creative and destructive, which we attribute to time. But his cannibalism is more impressive than his procreative activities.

Here we must sound a note of warning. These allusions to the mythical figures which the human imagination has evolved to represent time must place us on our guard against the danger of anthropomorphism inherent in the mind. If I speak of time preserving, creating or destroying, even though I can appeal to many a precedent in philosophy, am I not unwittingly falling into animistic habits of thought, like any Australian aboriginal? Have I not been accepting quite literally a personified figure of time, with white beard and scythe, who passes by and, after begetting children like any other mortal, mows them down? It is therefore doubtless no more permissible to speak of a creative or destructive function of time than of a conservative one. The only description adequate to the observed facts would

be to say that, in that element which presents itself to us as unidimensional time, everything is first created, then preserved and finally destroyed. Time then finds itself acquitted of the charge which men have preferred against it, of destroying them without pity ; one might say that it is thereby rehabilitated.

But, whatever one may say or do, human imagination, being constituted as it is, cannot ever break away from an animistic conception of time. And in human eyes time is primarily a destructive thing, seeing that it deprives us of all that we hold dear and that it will one day carry us away bodily in our turn. That is why, ever since there have been philosophers, they have all, with very few exceptions, attempted to wriggle their way out of time. How nice it would be if we could escape the annihilating influence of the passage of time !

' Deliver us from time, space and number ! ' exclaimed Leconte de Lisle, addressing Death, who could alone, as the positivists believed, fulfil their prayer. But long before the poet, the philosophers had almost one and all voiced a similar appeal to some god, conceived as the very incarnation of eternity. Thus philosophical systems fall more or less into line with those of the theologians in lifting up their eyes towards the Eternal One.

Plato observes that God, finding it impossible to make the world eternal, gave it time, which is a moving likeness of eternity.[11] There have been the Ideas of Plato, pure concepts of the mind projected outwards, Ideas untrammelled by Space or Time which for long succeeded in dazzling humanity ; and there have been the God of Aristotle and the God of Plotinus ; and there has been the God of mediæval Christian theology, omnipresent both in space and in time. And Spinoza dreamed of his God as the Absolute.

And then Kant appeared. He pitched his tent, as so many had done before him, in front of the Monster of time and, reversing the rôles of Œdipus and the Sphinx, sought to elicit from it an answer to this philosophical problem : ' What is your true nature, you who seem to devour all things, you without whom I could not perceive the world ? ' And before long we find Kant claiming that he has torn away the mask assumed by Time and discovered behind it nothing but smoke.

' Forms of our perception ', he exclaimed, ' time as well as space ! Apart from the subject, they are nothing at all ! So much so that they

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[11] *Timaeus*, 37 D.

are not determined by anything in experience but exist in us *a priori*.'

For the moment let us hear how Kant himself explains his views. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* he writes : ' What we are maintaining is, therefore, the *empirical reality* of time, that is, its objective validity in respect of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be given to us in experience which does not conform to the condition of time. On the other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality ; that is to say, we deny that it belongs to things absolutely, as their condition or property, independently of any reference to the form of our sensible intuition ; properties that belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through the senses. This, then, is what constitutes the *transcendental ideality* of time. What we mean by this phrase is that if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, time is nothing, and cannot be ascribed to the objects in themselves (apart from their relation to our intuition) in the way either of substance or of accident. This ideality, like that of space, has however nothing in common with the subreptions of the sensations, because in their case it is assumed that the appearance, in which the sensible predicates inhere, itself has objective reality , but in the case of time, such objective reality falls entirely away, save in so far as it is merely empirical, that is, save in so far as we regard the object itself merely as appearance.' [12]

It is comprehensible that such a conception of time, and equally the Kantian conception of space, utterly contrary as they are to all the data of common sense, should have challenged opposition. Kant's phenomenalism has been criticized on the ground that it is a disguised form of idealism, that it is really tantamount to a denial of reality.

In the *Prolegomena*,[13] Kant defends his position against this suggestion, and endeavours to lend greater precision to his thought : ' I should like to know what my assertions must be to avoid all idealism. No doubt I should have to say that the representation of space is not only in complete harmony with the relation which our sensibility has to objects—indeed I have said as much—but that it is quite similar to the object : an assertion in which I can find as little meaning as if I

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[12] *Critique of Pure Reason.* (Adapted from Norman Kemp Smith's translation.)

[13] *Prolegomena,* 13, Note II.

said that the sensation of red has a similarity to the property of the cinnabar, which excites that sensation in me.'

And later : ' For what I have called my idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, indeed, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense) since it never came into my head to doubt it, but it concerns the sensory representation of things to which space and time especially belong. Of these and consequently of all *appearances* in general, I have only shown that they are neither things (but mere modes of representation) nor determinations belonging to things in themselves. But the word " transcendental ", which with me means a reference of our cognition not to things but only to the cognitive faculty, was meant to obviate this misconception.'

We see what difficulty Kant himself experienced in trying to clarify his ideas. He had previously written in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that one must not compare the qualities of space and time with the ' subreptions of the sensations ', the latter alone possessing an objective substratum ; but in the *Prolegomena* he brings the sensation of red into relation with the perception of space, asserts that space and time belong to the ' sensory representation of things ' and even goes so far as to assure us that ' of these and consequently of all appearances ' he has only maintained that they are neither things nor ' determinations belonging to things in themselves '. So far then we find that space, although according to Kant not derived from experience, is brought into relation both with the sensation of red and with those qualities of things with which it should have no relation since they are given *a posteriori*, being derived from our experience, whereas space, by definition, arises within our own mind and constitutes an innate, *a priori* form of our perception. And time falls into the same category.

But that is precisely the difficulty. The idea of a synthetic *a priori* judgement whence is derived, according to Kant, the absolute transcendental ideality of time and space seems to represent a survival in the work of this profound and penetrating thinker from the antiquated metaphysic for which he nevertheless entertained such a thoroughgoing aversion. Perhaps we must regard it as his own private attempt at wriggling his way out of time.

In actual fact it seems impossible to conceive of any object in our perception to which reality, in the fullest sense of the word, has not in

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[14] *Prolegomena*, 13, Note III.

some way contributed. It is true that our senses only allow us to form a very imperfect picture of the universe and it is doubtless correct to say that they only fasten upon inadequate samples of reality, in the form of ' appearances '. But, after all, everything we perceive with the aid of our senses must in some way be derived from external reality in which those senses have gradually been developed in the course of the evolution of the human race.

Accordingly it does not seem possible to imagine anything enjoying a purely subjective existence and owing nothing to the environment in which for thousands of years the human mind has sought and received sustenance and thus developed its faculties. If space and time are always and everywhere present to our perception, this must certainly be due to our intuition or sensibility having acquired these forms. But how could we have come to acquire them unless something in our environment imposed them upon us ? Kant's great distinction between the thing in itself which can never be known and the appearances of things may itself be made to serve as an instrument for developing a critique of the Kantian critique of space and time. Behind space and time in the phenomenal aspect in which they are presented to us there must be hidden some portion of reality (which we can, if we are so minded, call ' subreptions ' of space and time), though our perception of them differs as widely from the reality as the red impinging on our retina from the vibrations of light which condition it.

More recently a conception of time which departs from Kant's has attracted many supporters : I refer to that formulated by Bergson. If Kant's standpoint is : ' I create time ', Bergson replies : ' Time creates me '. With Bergson time is no longer denied an objective existence ; on the contrary, his concept of duration is presented as the supreme reality of life and of the Universe.

At last then we seem to have found a philosopher who forms an exception to the rule, who does not recoil from time in horror or attempt an impossible wriggle out of it. Time as living duration has inspired Bergson to write some magnificent pæans. Those who have not read him will imagine that this philosopher must be more attentive to reality, more of a realist than the others.

They would be wrong. Time, the time which we live, and which we know is slipping away, the time which destroys us, the time of Lamartine's ' Lac ', could never have undergone such an apotheosis except on one condition determined by our deepest unconscious wishes , namely that it should cast off the features of old age, lay aside its

scythe, and proceed to confine itself almost entirely to the rôle of a benevolent creator.

According to Bergson we, the living, exist in time or duration, or rather are but a part and parcel of it. A splendid ' *élan vital* ' sustains us, we are free, we progress, we become more perfect and beautiful with each succeeding generation. An intuition superior to intellect, more creative than knowledge, enables us to capture within ourselves duration, life in the being. This is proved by the mystics who, with that sympathetic insight peculiar to intuition which makes it possible to penetrate to the inner meaning of things, have truly captured within themselves life, creative duration—God. And this intuition can lead us very far. Not only does it allow the soul an after-life ' which is apparently assured to the soul by the simple fact that, even here below, a great part of its activity is independent of the body '—not a particularly novel suggestion since the various religious systems have already given us a similar assurance—but, besides offering to reward the soul with eternity, it provides the body with a sizeable expanse in space. ' People are never tired ', declares Bergson, ' of saying that man is but a minute speck on the face of the earth, the earth a speck in the universe. Yet, even physically, man is far from merely occupying the tiny space allotted to him and with which Pascal himself was content when he condemned the " thinking reed " to be, materially, a reed and nothing more. For if our body is matter for our consciousness it is co-extensive with our consciousness, it comprises everything we perceive, it reaches as far as the stars. But this vast body is changing continually, sometimes radically, at the slightest shifting of one part of itself which is at its centre and occupies a small fraction of space. This inner and central body, relatively invariable, is ever present. It is not merely present, it is operative : it is through this body, and through it alone, that we can move other parts of the large body. And, since action is what matters, since it is an understood thing that we are present where we act, the habit has grown of limiting consciousness to the small body and ignoring the vast one.' [15]

Such are the dreams of conquest of time and annexation of space to which our deep unconscious wishes can reduce us, simple mortals and powerful thinkers alike. And even in these days there is no occasion for us to manifest undue surprise at finding that a writer so little inclined to mysticism as Pierre Janet should have penned the

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[15] Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, pp. 221–2.

following conceit : ' The idea of progress possesses numerous features which offend our habitual modes of thought. For instance, it necessarily implies a change, a complete novelty, something which had no previous existence. In short, the journey we should make into the past, as in H. G. Wells's *Time Machine*, if it ever does come to pass—and I think it will in some hundreds of years—will be something which had had absolutely no previous existence of any kind, of which, indeed, science had not allowed us to form the remotest conception. The past had been destroyed, was nothingness. How should we explore it when nothing is there ? It is a contradiction in terms.' [16]

Sublime optimism, born of our desires !—born of the fundamental desire for ever embedded in our unconscious to annul the always hateful ravages of time !

Concluding Remarks : Synthesis and Criticism

In this brief survey we have attempted to review the principal methods whereby we poor mortals, impelled by our deep unconscious urge to live, seek to escape from time from the moment we become conscious of its existence and of what we feel to be its fatal destructive influence.

The child has at first only a very hazy notion of time. We have ascribed this state of affairs to the fact that he is originally dominated by his unconscious, from which the preconscious only becomes differentiated by degrees. Little by little the combined efforts of adults and time-pieces manage to take care of this part of his education, which indeed constitutes one aspect of man's education to reality. A little later, the adolescent, owing to pressure from the powerful instincts now awakening within him, has still to learn that time is not unlimited and his first experiences of the ecstasies of love provide, while they last, an illusion of eternity. It is only later, as the conscious mind becomes adult and mature, that the sense of time acquires its prosaic precision.

However, at night our consciousness is shrouded in sleep. Then the portals of the unconscious are opened to allow of a greater or less degree of freedom of access to tidings from the unconscious. And the timelessness which is a feature of this makes of our dreams a world alien from that of our waking life, a world in which temporal and spatial limitations seem to exist no longer. This flight from the tyranny

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[16] *L'évolution de la mémoire et de la notion du temps*, Chap. XXIII, ' Le progrès ', p. 560.

of time which we are able to renew each night seems to me to represent one of the greatest wish-fulfilments accomplished by the dream for the benefit of human beings who remain harnessed to time's chariot while day lasts.

Even in their waking hours men have acquired the habit of dreaming, in order to be able to continue to find life tolerable. Myths, legends and fairy-tales, products of the human imagination, represent the accumulated treasure of the dreams of mankind.

But, awake or asleep, man cannot always dream when it pleases him. He has therefore sought to circumvent his sense of time by other means which his nature places at his disposal. Endowed to a greater extent than other animals with a powerful libido, men have found their pleasure in the intoxications of love in which all sense of time is lost. But the happiness of love depends on the willingness of another person. Accordingly they have sought to procure intoxication on more favourable terms—a purely private intoxication induced by toxic substances or the ecstasies which mystics derive from union with some imaginary God who gives himself to them with sublime magnanimity.

However, these states of intoxication are of limited duration and always one emerges from them to discover time still on the watch by one's bedside—time, whose path, as man alone among living creatures knows, leads only to the grave. He has therefore had recourse to magic, to prayer and to science to help him to postpone the process of dissolution and prolong his life, and his efforts have sometimes been successful. But since he may postpone but not escape his destiny, he has tried, by transmitting his life to his work, sometimes at least to survive through the creative achievements of his hands or his brain. To-day we can still behold the Parthenon and the Pyramids or read the Vedas, the works of Homer or of Plato.

But only a few select spirits dare hope thus to survive. And, however great my work, it is not my living self ; death awaits me whether I have written the *Phædo* or whether I am a humble labourer. That is why from the moment that man had come to understand the nature of death, there arose the diverse kinds of Paradise located in the heavens or beneath the earth in which he could prolong his all too brief existence in an eternity of bliss, variously conceived among the different peoples.

But man's curiosity would not allow him to rest content with this. In his struggle against time, neither dreams nor intoxication, neither creative work nor religion sufficed ; he found it necessary to invoke as

well the aid of philosophy, the occupation *par excellence* of the crazy creature that man so often is.

And almost all systems of philosophy have to a greater or less extent tried to banish the inexorable presence of time which seems to bring us into the world only to destroy us as quickly as possible. They have always dreamt of a different dimension, in which space and time, the latter especially, have either been abolished or transformed, where we can seek refuge, after the fashion of the mystics, in pure contemplation of some timeless and spaceless god. And to-day, after a century which proudly and with justice proclaimed itself the age of positive science, we are witnessing a revival of this ineradicable tendency in the human heart.

The truth is that man cannot change his unconscious ; at the very most he can sometimes learn to control the indestructible urges in it ; and one of his fundamental wishes is to escape from the insatiable maw of time.

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Reason, which, after all, in the course of centuries has somewhat extended its influence in human affairs, compels us to recognize the unalterable fact that we cannot reverse the wheels of time. To me, as a living creature, it is of little practical importance what kind of substratum in the realm of ' things in themselves ' may underlie time in its phenomenal aspect. It is this time which enters into my life, which drives me to flight or resistance. But if I have the power of reason, I well know that this time will ultimately defeat me.

However, even after the pronouncements of Plato, Kant, Bergson and other great thinkers, I feel impelled, insignificant woman that I am, to interrogate time afresh, to call upon this adversary to disclose its true nature and ultimate identity.

Is it conceivable that time, which appears to be the cause of my death, the medium in which my life slowly ebbs away, should be nothing but a form of my perception ? Can it be merely an *a priori* category projected by my mind into the universe, which is otherwise full of the real and solid appearances of things ? I cannot bring myself to believe it. I am prepared to assent to the proposition that time, in the form in which I perceive it, is only a phenomenon ; but this phenomenon must possess some underlying reality, even if, like the universe as a whole, it remains impenetrable. Three arguments lend themselves to the support of this theory.

The first of these might be called the cosmological argument. If

in fact there were no reality underlying phenomenal time, how could the hypothesis of this time in its application to the universe have enabled us to account for and actually to predict the movements of the suns and the planets, whether we calculate this movement in relation to the independent and absolute time and space of Newton or the single space-time theory of Einstein ?

I know that I shall be told that time as conceived by the physicists, astronomers and mathematicians has nothing in common with the time in which I live—with pure duration—and is only a spatialized time. Nevertheless the one is derived from the other, whatever aspect it may ultimately have come to assume, and if no one had ever experienced, perceived or conceived time and space, the human architect would never have been able to raise those grandiose structures which owe to Space and Time their magnificent inspiration.

However, Kant has no difficulty in disposing of this argument. If the calculations of the astronomers agree, this, he maintains, is because the human mind, being everywhere the same, everywhere and always projects into things the self-same forms of its intuition ; and thus agreement is achieved. If the suns, the planets and the comets appear to conform to human calculations concerning them, it is really because human minds already conform with one another.

Perhaps more directly to the point, since it applies to the mind itself, is our second argument, the psychological one. It has recently been placed at our disposal by the science of psycho-analysis, still in its infancy. Psycho-analysis has taught us to recognize the co-existence of two facts : a sense of reality and a sense of time appear simultaneously in the system of perceptual consciousness alone. Neither exists for the timeless unconscious, which remains independent of the secondary process dominated by the reality principle and continues wholly subject to the primary process regulated by the pleasure principle.

But if the sense of time and the sense of reality begin to pervade the human mind at one and the same time, must there not be some connection between them ? Thus time must in some way form an integral part of the objective world which we perceive.

And the aversion, emphasized by a number of thinkers, which characterizes man's attitude towards time, points in the same direction. Time has certainly not been imposed upon us by the pleasure principle ; on the contrary, the pleasure principle takes advantage of every favourable opportunity to help us to forget it. It demands the highest

effort of which the human intelligence is capable to induce us to pay attention to time, just as to reality.

Thus time does not appear to form an integral part of our fundamental nature but seems to belong solely to our dawning perception of the reality of the world outside us.

But Kant would not have allowed such considerations to trouble him. He would perhaps have said that the sense of time originated when consciousness established contact with reality, much as a chemical reaction results from contact between two bodies, but that that did not necessarily show that it formed part of the Universe, even when one insists that phenomenal time must possess some substratum.

In his paper on ' The Unconscious ',[17] Freud writes as follows :

'In psycho-analysis there is no choice for us but to declare mental processes to be in themselves unconscious, and to compare the perception of them by consciousness with the perception of the outside world through the sense-organs ; we even hope to extract some fresh knowledge from the comparison. The psycho-analytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us, on the one hand, a further development of that primitive animism which caused our own consciousness to be reflected in all around us, and, on the other hand, it seems to be an extension of the corrections begun by Kant in regard to our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perception is subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with the phenomena perceived but never really discerned, so psycho-analysis bids us not to set conscious perception in the place of the unconscious mental process which is its object. The mental, like the physical, is not necessarily in reality just what it appears to us to be. It is, however, satisfactory to find that the correction of inner perception does not present difficulties so great as that of outer perception—that the inner object is less hard to discern truly than is the outside world.'

Kant might well have taken advantage of this comparison with his own theories and argued that Freud himself admits that the unconscious is unknowable. It would follow that the unknowable substratum underlying the phenomenal aspect of time which only consciousness perceives might equally well be found in the internal aspect of this unknown element as in its external aspect, in the heart of our internal world as in that of the universe outside us.

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[17] *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 104.

In a conversation which I had with him after he had read this paper, Freud confirmed that his views were potentially in agreement with those of Kant. The sense we have of the passing of time, he observed, originates in our inner perception of the passing of our own life. When consciousness awakens within us we perceive this internal flow and then project it into the outside world.

The perception of space, Freud went on, cannot be separated from that of time. How have we come to acquire it ? To begin with we must ask ourselves whether there is anything in the world which we can conceive of apart from space, non-spatially. One such thing does exist, namely the mind or psyche. But this discovery must itself provide us with food for reflection. If the mind seems thus to lack the quality of space, perhaps it is by reason of a massive projection outwards of all its original spatial attributes. Psycho-analysis has in fact taught us that the psyche is composed of separate institutions which we are obliged to represent as existing in space. It might be said that this is due to our introjecting external space. But why should it not be the other way round ? When our consciousness begins to establish itself, it would perceive these internal institutions, the reconstruction of which we owe entirely to depth psychology, as located in space. No doubt they even possess an anatomical substratum, although the nature of this has still to be determined. We should then project this internal act of cognition outwards, so that the space inhering in the outside world would originate in a projection of our own internal space which we should then proceed to deny.

The perceptions which we owe to our physical senses, Freud continued, are themselves ' projections ' in varying measure, according to the particular sense involved. Those associated with our sense of touch and taste remain almost entirely an internal matter. The sense of smell already begins to project its perceptions into the surrounding atmosphere. Hearing distributes them equally between the inner and outer world. And as regards sight, its perceptions are completely ' projected '. Impressions and images which are inscribed in the optical layers of our brain and thus located rather far back in the cranium, seem to us in fact to exist in the outside world. So much so, I might add, that for thousands of years men believed that it was their eyes which projected some kind of rays on to objects.

May it not be the same, Freud concluded, with our external perceptions of space and time, and would not this translation into psycho-

analytical language of the old *a priori* judgements of Kant vindicate him approximately ?

I must confess that even Freud's arguments fail to convince me that our perceptions of space and time are originally and essentially an internal affair. For if the prototypes of these perceptions lie thus deeply buried within ourselves, how has this come to pass ? Here I would recall Goethe's dictum that all that is within us exists without, insisting on the sense in which Goethe used it, of internalization of the outside world.[18]

The third argument, which we outlined earlier in this paper, when we ventured to embark upon a critique of Kant's time, seems to us the most difficult to answer. It is impossible to suppose, we argued, that men have derived those forms of their intuition or perception which we call space and time from any conceivable source other than the environment in which they have evolved for thousands of years, ever since they began to walk the face of the earth. If Kant thought otherwise, it must have been because, notwithstanding the aversion which he professed for the old school of metaphysics, he had not really been able to renounce the dualistic belief in a soul independent of the body and in a creative God. It is true that he invoked the support of moral law as a basis for a belief in the existence of the deity, but he

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[18] After reading this paper Freud communicated to me another idea which had occurred to him, based on a psychology of attention. According to this, the attention which we bestow on objects is due to rapid but successive cathexes which might be regarded in a sense as quanta issuing from the ego. Our inner perceptual activity would only later make a continuity of it, and it is here that we find, projected into the outside world, the prototype of time. During sleep, these cathexes would be withdrawn, which would explain why time is abolished while one sleeps. It is only reactivated in the course of sleep in association with the hallucinatory perceptions of the dream, attention needless to say remaining closely bound up with perception.

We might add that man afterwards re-establishes these primitive quanta of cathexis in time when he divides up measurable time.

The upshot of all this would be the equation ' attention = perception = time '.

[A further reference to this theory of Freud's will be found at the end of his ' Note upon the " Mystic Writing-Pad " ', pp. 473–4 of the present volume of this JOURNAL. See also *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 32.—*Ed.*]

was already a believer. This God, who creates souls at his pleasure and has deposited in them *a priori*, prior to all experience, those forms of our perception or intuition which we call space and time, can no longer command our adherence. There seems to confront us only the unity of the universe, a unity in which it seems difficult to conceive of a mind sufficiently independent to create out of nothing the forms under which the universe may be apprehended. The humility which I feel in face of the universe forces me to the conclusion that the human species has become attuned in the course of its long history to the environment to which it belongs and has evolved in complete harmony with it.

That is why, having regard to this last, biogenetic argument, I consider it impossible to avoid the conclusion that the phenomenal time in which we are born, grow up, decline and die must bear some relation to the fundamental reality of the universe, must possess some objective substratum in the outside world.

Evidently we shall never be able either to prove or to disprove this hypothesis, since ' time in itself ', if we may be allowed to invent such a term, lies wholly beyond the range of our experience. But perhaps it must be accounted precisely one of the greatest triumphs of the human intelligence that it has surpassed all other creatures in the degree in which it recognizes the phenomenal emanations of ' noumenal ' time, in which the universe is constantly being renewed and destroyed.

UNTRANSLATED FREUD

[EDITORIAL NOTE: *We propose to publish from time to time under this heading selections from those of Freud's writings which, so far as we can discover, have not yet appeared in English. Since all of his major works have already been translated, it is not to be expected that anything of outstanding importance will be included here. Nevertheless, much will be found that is of very great interest and nothing, perhaps, that does not exhibit in some degree the characteristic originality of its author's mind. Our selections will treat of a large variety of topics and will be drawn from many periods of Freud's life. Readers may be advised to have particular regard to this latter point and to judge each selection with reference to the date at which it was written.*]

(1) A NOTE UPON THE 'MYSTIC WRITING-PAD' (1925) [1]

If I distrust my memory—neurotics, as we know, do so to a remarkable extent, but normal people have every reason for doing so as well—I am able to supplement and guarantee its working by making a note in writing. In that case the surface upon which this note is preserved, the pocket-book or sheet of paper, is as it were a materialized portion of my mnemonic apparatus, the rest of which I carry about with me invisible. I have only to bear in mind the place where this 'memory' has been deposited and I can then 'reproduce' it at any time I like, with the certainty that it will have remained unaltered and so have escaped the possible distortions to which it might have been subjected in my actual memory.

If I want to make full use of this technique for improving my mnemonic function, I find that there are two different procedures open to me. On the one hand, I can choose a writing-surface which will preserve intact any note made upon it for an indefinite length of time—for instance, a sheet of paper which I can write upon in ink. I am then in possession of a 'permanent memory-trace'. The disadvantage of this procedure is that the receptive capacity of the writing-surface is soon exhausted. The sheet is filled with writing, there is no room on it for any more notes, and I find myself obliged to bring another sheet into use, that has not been written on. Moreover, the advantage of this procedure, the fact that it provides a 'permanent trace', may

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[1] ['Notiz über den "Wunderblock"' was first published simultaneously in Freud's *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. VI, 1925, S. 415–420 and in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XI, 1925, S. 1–5.]

lose its value for me if after a time the note ceases to interest me and I no longer want to 'retain it in my memory'. The alternative procedure avoids both of these disadvantages. If, for instance, I write with a piece of chalk upon a slate, I have a receptive surface which retains its receptive capacity for an unlimited time and the notes upon which can be destroyed as soon as they cease to interest me, without any need for throwing away the writing-surface itself. Here the disadvantage is that I cannot preserve a permanent trace. If I want to put some fresh notes upon the slate, I must first wipe out the ones which cover it. Thus an unlimited receptive capacity and a retention of permanent traces seem to be mutually exclusive properties in the apparatus which we use as substitutes for our memory: either the receptive surface must be renewed or the note must be destroyed.

All the forms of auxiliary apparatus which we have invented for the improvement or intensification of our sensory functions are built like the sensory organs themselves or portions of them: for instance, spectacles, photographic cameras, ear-trumpets. Measured by this standard devices to aid our memory seem particularly imperfect, since our mental apparatus accomplishes precisely what they cannot: it has an unlimited receptive capacity for new perceptions and nevertheless lays down permanent—even though not unalterable—memory-traces of them. As long ago as in 1900 I gave expression in *The Interpretation of Dreams*[2] to a suspicion that this unusual capacity was to be divided between two different systems or organs of the mental apparatus. According to this view, we possess a system Pcpt.-Cs., which receives perceptions but retains no permanent trace of them, so that it can react like a clean sheet to every new perception; while the permanent traces of the excitations which have been received are preserved in 'mnemonic systems' lying behind the perceptual system. Later, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*,[3] I added a remark to the effect that the inexplicable phenomenon

[2] [Pp. 497–8 of the English translation (Revised Edition, 1932). The translation of the decisive sentence, however, is misleading: 'for consciousness memory and quality are mutually exclusive in the ψ-systems' should read 'memory and the quality of being conscious are mutually exclusive in the ψ-systems.'—*Ed.*]

[3] [P. 28 of the English translation, where, once more, the original meaning is unfortunately missed: 'consciousness arises *in the place of* the memory trace' should read '*instead of*'. The same mistake is repeated in a more marked form, in the translation of an additional footnote in

of consciousness arises in the perceptual system *instead of* the permanent traces.

Some time ago there came upon the market, under the name of the Mystic Writing-Pad,[4] a small contrivance that promises to perform more than the sheet of paper or the slate. It claims to be nothing more than a writing-tablet from which notes can be erased by an easy movement of the hand. But if it is examined more closely it will be found that its construction shows a remarkable agreement with my hypothetical structure of our perceptual apparatus and that it can in fact provide both an ever-ready receptive surface and permanent traces of the notes that have been made upon it.

The Mystic Pad is a slab of dark brown resin or wax with a paper edging; over the slab is laid a thin transparent sheet, the top end of which is firmly secured to the slab while its bottom end rests upon it without being fixed to it. This transparent sheet is the more interesting part of the little device. It itself consists of two layers, which can be detached from each other except at their two ends. The upper layer is a transparent piece of celluloid; the lower layer is made of thin translucent waxed paper. When the apparatus is not in use, the lower surface of the waxed paper adheres lightly to the upper surface of the wax slab.

To make use of the Mystic Pad, one writes upon the celluloid portion of the covering sheet which rests upon the wax slab. For this purpose no pencil or chalk is necessary, since the writing does not depend on material being deposited upon the receptive surface. It is a return to the ancient method of writing upon tablets of clay or wax: a pointed stilus scratches the surface, the depressions upon which constitute the 'writing'. In the case of the Mystic Pad this scratching is not effected directly, but through the medium of the covering sheet. At the points which the stilus touches, it presses the lower surface of the waxed paper on to the wax slab, and the grooves are visible as

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The Interpretation of Dreams (Revised Edition, 1932, p. 498): 'consciousness occurs actually *in the locality* of the memory-trace,' which should read, once again, '*instead of* the memory-trace.' This characteristic detail of Freud's theory of the dynamics of consciousness does not appear to have been mentioned elsewhere in his writings; it seems likely therefore that it has hitherto escaped presentation in English.—*Ed.*]

[4] [It is still obtainable as such in England, where however it is also known as 'Printator'.—*Ed.*]

dark writing upon the otherwise smooth whitish-grey surface of the celluloid. If one wishes to destroy what has been written, all that is necessary is to raise the double covering sheet from the wax slab by a light pull, starting from the free lower end. The close contact between the waxed paper and the wax slab at the places which have been scratched, upon which the visibility of the writing depended, is thus brought to an end and it does not recur when the two surfaces come together once more. The Mystic Pad is now clear of writing and ready to receive fresh notes.

The small imperfections of the contrivance have, of course, no importance for us, since we are only concerned with its approximation to the structure of the perceptive apparatus of the mind.

If, while the Mystic Pad has writing upon it, we cautiously raise the celluloid from the waxed paper, we can see the writing just as clearly on the surface of the latter, and the question may arise of why there should be any necessity for the celluloid portion of the cover. Experiment will then show that the thin paper would be very easily crumpled or torn if one were to write directly upon it with the stilus. The layer of celluloid thus acts as a protective sheath for the waxed paper, to keep off injurious effects from without. The celluloid is a ' protective barrier against stimuli ' ; the layer which actually receives the stimuli is the paper. I may at this point recall that in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* [5] I showed that the perceptive apparatus of our mind consists of two layers, of an external protective barrier against stimuli whose task it is to diminish the strength of excitations coming in, and of a surface behind it which receives the stimuli, namely the system Pcpt.-Cs.

The analogy would not be of much value if it could not be pursued further than this. If we lift the entire covering sheet—both the celluloid and the waxed paper—off the wax slab, the writing vanishes and, as I have already remarked, does not re-appear again. The surface of the Mystic Pad is clear of writing and once more capable of receiving impressions. But it is easy to discover that the permanent trace of what was written is retained upon the wax slab itself and is legible in suitable lights. Thus the Pad provides not only a receptive surface that can be used over and over again, like a slate, but also permanent traces of what has been written, like an ordinary paper pad : it solves the problem of combining the two functions *by dividing*

[5] [Pp. 30 ff.]

them between two separate but interrelated component parts or systems. But this is precisely the way in which, according to the hypothesis which I mentioned just now, our mental apparatus performs its perceptual function. The layer which receives the stimuli—the system Pcpt.-Cs.—forms no permanent traces; the foundations of memory come about in other, adjoining systems.

We need not be disturbed by the fact that in the Mystic Pad no use is made of the permanent traces of the notes that have been received; it is enough that they are present. There must come a point at which the analogy between an auxiliary apparatus of this kind and the organ which is its prototype will cease to apply. It is true, too, that, once the writing has been erased, the Mystic Pad cannot 'reproduce' it from within; it would indeed be a mystic pad if, like our memory, it could accomplish that. None the less, I do not think it is too far-fetched to compare the celluloid and waxed paper cover with the system Pcpt.-Cs. and its protective barrier, the wax slab with the unconscious behind them, and the appearance and disappearance of the writing with the flickering-up and passing of consciousness in the process of perception.

But I must admit that I am inclined to press the comparison still further. On the Mystic Pad the writing vanishes every time the close contact is broken between the paper which receives the stimulus and the wax slab which preserves the impression. This agrees with a notion which I have long had about the method in which the perceptual apparatus of our mind functions, but which I have hitherto kept to myself. I have supposed that cathectic innervations are sent out and withdrawn in rapid periodic impulses from within into the completely pervious system Pcpt.-Cs. So long as that system is cathected in this manner, it receives the perceptions (which are accompanied by consciousness) and passes the excitation on to the unconscious mnemonic systems; but as soon as the cathexis is withdrawn, consciousness is extinguished and the functioning of the system ceases. It would be as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of the system Pcpt.-Cs., towards the external world, and these are hastily withdrawn as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it. Thus I attributed the interruptions, which with the Mystic Pad have an external origin, to the discontinuity in the current of innervation; and the place of an actual breaking of contact was taken in my hypothesis by the periodic non-excitability of the perceptual system. I further suspected that this discontinuous method

of functioning of the system Pcpt.-Cs. lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time.[6]

If we imagine one hand writing upon the surface of the Mystic Pad while another periodically raises its covering sheet from the wax slab, we shall have a concrete representation of the way in which I tried to picture the functioning of the perceptual apparatus of our mind.

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[6] [An elaboration of Freud's views on this subject (which are also hinted at in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 32) will be found reported in the last pages of Marie Bonaparte's paper on ' Time and the Unconscious ', in the present volume of this JOURNAL, pp. 466–7 and footnote 18. —*Ed.*]

ABSTRACTS

General

Imre Hermann. ' Zur Triebbesetzung von Ich und Über-Ich.' (' Instinctual Cathexis of Ego and Super-Ego.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 2, S. 131–137.

The author selects the two opposed component instincts of clinging to and going in search of, and their respective reactive tendencies of separating and retaining. Taken together, these four trends constitute what he calls the ' clinging syndrome ' (*Anklammerungssyndrom*). This syndrome is not only present as a pathological element in neuroses and psychoses—as in Schreber's delusion of being tied to God by his nerves—but also forms part of the normal functions of the ego and super-ego.

As far as the ego is concerned, and in its instinctual aspect of clinging to, we see this syndrome operating, for instance, whenever there is any stress of anxiety, or in the act of going to sleep. In these situations the ego clings to its id, thus going back to an early stage of development at which ego and id were as yet undifferentiated and at which the infant still clung to its mother. Its instinctual opposite of going in search of is represented by the processes of perception. In its reactive aspects as a tendency to retain or to separate off, it finds expression in the various defensive mechanisms of the ego, and, on higher levels of thought, in relations of duality such as ' either—or ' and ' if—then '.

As regards the super-ego, this four-sided syndrome shows itself mainly as a clinging to the super-ego by the ego ; a going in search of ideals ; a being able to tolerate separation from the penis ; and a retention of the values the penis stands for. The aggressive nature of the original instinctual situation makes itself felt, moreover, in the severity of the super-ego towards the ego.

A. S.

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Clinical

Grete Bibring. 'Über eine orale Komponente bei männlicher Inversion.' (' An Oral Component in Masculine Inversion.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 2, S. 124–130.

Just as there is a class of men who are apparently heterosexual but whose latent homosexuality finds expression in the fact that they choose as their sexual partners women who copulate with a great many men, and in this way get into sexual relationship with men, so there is a class of apparently homosexual men who gratify their latent heterosexuality by choosing as their sexual object a man who has had sexual intercourse with many women ; for thus they can copulate vicariously with women.

An illustrative case is that of a patient who was strongly fixated on his mother in an oral way but who saw his younger brother preferred to him by her. He reacted by taking the type of his brother ostensibly as his love-object but in reality as an identificatory object—as a figure through whose means he would get access to women. In his homosexual relations he practised *fellatio*, but he did not himself have an ejaculation, for his phantasy was to get hold of his partner's penis and semen and use them as his own. His repressed hatred of his male rivals is seen in his desire to take away his partner's penis and virility.

Some types of heterosexual masochists make use of a similar manœuvre. For instance, a patient used to have a phantasy of kneeling with his head in a woman's lap while a man was beating him behind with some sort of whip. The meaning of this was that he was taking in the man's penis through his anus (and through his mouth, as the associations showed) so that he could employ it with the woman and be very potent towards her.

A. S.

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J. Marjasch. 'Chronische Schweiger in der Analyse.' ('Chronic Silence in Analysis.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 2, S. 111–123.

In discussing the various methods of dealing with cases of this type, the author points out the danger that the analyst may unconsciously respond to his patient's continued silence in a hostile way by being silent himself, or may increase his resistance by making direct appeals to him to speak. The exercise of a great tact and infinite patience is recommended in treating cases of this kind.

As regards the significance of the symptom, the author draws a parallel between talking and seminal emission on the genital level and evacuation on the pre-genital level; and he shows the homosexual and masochistic meaning of silence and its rôle in the Œdipus situation, both active and passive. But he gives no more specific ætiology for it.

A. S.

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Eric P. Mosse. 'Painting-Analysis in the Treatment of Neuroses.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, pp. 65–82.

Drawing, especially finger painting, is an unconscious manifestation and can be treated like dream material. Resistances appear and must be overcome. A frequent one is the patient's refusal to draw anything owing to the fear of revealing himself. Also, there may be intellectualization or the reproduction of childhood learning or an attempt to fool the analyst.

Very important in understanding these pictures is knowledge of the way in which they are made; e.g. 'sharp staccato lines drawn like knives',

or ' weary solemn technique '. Pushing-away gestures are suggestive of hostile attitudes, etc.

No standardized values were found for the use of different colours, nor were the types of pictures typical of specific neuroses, but there were evident differences in the designs of psychotics and neurotics. Specific for psychosis were (1) the criss-cross outline, (2) one line outlining two faces, (3) grotesque caricatures, (4) strange organ relationships, (5) drawings resembling designs of children.

When the drawing test is used after metrazol shock, it shows that the confusion lasts as long as three hours instead of the ninety seconds shown by clinical symptoms, and that there is no characteristic difference in content, style, colour, or form before and after treatment.

Conclusions were drawn from 30 cases, chiefly male, including most of the neuroses and psychoses.

Clara Thompson.

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Bela Mittelmann. ' Euphoric Reactions in the Course of Psychoanalytic Treatment.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, pp. 27–44.

One type of reaction of a patient during analysis is studied in detail. The patient is a homosexual woman with anxiety attacks. Three periods of euphoria were observed, each occurring at a time when the patient made a progressive step, but the means used to achieve the step had pathological features. On the first occasion, she dared have positive feelings for the analyst towards whom she had felt aloof. On the second occasion, she dared assert her independence of her homosexual partner. On the third occasion, the patient acquired more freedom in her contact with men. Each step was, however, accompanied by anxiety and an overreaching of the goal; e.g. on the last occasion there was a feeling of superiority to men. Thus in these reactions there was combined joy in increased health and self-confidence, plus the gratification of pathological trends, plus release from humiliation and guilt. Each represented a definite turning point in the analysis although the means used to cope with the situation had pathological features.

Clara Thompson.

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Eduard Hitschmann. ' Beiträge zur Aetiologie und Konstitution der Spermatorrhœ.' (' Aetiological and Constitutional Factors in Spermatorrhœa.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 2, S. 197–205.

Dr. Hitschmann cites a number of cases to show that spermatorrhœa is often occasioned by psychogenic sexual abstinence and is associated with

an impairment of sexual potency and with latent or manifest homosexuality of a feminine type, based upon a bisexual constitution. He enlarges upon the probable physical causes of this disorder, the chief among them being an actual deficiency of spermatozoa in the seminal fluid ; and he places it in a more general class of pathological forms of seminal emission (which he calls ' *Incontinentia Spermatica* ') along with three other pathological forms, viz., diurnal emissions, *ejaculatio præcox* and unduly frequent nocturnal emissions.

A. S.

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Fritz Wittels. ' Psychology and Treatment of Depersonalization.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, pp. 57–64.

The term phantom is used for an identification which has become a part of the personality. Depersonalization is brought about by the incorporation of a great many phantoms. Insufficient ego libido is invested in any one of them : they are thus grey and colourless and the ego cannot decide which one of these phantoms is to be acknowledged as its representative. In all cases of depersonalization observed something was wrong in the infantile relation to the father. Thus it later appears that the super-ego is responsible for the disintegration of personality.

Clara Thompson.

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Hans Christoffel. ' Psychoanalytic Tendencies in Mental Hygiene in Switzerland, especially in Enuresis.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, pp. 45–56.

Enuresis is a functional relationship between child and educator ; therefore insight is important in the trainer. Various devices for wakening the bed wetter are condemned. It is pointed out that it is a character disturbance connected with sexual excitement. In so far as children are able to love the educator, enuresis will tend to diminish and chronic enuresis found in institutions need not exist.

Clara Thompson.

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Applied

Oskar Pfister. ' Lösung und Bindung von Angst und Zwang in der israelitisch-christlichen Religionsgeschichte.' (' Release and Binding of Anxiety and Compulsion in the History of the Jewish-Christian Religion.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 2, S. 206–213.

The writer traces the history of the Jewish and Christian religion to show that it exhibits a continuous alternation between anxiety and

obsessive states on the one hand and liberation from such states on the other. To begin with, Moses introduced the liberating phase with his idea of Jahve as a God of war and as a deliverer of the Jews from their Egyptian servitude. This phase of freedom was succeeded by one of compulsion in which Jahve became associated with the cruel God Baal and this new Jahve-Baal exacted ritual and sacrifice. Next followed the God of the prophets, who was a merciful God. But after the tribulations of the captivity the repressive hand of the priestcraft made itself felt and God once again became a retributive figure. In the next phase, Christ appeared as the liberator from fear, with his belief in a God of love ; and the idea of punishment disappeared, together with the obsessions and magical beliefs and ritual of the Jewish religion. But with the emergence of St. Paul some of the old fears began to return, as is seen, for instance, in the belief in being saved by faith and the crucifixion, in the pre-occupation with the problem of evil and in the condemnation of all spiritual and physical self-indulgence. This return of compulsion and anxiety was stabilized by Roman Catholicism in its insistence upon the Church as the sole intermediary between God and man, its stereotyped ceremonial and its persecution of heresies. The Reformation was at first a move towards liberation, as is shown by its breaking down of Church orthodoxy, its belief in the forgiveness of sins as a personal matter between God and each individual and its interest in the advancement of human kind ; but it once more went over to the gloomier side with the advent of belief in predestination and the widespread practice of witch-hunting. From the sixteenth century onwards the New Protestantism marked a swing of the pendulum towards freedom once more. It showed a great deal of lay influence in the form of a more rational attitude towards religion itself and a decided relaxation of morals ; while the religious influence which informed it led to Pietism. Here the tendency was to reject dogma and stress the emotional side—the love of God—while at the same time to insist on an ascetic conduct of life.

The writer regards the states of anxiety and obsession associated with religion as a collective neurosis, and release from those states as a collective cure. This cure comes from persons who have experienced the love of God in themselves and who transmit it to others, much in the same way as in psycho-analysis the patient is cured by finding new paths of love opened to him in virtue of his transference-relations to his analyst. There are two methods of effecting a religious cure. One is by the free remission of sins, the other by expiation and atonement. The first method implies the existence of a loving God (of which Christ is the arch example) modelled upon the subject's infantile view of his father as a kind and all-powerful being. It carries with it a high degree of gratification and feeling of release ; but it is difficult for anxious and obsessive people to achieve, since it does

not deal with their very severe sense of guilt. The second method is a modification of the Law of Talion and is better suited to remove feelings of hatred and guilt, for the punishment involved is felt by the subject as undoing the evil he has done or willed.

In conclusion, Dr. Pfister thinks that the reason why phases of release in religion were always followed by phases of compulsion is that even those free phases did not give sufficient outlet for a man's instinctual trends nor catch up enough of his psychic energies into channels of love. Thus his sense of sin and belief in a hating God were apt to become too powerful—especially when stimulated by external calamities like wars and pestilence—and obliged him to try to counteract his resultant fears by having recourse once more to religious sacrifice, ceremonials and persecution.

A. S.

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Maria Weigl-Pisk. 'Zur Psychologie der Todfeindschaft: Bemerkungen über das Kopfjägertum.' ('The Psychology of Death-Feuds: Some Notes on Head-Hunting.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 2, S. 214–220.

This paper deals with the head-hunting habits of certain tribes in Further India and Indonesia. It points out that the decapitated head is a male sexual symbol and is used in a magical way to fertilize the fields of the village in which it is kept. The head also has a concealed homosexual relationship to its captor, as is exemplified by the custom according to which the successful head-hunter must keep his trophy under his bed for five days after he has taken it, during which time he must have no contact of any kind—sexual, social or oral—with women. The head is furthermore expected to protect its new owner from evil spirits, although it itself represents the man whom he has killed and might therefore be expected to be hostile to him. But this is probably because the slayer has projected on to it his own unconscious love for his former enemy and victim.

A. S.

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Géza Róheim. 'The Garden of Eden.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 1–26 and 177–199.

The story of the Garden of Eden as related in Genesis is correlated with Babylonian and East African myths. These are essentially coitus myths in which the man struggles with the father (God) and wins the mother (Eve). In connection with this he loses immortality and civilization develops. The similarity of the story with certain typical phantasies of male patients is pointed out.

The eating of the fruit of the tree is also correlated with myths of other

races. It is clear that the sin committed is sexual desire or maturation and for this the father punishes by driving man out of the infantile relationship. So sexual maturity plus the aggressive impulse produce the Œdipus complex. Woman is represented by anxiety symbols (serpent) and pleasure symbols (breast—garden). So the story of the Garden of Eden means that maturation, the end of infantile bliss, is a misfortune.

Clara Thompson.

BOOK REVIEWS

Man against Himself. By Karl Menninger. (Harcourt, Brace & Company, New York, 1938. Pp. 485.)

This is a very readable, well-written and interesting book. It ranges through an immense field from the unusual view-point of the subject of suicide, a subject to which the author has already made important contributions. It begins with a discussion of this, and the author rightly comments on the remarkable extent to which such a frequent and important event is tabooed in discussion. He describes the psycho-analytical conclusions that have been reached on the subject. Throughout the book he lays unsparing stress on the significance of the self-injuring and self-thwarting tendencies in man and points out in detail the extraordinarily circuitous ramifications which these tendencies may follow. He seems on the whole to accept the concept of a primary death instinct and he courageously views life as a brave, though losing, fight against it. His final paragraph runs as follows : ' And so our final conclusion must be that a consideration of war and crime, no less than of sickness and suicide, leads us back to a reiteration and re-affirmation of the hypothesis of Freud that man is a creature dominated by an instinct in the direction of death, but blessed with an opposing instinct which battles heroically with varying success against its ultimate conqueror. This magnificent tragedy of life sets our highest ideal—spiritual nobility in the face of certain defeat. But there is a lesser victory in the mere prolonging of the game with a zest not born of illusion, and in this game within a game some win, some lose ; the relentlessness of self-destruction never ceases. And it is here that Science has replaced magic as the serpent held high in the wilderness for the saving of what there is of life for us. Toward the temporary staying of the malignancy of the self-destructive impulse, toward the averting of a premature capitulation to Death, we may sometimes, by prodigious labors, lend an effective hand.'

E. J.

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Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis. By Ives Hendrick. New Edition. (Alfred A. Knopf Ltd., New York, 1939. Pp. xv + 369. Price, $3.00.)

The first edition of this book was reviewed in this JOURNAL six years ago (Vol. XV, 1934, p. 474). The favourable impression then expressed is more than confirmed by the present edition. It has been considerably extended and two new chapters have been added : one on the psychological study of organic disease, and one on the extra-medical applications of psycho-analysis. The inadequate account of the new ideas evolved in

London which was a defect of the first edition has now been replaced by a more satisfactory one.

There are few textbooks on psycho-analysis better than this one. It is so good that there is little to criticize or correct in it. The only important mistake is that the author identifies Freud's Eros concept with Jung's Libido concept, overlooking the important difference that the former is part of a dualistic theory inherently involving conflict, whereas the latter is not. He still over-estimates the value of Jung's more recent ideas and does not perceive enough the negative element in them ; consequently he can write : ' On this, as on other points of theory, the views of Freud and Jung to-day are seldom irreconcilable ' (p. 310). There are a few errors of fact. The *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* was founded in 1920, not in 1923. Dr. Eitingon was not a Zurich psychiatrist practising analysis in 1902, but a German psychiatrist who studied with Jung in 1907. The name of Dr. Edward Glover should have been added to mine on p. 315. *Totem and Taboo* was very far indeed from being Freud's first contribution to applied analysis (even the *Interpretation of Dreams*, in 1900, was not) ; and it was published in 1914, not in 1904.

E. J.

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The Neuroses in War. By Several Authors under the Editorship of Emanuel Miller, with a concluding chapter by H. Crichton-Miller. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1940. Pp. xii + 250. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.*)

This book has been written by a number of doctors most of whom were engaged during the last war in the treatment of service or ex-service men suffering from neuroses. Previously the publication which had examined most widely and generally the experience of the last war was the Report of the War Office Committee on ' Shell-shock ', which was published in 1922. By that time however we had embarked on our illusory sea of security, war was finished and war neuroses had lost interest, except for those whose province it was to continue the treatment of the large number of cases which had come under the care of the Ministry of Pensions, many of whom remain to this day. Now war neuroses are again on the picture, and this volume which embodies the experience gained in the last war, with the addition of the knowledge gathered from the course and treatment of the cases in subsequent years, will be of great value to all who have the duty of handling these cases. Dr. Crichton-Miller gives an excellent summary of the views expressed by the individual writers ; and appendices contain pertinent extracts from the Report of the War Office Committee and a useful summary of drug treatment which may be adopted in selected, acute cases as a preliminary to psychological treatment.

A feature of the last war was the unexpectedly large number of psychological casualties, but if the lessons of that war, so excellently set forth in

this book, have been learned, the number on this occasion should be far less. Many statements show how great has been the advance in psychological medicine since 1914. Professor Culpin, for instance, reminds us that the method of reviving memories in an hypnoidal state was regarded as an application of psycho-analysis, which at that time was under general condemnation. Any discussion of the method was likely to be met by charges of obscenity, and those who used it were supposed to be particularly credulous people fooled by artful neurotics or malingerers. Even today, as Dr. Miller says, psychological medicine is a closed book to most medical men, and already some neurologists who have been called upon to treat psychological casualties in the present war, have found that what may be termed the ' bromide, nightlight and forget it ! ' school of therapy is still very much alive.

A book written by a number of writers unavoidably shows some overlapping ; on the other hand it affords opportunity for expression of divergent opinion. An instance of this is afforded by Dr. Hadfield's contribution. He alone of the contributors speaks of ' traumatic neuroses' and draws a distinction between the neuroses of war and those of civil life, ' the fundamental factor in the production of the war neuroses being an objective experience, such as an explosion or witnessing a horrible sight '. This however is not the experience of most of those who have had the handling of both civil and war cases. They have come to regard the effect of physical violence as negligible, and where it appears to have been responsible, investigation has always shown that it was the psychic concomitants of the violence which really produced the result ; and surely ' witnessing a horrible sight ' should be classed as a subjective experience. Dr. Hadfield is no doubt etymologically correct in using the word ' traumatic ' to include such experiences, but such use is apt to be misleading, since most doctors would interpret the word as applying only to physical violence. The words ' traumatic neurasthenia ' and ' traumatic neurosis ' have done as much harm in civil cases as ' shell-shock ' did in war cases, and it would be better to let these unfortunate misnomers sink together into oblivion. This criticism of terminology in no way detracts of course from the very complete and excellent description Dr. Hadfield gives of the methods of treatment by suggestion and hypno-analysis followed at Ashurst hospital, which rendered such valuable service during the last war.

Dr. Dillon gives an account of the establishment, in 1917, of an advanced psychiatric centre in the field, and the immediate treatment of men who had broken down with functional disorders. The results of the treatment were surprisingly good, no less than 63·5 per cent. out of 4,235 cases becoming fit to return to duty, that is, mainly to fighting units. In the later years of the war the necessity of eliminating from the forces those

liable to psychological breakdown became obvious, and in this war it is understood that steps for the same purpose are being taken during the examination and subsequent training of recruits. The difficulty of detecting these cases, however, is illustrated by an observation of Dr. Dillon's that many men with histories indicating predisposition to neuroses rendered valuable first line service and won decorations for bravery. Dr. Prideaux of the Ministry of Pensions has elsewhere made a similar observation. No man, not even himself, can tell how a man will behave in a position of danger until he has been tried.

The large number of psychological casualties occurring among the forces in the last war found the military and medical authorities wholly unprepared to meet them, but we are now far better equipped both to prevent them from arising and to treat them adequately if they do arise. The editing of a book of this composite character must have presented many difficulties, and Dr. Miller is to be congratulated on the very successful way in which he has handled the material at his disposal. It is a volume which should be in the hands of all medical officers who have the duty of examining or treating these cases, whether arising in the Forces or in the civilian population.

There is one omission which must be noted in a volume which is so largely historical. Reference is made to the treatment and training centre at Maghull, but the name of its brilliant superintendent, the late Dr. R. G. Rows, is not mentioned, yet he played a great part in laying the foundations of much that is written in this book.

William A. Brend.

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Beyond the Clinical Frontiers: A Psychiatrist Views Crowd Behaviour. By Edward A. Strecker. (Chapman & Hall Ltd., London, 1940. Pp. 210. Price, 9*s.* 6*d.*)

The Rape of the Masses: The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda. By Serge Chakotin. (George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., London, 1940. Pp. xviii + 299. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. By Karl Mannheim. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. xxii + 469. Price, 16*s.* 6*d.*)

These three books all deal with modern social phenomena, and in all three the possibilities of ' planning ' and the implications of psychology are in the forefront of discussion.

Professor Strecker is a distinguished psychiatrist and is here concerned with the relations between psychiatry and crowd behaviour, his book representing a recently delivered course of Salmon Memorial Lectures at the New York Academy of Medicine. Dr. Chakotin is a physiologist and

psychologist of the Pavlov school, who took an active part in the Social Democratic movement in Germany in the momentous days immediately preceding Hitler's accession to power. His book, which first appeared in French in 1939, is a brilliant and very readable study of modern political propaganda, behaviouristic in outlook and frankly anti-fascist in tendency. Dr. Mannheim, formerly Professor of Sociology in Frankfurt-am-Main, now attached to the London School of Economics, has written the largest and most ambitious of the three works, a sociological treatise in six independent but closely inter-related parts, written over a period of several years. It is a considerably modified and extended version of the German volume of similar title published in Holland in 1935, though portions of the present work have already appeared separately in English.

Professor Strecker's book is frankly a little disappointing in view of the hopes and anticipations raised by its sub-title. It is pretty generally agreed that there are important parallels between psycho-pathological manifestations in the individual and certain of the cruder and more dangerous phenomena of group psychology. A few authors have touched upon these parallels in an illuminating way and such terms as ' mass-neurosis ' and ' mass-psychosis ' are in fairly frequent use. But, as far as the present reviewer is aware, there is no full and detailed treatment of the problems presented by this parallelism ; there is no adequate treatise on group psychiatry or group psycho-pathology dealing with the justifiability and limitations of such a concept as mass-neurosis or presenting a full critical review of the main contributions which abnormal psychology can at present make to group psychology. Professor Strecker's lectures unfortunately do not constitute such a treatise ; after reading them we feel that the contact between the two branches of psychology has been too superficial to allow of the transfer of much of real explanatory value from one field to the other. The author's failure to make the fullest use of his opportunities may perhaps be held to illustrate the kind of specialization and unwillingness to envisage complex problems in all their many-sidedness that Dr. Mannheim deplores in one section of his book. Professor Strecker's own medical approach and his preoccupation with the individual patient exert an excessively preponderant influence ; we are allowed to feel that he is more at home in the atmosphere of the consulting room or mental hospital than in that of the market place. Indeed there are moments at which we are tempted to think that his conception of group psychology has advanced little beyond that of Le Bon ; for the most part we wait in vain for anything resembling the genial penetration of Freud, the systematization and common-sense clarity of McDougall, the illuminating intuition of Trotter and Madariaga, or the painstaking and ingenious empiricism of the recent American experimental approaches.

The fundamental common element in individual mental disease and in

group psycho-pathology Professor Strecker considers to be the retreat from reality. Since ' reality ' includes our economic and social environment, the less attractive this environment, the greater (other things being equal) is the temptation to retreat. The mental patient, did he choose or were he able (there perhaps is the rub), could, it is suggested, put up a pretty good case both as regards the justifiability of his retreat and as regards the fact that in reality evasion he is little worse than many others who are esteemed normal. Unfortunately, this line of approach, stimulating as it undoubtedly is, soon leads one to demand some, at least provisional, definition or criticism of ' reality '—a question that Professor Strecker, like most other psychiatrists and psychologists, is (understandably enough) unwilling to face ; though it is pretty clear that, if pressed, his answer would be on pragmatic lines. (He quotes with humorous approval the reply he once received to his own importunate question, ' What is sanity ? ', to the effect that it is ' a capacity for being dexterous in keeping out of insane asylums '.) As is natural from his present point of view, he considers that the task of mental hygiene has both an autoplastic and an alloplastic side ; with every allowance made for the avoidance or clearing up of inner difficulties, the chances of health or recovery yet depend considerably upon the chances of future reality satisfaction. Where the psycho-analyst would be inclined to join issue with Professor Strecker is the latter's tendency (perhaps all the more insidious because it is not avowed) to underrate the aggressive and moralistic elements in mental disease (as compared with those factors that depend chiefly on the pleasure principle), and to regard the ' reality ' that is evaded as, purely or principally, an external reality. Psycho-analysis has surely shown that we are often loath to recognize, not only certain aspects of physical (including social) reality, but also certain important elements of psychic reality. The two are no doubt often inter-connected, but both kinds of reality must be taken into account in that ' mental hygiene planning ' for which Professor Strecker hopes—a planning in which he considers that psycho-analysis will have an important part to play.

Dr. Chakotin's contribution is a most striking study of recent fascist and anti-fascist propaganda by one who has enjoyed wide and vivid personal experience of its use. His thrilling account of political campaigning in Germany (campaigning based to an appreciable extent on scientific concepts and scientific methods—notably the use of control areas in which a given kind of propaganda was not employed) will be read with pleasure and profit by many who are but little interested in the author's background of psychological theory ; the same applies also to his practical advice as regards the use of propaganda. This theory aims at maintaining the rigidly behaviouristic framework of the Pavlov school, but it must be confessed that most of the attractive precision of the conditioned-reflex

method is lost as soon as we leave the laboratory and enter the complicated hurly-burly of public life ; and indeed, though the author has to remind himself from time to time that he is a behaviourist, one feels that he might have written at least an equally good book, had he belonged to almost any other school of psychology. His choice of four fundamental instincts—struggle (or preservation from danger), nutrition, reproduction, care of offspring—is taken from general biological considerations and not from experimental results, while the purely experimental evidence for their relative prepotence in the order given above is of the slenderest. Having chosen his instincts, however, he makes good play with them, and shows how propaganda does, and should, appeal to them all. It will perhaps amuse many readers to find the movements associated with Adler, Marx, Freud and Christ pointed out as examples where propaganda has played too exclusively on one of the instincts—again in the order mentioned.

From a theoretical point of view, it is probably a just criticism to say that, as with many other writers on social psychology, the instincts are made to play too big a rôle. To the present reviewer at least (though as a pupil of McDougall he must admit the possibility of prejudice) there seems to be a crying need for some such concept as that of ' sentiment ', which expresses the relation between instincts and ideas. Still less is there any adequate account, here any more than in the previously mentioned book, of the facts of moral inhibition and control. Unfortunately the method of conditioned reflexes, for all the light it has thrown upon inhibition at lower levels, has not yet led us to the study of the super-ego or the ' sentiment of self-regard '. Pure behaviourism seems at present impotent also to reveal or explain certain fundamental factors which affect our attitude to propaganda, factors some of which will be obvious to the psycho-analyst and which are indeed forced upon our notice by the very title of Dr. Chakotin's book and the terms he uses—' the *rape* of the masses ', ' immunization from authoritarian toxins ', etc. When we oppose propaganda or feel disgust for it (as so many intellectuals do), we mobilize for this purpose our sexual fears and resistances—we preserve our intellectual and emotional integrity as though it were our virginity or our generative organs (though anal resistances are doubtless also involved) ; when we succumb to it, we indulge—among other things—our feminine-masochistic tendencies. A criticism which Dr. Mannheim would probably raise is that, in his treatment of effective and ineffective propaganda, Dr. Chakotin allows too little influence to the varying mental make-up and habits of the group concerned (and this in spite of the fact that he recognizes theoretically the mistake of ' thinking and acting as if each person reacted in the same way '). To take a striking example (p. 277), he recommends as an expressive verbal and visual symbol ' a form of salute widely spread among the masses of the democratic camp ', the extended arm and clenched fist—the

salute to be given with the ' utmost energy ' and ' accompanied by a short, sharp exclamation "Freedom" '. It is difficult to imagine this rousing any other reaction than mirth or embarrassment among Englishmen.

Dr. Mannheim's book is the longest and profoundest of the three ; it is a work of painstaking thoroughness, scientific impartiality and great erudition. Unfortunately, a good deal of it makes rather heavy reading (for the author does not possess that lightness of touch which has no doubt helped Dr. Chakotin's work, in its French original, to achieve no less than five editions in one year). Its literary quality indeed falls considerably short of its high scientific standard, but it would be a great pity if for this reason it were to receive less than the full attention it undoubtedly deserves. It is a work to which it is difficult to do justice in any but a very long review, for there is scarcely a single one of its forty-three sub-sections that does not deal with important facts or open up significant trains of thought. Indeed it may be safely said that the book deserves to be treated as an indispensable source of inspiration and reference by every serious student of the social sciences.

Dr. Mannheim's main contention is that planning is necessary if civilization is to survive, but that, contrary to what he believes to be the general feeling in democracies, it is not incompatible with freedom, initiative and responsibility for the individual citizen ; though it is true that we must recognise that the day of *laissez-faire* is definitely over and that freedom inevitably means different things at different levels of life and culture. ' Planning ', which considers not only individual reforms and inventions but their bearing on the whole of social life, is contrasted with the earlier stage of ' invention ', in which men set themselves deliberately to solve one problem at a time without considering the remoter effects and implications of any solution that was found, and with the still earlier stage of ' chance discovery ', in which there was no deliberate solving of problems but only occasional happy inspirations or observations. In a planned society that is to remain progressive it will be necessary to combine compulsory settlement of the basic conditions of social life with freedom of thought and expression at a higher level. In view of the importance of the acceptance of these ' basic conditions ', it is perhaps to be regretted that a special section is not devoted to the question of how far modern societies can be made to agree upon fundamental principles (expressed in terms of ' the rights of man ' or otherwise) and how far any agreement arrived at can be incorporated in ' sentiments ' that will withstand the shock of conflicting interests and traditions (in this matter perhaps Dr. Mannheim and Dr. Chakotin might profitably collaborate). The reader will perhaps be inclined to feel that the indications that are given in this direction (especially on pp. 345 *et seq.*) are too much concerned with the purely economic sphere (though of course no one will deny

the importance of this sphere). Elsewhere, however, the author shows that he is almost as much at home on psychological as on sociological ground, and his sociology is deeply influenced by his psychological knowledge, mental factors receiving almost everywhere a full consideration. Dr. Mannheim is no adherent of any one psychological school; his tastes are catholic and he can extract something of value for his purpose from almost every psychological approach, including that of psycho-analysis. For this reason his treatment of any complex sociological problem lacks that over-simplification which is only too apt to occur when unconscious factors are neglected. As a sociologist, however he is also keenly aware of the dependence of psychological thought (as of all other thought) on the social problems and conditions of its age. He considers that behaviourism ' plans ', but only in a piecemeal fashion. Its weakness is that it refuses to consider the individual (let alone the environment) as a whole. (Incidentally he considers that Fascism plans and changes the political world at the level of behaviourism. Its propaganda is used neither to change nor to enlighten the populace but merely to make it obedient. For Dr. Chakotin, however, behaviourism is at least equally suitable as a socialistic weapon.) Psycho-analysis, on the other hand, does consider the individual as a whole, but in its turn takes inadequate account of him in relation to his whole social environment. (Here Dr. Mannheim and Professor Strecker would doubtless agree.) In this connection he welcomes the studies of Malinowski and Margaret Mead, the former as contrasting family relations in patriarchal and matriarchal societies, the latter as throwing light on puberty changes in European and primitive cultures. The laws relating to factors inherent in cultural *milieux* should be regarded as *principia media* (midway between the general laws of human behaviour on the one hand and purely individual behaviour on the other) which are of the utmost importance for sociological thinking and successful political and economic planning.

With these very inadequate indications of some few of its main lines of thought, we must leave this very significant book, only remarking once again that it will undoubtedly repay careful study by all those who are concerned with the tangled problems of contemporary culture.

All three books contain useful bibliographies, the first two short and relatively specific ones in accordance with their more specialized character, Dr. Mannheim's a classified one that extends to no less than 73 pages and that is supplemented by special shorter lists of references to the particular topics treated in the course of the work These bibliographies of Dr. Mannheim's will themselves be of very considerable value to all students of sociology, social psychology and allied fields. Frequent reference is made to both the books and articles of psycho-analysts.

J. C. Flugel.

The Child and his Family. By Charlotte Bühler. With the collaboration of Edeltrud Baar, Lotte Danzinger-Schenk, Gertrud Falk, Sophie Gedeon, Gertrud Hortner. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1940. Pp. viii + 187. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*.)

This volume is of considerable interest to students of character and of social relationships. It describes an attempt ' to apply exact methods to problems which have hitherto been approached only descriptively '. The method evolved was applied to the relationship of parents and children and of brothers and sisters at home in seventeen upper middle class families having from one to three children of school age. The facts gathered and the conclusions reached are well worth attention, although it is an open question whether the yield is sufficient to justify such an elaborate apparatus. There is very little in the conclusions which is not familiar ground to the clinical student arriving at his facts more simply and directly. Certain elements in the psychological structure of the intimate life of particular families and the effects upon the developing character of the children of the more enduring characteristics and purposes of the parents are brought out.

The authors say, however, that the book has ' a methodological significance only ', and it is the discussion of method which will be of special interest to readers of this JOURNAL. Its aim is to evaluate the mutual relations between individuals quantitatively. The unit of measurement is *an activity*. ' Everyone knows in practice what an activity is.' Examples are : writing a letter, going shopping, making a call, lying on the grass and looking at the sun. Every activity consists of a number of events presenting a particular unity characterized by the object which forms the core of the activity. The difference between an activity and a simple response is that the activity centres round an object.

This approach to the child's behaviour is in line with Charlotte Bühler's earlier study of *The First Year of Life* and her tests of children's development. The psycho-analyst will be in entire agreement with the emphasis which the authors lay on activities, in contrast to the physiological concept of a reflex. It is impossible for the science of human behaviour to leave out of account the constant reference of behaviour to an object, which unifies the various elements in the activity directed towards it.

The technical problem which confronts anyone wishing to quantify the study of human acts towards either material or social objects is that of distinguishing and enumerating precisely and reliably the activities which constitute the units of behaviour. In this study the observers were trained to record and analyse the behaviour of particular children in their relations with parents or brother and sisters. ' The degree of accuracy obtainable in these records was determined by comparing two of the

made independently by different observers. That was found satisfactory for statistical purposes.'

In analysing the data gathered, the relation established between one person and another is referred to as a *contact*, and such contacts usually contain several phases.

The unit activities are qualified in various ways: (*a*) the *theme* of the contact, the object around which it centres—a toy, a dress, a meeting or a farewell; (*b*) the *form* of the contact, the means by which it is initiated, for example, a question, a statement, an exclamation, a request, an embrace; (*c*) the *psychological situation* in which the contact is established, for example, whether in play or work, during social intercourse, at dinner or bed time, and so on. It was found that the situations which adults provided regularly for the child and those in which they established the most intense and frequent contacts with him determine to a considerable extent the characteristics of family life and of the contacts which the child initiates with others in his environment. (*d*) ' The most essential aspects of a contact, its purpose and the attitude which it expresses, offer the greatest obstacles to scientific analysis. When human beings establish contacts with each other, they do so for certain reasons. They either want to give something to or take something away from each other, and they pursue their intentions with a very definite attitude toward their partner. The difficulty, however, is that these intended purposes and basic attitudes are not as objectively manifest as are the means and the theme of their contact and the situation in which it became established. These purposes and attitudes remain more or less hidden, and may be quite complex and even contradictory. . . .

' Scientific methods of discovering the hidden multiplicity of obscure human relations and the different manifestations of human attitudes and purposes were first developed by the psycho-analysts. However, we are unable to accept the concepts and principles upon which their technique is based. Regardless of the fact that no adequate methods exist for determining the prevalence of purposes and attitudes at different levels of personality (except those conceptually and ideationally related to the analytical technique), we must and we want to limit ourselves to a much simpler procedure to find the purposes and attitudes contained in the child's contacts. In the present study, therefore, we have concentrated on those which were overtly expressed; even these have never before been studied. We shall see that this will lead to interesting and significant results when combined with our study of the means chosen to establish contacts and the situations in which they are made. Of course, it is no simple matter to investigate even these manifest aspects, for they can only be implied indirectly; they are never given directly or expressed in words. Even these superficial, acute and overt purposes and attitudes

require careful consideration before we can work out units for their proper classification.' (Pp. 16–17.)

There seems to be a somewhat wistful note in this reference to psycho-analytical studies of human attitudes and purposes, as if the authors almost wished that they did not feel themselves so strongly compelled to reject ' the concepts and principles ' of the psycho-analysts. Perhaps if they would look a little more directly at the *methods* and the *facts* of psycho-analysis, the concepts and principles thus arrived at would become more acceptable to them.

The devising of this present method of studying human activities is at any rate a valiant attempt to deal scientifically with overtly expressed purposes. It is of course an assumption, and the readers of this JOURNAL will regard it as an unjustified assumption, that overtly expressed purposes can be scientifically understood without reference to hidden and indeed unconscious wishes and attitudes. Nevertheless, the authors of this book and the psycho-analysts are at one in the view thus stated : ' In the long run, social psychology and the study of social conduct become impossible if the purposes and attitudes expressed in human relations continue to be ignored, since they constitute the most essential elements. Furthermore, it is relatively useless to determine how often one child establishes contact with another, without stating whether this was done with friendly or unfriendly intentions, for the purpose of taking something away from him or giving him something, attacking him or defending oneself, etc. Every effort should be made to make possible a reliable study of such elements as can be grasped only by interpretation.

' In view of the extraordinary precision with which we react in every-day life to the intended purposes of other persons, it seems quite indefensible that psychology should ignore the study of these phenomena. Adult psychologists should be able to discover criteria for recognizing the child's purposes as expressed in his behaviour, since, as Adela Poznanska has shown in a Viennese study, an eight-months-old child can recognize different play intentions in his mother's facial expressions and gestures and, as Hildegard Hetzer found in a second study, understands quite well whether his mother makes an angry face playfully or in earnest ; since a kindergarten child feels and shows in his reactions that he understands whether someone approaches him with real affection or with affectation ; and since a school child understands and shows in her reactions that she knows whether her mother makes her dry the dishes and clear the table for pedagogical reasons, or because she herself happens to be seated comfortably.' (Pp. 23–24.)

The authors rightly say that if we ignore and treat with contempt the interpretation of purposes expressed in activities because of its insufficient reliability, this will result in such an extreme limitation of the scope and

effectiveness of research as to make the high reliability of the results actually obtained of little scientific value.

Psycho-analysts would go further and say that to leave out *unconscious* motives and 'the *hidden* multiplicity of obscure human relations', in order to produce an illusion of scientific method, is in fact to throw out the baby with the bath water.

Susan Isaacs.

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Borrowed Children: A Popular Account of Some Evacuation Problems and their Remedies. By Mrs. St. Loe Strachey. (John Murray, London, 1940. Pp. xiv + 134. Price, 2*s.* 6*d.*)

This is an excellent little book. It describes the experiences of children who were transported from London and the large industrial centres to country towns and villages in September of last year. Mrs. Strachey writes clearly and vividly, presenting the problems she deals with always in terms of concrete happenings, very often in the words of the children themselves. She illustrates the successes and failures of the borrowed children in their temporary homes, and shows both the wisdom and the folly of the hostesses in their dealings with the children. Discussing the psychological problems of children who have shown serious difficulties, and caused bewildered hostesses so much trouble of one sort or another, she brings out the fact that those 'evacuees' were not made difficult by evacuation, but had already been ill or unhappy in their own homes at ordinary times. She then describes the valuable help which Child Guidance Clinics can render to such children. Finally she discusses the various ways in which the conditions of life for borrowed children could be improved and lasting benefits for their health and education be ensured from their experiences.

Susan Isaacs.

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Analysis of Handwriting. By H. J. Jacoby. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. 283. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.*)

I have read a number of books on graphology, but until I came across this book I had never been greatly impressed by any signs of progress in the study. The present book, however, is both a valuable contribution to the subject and also an excellent presentation of the definite knowledge that has been acquired about it. Handwriting is as individual as speech —the author demonstrates, for instance, how completely impossible it is for one person to imitate even the simplest straight line made by another —and it is therefore certain that it must be the expression of the most distinctive elements of the personality. What no layman can well imagine is the quite extraordinary fineness of detail in handwriting that can be distinguished and studied.

The classificatory stage of this study is now far advanced and it is gradually entering on that of interpretation, the one with which so many of its earlier devotees wrongly began. The correlation between observing facts in handwriting and the distinctive features of personality will no doubt prove a difficult study, one in which great progress can hardly be expected except through co-ordination between graphology and psychology. As this excellent book shows, graphology is now in a position to supply the data in an accessible form : it is now for psychologists to make their contribution.

E. J.

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The Social Function of Science. By J. D. Bernal. (George Routledge & Sons Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. 482. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

In these days Science like everything else has to justify itself. Even the search for truth, as that for power, which used to be the two alternative views of Science, assert with difficulty its absolute value. The author, imbued with the modern relativist attitude, enquires searchingly into the various functions of science, philosophical, social and so on. In this task he is much hampered by a lack of familiarity with modern psychology and asserts, in a way rather characteristic of physicists, that ' psychology is still very much of a pseudo-science '.

His real interest would seem to be in practice rather than in theory, and above all in the organization of research work. In this field he presents a mass of invaluable data, especially those concerning the relation between industry and scientific research. He has no difficulty in showing how research work could be better organized and be of greater value to the community.

E. J.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

[*Appearance in this list does not preclude subsequent notice.*]

A. BOOKS

An Investigation of the Technique of Psycho-Analysis. (Research Supplement to the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, No. 4.) Edited by Edward Glover with the assistance of Marjorie Brierley. (London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox for the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. 1940. Pp. ix + 188. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Aus Leiden Freuden. By Theodor Reik. (London: Imago Publishing Co. Ltd. 1940. Pp. 406. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Educational Psychology. By Charles H. Judd. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1940. Pp. xx + 566. Price, 18*s.*)

Infinite Traveller, What of the Road? By Charlotte Bacon. (London: Williams and Norgate Ltd. 1939. Pp. 300. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Ingalik Material Culture. By Cornelius Osgood. (Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. 500.)

Man's Dynamic Equilibrium and Motive Power. By Cora G. Gregory. (Boston: Christopher Publishing House. Pp. 235. Price, $2.00.)

Psychological and Neurological Definitions and the Unconscious. By Samuel Kahn. (Boston: Meador Publishing Co. 1940. Pp. 219. Price, $2.00.)

The Relativity of Reality. By René Laforgue. (New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs. Pp. 92. Price, $2.50.)

B. PERIODICALS

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry (Chicago).
British Medical Journal (London).
Indian Journal of Psychology (Calcutta).
Man (London).
Medical Record (New York).
Mental Hygiene (New York).
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research (London).
Psychological Abstracts (Providence).
Psychosomatic Medicine (New York).
Revista de Neuro-Psiquiatria (Lima).
The American Imago (Boston).
The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (Sydney).
The Journal of the American Medical Association (Chicago).
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly (New York).
The Psychoanalytic Review (New York).

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY
EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

I. CLINICAL ESSAY PRIZE

Members and Associate Members of the International Psycho-Analytical Association are reminded that competitors for the Clinical Essay Prize must send in their work to the Hon. Secretary of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 96 Gloucester Place, London, W.1, by March 31, 1941.

The conditions governing the competition are recorded in Vol. XVII, Part I, p. 139, of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.

SYLVIA M. PAYNE
(*Acting Secretary*)

II. CLINIC REPORTS

In the last Bulletin it was announced that owing to war conditions the publication of Clinic Reports was held up. It was hoped to publish a comprehensive account on this occasion. Unfortunately it has not proved possible to do so. The only report available is that of the London Clinic, which is, therefore, published *in extenso* here. The period it covers coincides roughly with the first year of the war. It will be noted that although the number of consultations has diminished the total is still a satisfactory one. On the other hand the therapeutic activities of the Clinic have actually increased although it will be found in due course that the number of completed cases is much smaller.

Temporary Psychological Aid Centre.

At the outbreak of the war it was decided to establish a Temporary Psychological Aid Centre at which persons, either neurotic or normal, who suffered from stresses due to war conditions, could receive adequate diagnosis and an abbreviated form of treatment. Three teams of workers were organized providing diagnostic and therapeutic facilities three days a week. Owing to the fact that, after a preliminary phase of upset, war conditions in London were comparatively peaceful, the figures available are rather slender and it has been decided not to publish them in the meantime. At the time of writing the onset of the air attack in London has not produced any marked increase in the numbers, but this is due in the main to local disturbances of transport facilities, the many air raid warnings and a number of other causes. In the meantime the emergency staff has been considerably reduced by enlistment in the Army Mental Services and the civilian Emergency Mental Service. It is not yet certain

therefore whether it will prove necessary to continue this centre. For the time being, however, and so long as conditions permit, it is being kept going.

LONDON CLINIC OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

1939–1940

Consultations.

The total number of attendances at the Clinic consultations during the year was 81 (51 M., 30 F.) as compared with 111 the previous year and 88 the year before.

The 81 adults were dealt with as follows:

Advised at the time of examination	18 (12 M., 6 F.)
Recommended treatment	63 (39 M., 24 F.)
Of these latter, offered vacancies:	
(*a*) for psycho-analysis	9 (5 M., 4 F.)
(*b*) at the 'Temporary Psychological Aid Centre'	10 (4 M., 6 F.)
Put on the waiting list	44 (30 M., 14 F.)

Diagnosis.

The following is the provisional diagnosis of the 63 who were recommended treatment; it is subject to revision after treatment has begun.

Anxiety hysteria	10 (4 M., 6 F.)
Phobia	2 (1 M., 1 F.)
Claustrophobia	1 (1 M., —)
Conversion hysteria	2 (— 2 F.)
Obsessional neurosis	6 (5 M., 1 F.)
Mixed types	2 (2 M., —)
Hysteria	4 (1 M., 3 F.)
Neurasthenia	1 (1 M., —)
Depression	7 (4 M., 3 F.)
Depressive state	1 (1 M., —)
Stammering	4 (3 M., 1 F.)
Character	2 (2 M., —)
Anxiety character	2 (2 M., —)
Inhibitions	2 (2 M., —)
Impotence	2 (2 M., —)
Fridigity	2 (— 2 F.)
Homosexuality	1 (1 M., —)
Exhibitionism	1 (1 M., —)
Sexual maladjustments	7 (5 M., 2 F.)
Fetishism	1 (1 M., —)
Paranoid	1 (— 1 F.)
Schizophrenic	2 (— 2 F.)

Waiting List.

The number on the waiting list at the end of the year is 87, as compared with 142 last year and 117 the year before.

The 87 now on the list consist of 60 M. and 27 F.

Under Treatment.

There are at present 62 cases under treatment.

Child Department.

In September 1939 Dr. D. W. Winnicott took up his duties as Director of this Department. He reports as follows:

'Under the present arrangement patients are referred to the Clinic in order to provide clinical material for analysis by Candidates under control: only cases suitable for this purpose have been accepted on consultation. During the year 9 cases have been under treatment. Six of these were *new* cases, diagnosed as follows:

1 (F.) Stammering, feeding inhibition.
1 (M.) Backward in speech.
1 (F.) Enuresis, compulsive masturbation.
1 (F.) Learning difficulties.
1 (M.) Emotional instability.
1 (M.) Refusal to defæcate.

4 cases were rejected as unsuitable. It is not possible to give a clear account of discharged cases because of the war conditions, and especially the evacuation of children from London. In no case was analysis definitely completed, and in all cases either the analyst or the child, or both, left town for reasons connected with the war.'

III. CHANGES OF MEMBERSHIPS

The following list of changes of memberships and addresses is as complete and reliable as the existing emergency conditions permit. From a number of groups no information is so far available.

DIRECT MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

Change of Address

Ruben, Mrs. Margarete, 17 Kent Terrace, London, N.W.1.

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

(A Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies)

The only important change of which we have certain information is that the Secretaryship of the A.P.A. is held by Dr. John Murray.

BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Members

Deming, Dr. Julia, 406 Marlborough Street.
Jessner, Dr. Lucie, Baldpate, Inc., Georgetown, Mass.

Pavenstedt, Dr. Eleanor, 273 Beacon Street.
Rosenheim, Dr. Frederick, Judge Baker Guidance Center.
Young, Dr. David A., McLean Hospital, Waverley, Mass.
Young, Dr. Robert A., Massachusetts General Hospital.

Change of Address

Healy, Dr. William, Judge Baker Guidance Center.
Putnam, Dr. Marian C., 59 Larchwood Drive, Cambridge, Mass.
Rank, Mrs. Beata, Judge Baker Guidance Center.

CHICAGO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Members

Bollmeier, Dr. Ludolph N., 352, Belding, Hot Springs, Arkansas.
Deutsch, Dr. Felix, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.
Grinker, Dr. Roy, 30 N. Michigan Avenue.
Moellenhoff, Dr. Fritz W., Michell Sanitarium, Peoria, Ill.

Associate Members

Carmichael, Dr. Hugh T., Dep. of Psychiatry, University of Chicago.
Eissler, Dr. Kurt, 612 N. Michigan Avenue.
Masserman, Dr. Jules H., Dep. of Psychiatry, University of Chicago.
Meyer, Dr. Albrecht, 43 East Ohio Street.
Miller, Dr. Milton L., 43 East Ohio Street.

Change of Address

Gerard, Dr. Margaret, 43 East Ohio Street (*Secretary-Treasurer*).
Benjamin, Dr. John D., School of Medicine and Hospitals, University of Colorado, Denver, Colorado.
Steinfeld, Dr. Julius, The Forest Sanitarium, Des Plaines, Ill.

Change of Office

Eisler, Dr. Edwin R., 43 East Ohio Street (*Vice-President*).
Gerard, Dr. Margaret, 43 East Ohio Street (*Secretary-Treasurer*).
Mohr, Dr. George J., 43 East Ohio Street (*President*).

NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Honorary Members

Federn, Dr. Paul, 239 Central Park West.
Jekels, Dr. Ludwig, 61 East 86th Street.

Members

Herold, Dr. Carl, 1 West 67th Street.
Reich, Dr. Annie, 27 West 96th Street.

Change of Address

Bonnett, Dr. Sara A., 125 East 72nd Street.
Briehl, Dr. Walter, 240 Central Park Square.
Eisendorfer, Dr. Arnold, 1133 Park Avenue.

Gosselin, Dr. Raymond L., 405 Park Avenue.
Greenacre, Dr. Phyllis, 130 East 67th Street.
Haigh, Dr. Susanna S., 21 East 79th Street.
Horney, Dr. Karen, 240 Central Park South.
Rado, Dr. Sandor, 50 East 78th Street.
Rothschild, Dr. Leonard, 240 Central Park South, Apt. 11G.
Thompson, Dr. Clara, 151 East 83rd Street.
Powers, Mrs. Margaret J., 853 Seventh Avenue.
Wolfe, Dr. Theodore P., 401 East 56th Street.
Zilboorg, Dr. Gregory, 14 East 75th Street.

Change of Office

Lehrman, Dr. Philip R., 25 Central Park West (*Secretary*).
Powers, Dr. Lillian D., 128 West 59th Street (*Vice-President*).
Stern, Dr. Adolph, 57 West 57th Street (*President*).

PHILADELPHIA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Affiliate Member

Weiss, Dr. Edward, 269 South 19th Street.

Change of Address

Appel, Dr. Kenneth E., 111 North 49th Street.
Katz, Dr. G. Henry, 111 North 49th Street.
Pearson, Dr. Gerald H. J., 111 North 49th Street.
Smith, Dr. Lauren H., 111 North 49th Street.

TOPEKA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Members

Allen, Dr. Sylvia, The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas.
Haenel, Dr. Joachim, 244 South Muirfield Road, Los Angeles, Calif.
Hawkins, Dr. Mary O'Neil, The Southard School, Topeka, Kansas.
Kasanin, Dr. Jacob, Mount Zion Hospital, San Francisco, Calif.
Orr, Dr. Douglas W., The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas.
Weiss, Dr. Edoardo, The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas.
Windholz, Dr. Emanuel, 1809 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

Associate Members

Cameron, Dr. William M., The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas.
Galbraith, Dr. Hugh, 717 North Robinson Street, Oklahoma City, Okla.
Macfarlane, Dr. Donald A., Hotel Claremont, San Francisco, Calif.
Tillman, Dr. Carl-Gustaf D., The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas.

Change of Address

Bernfeld, Dr. Siegfried, 1020 Francisco Street, San Francisco, Calif.
Berliner, Dr. Bernhard, 120 Commonwealth Avenue, San Francisco, Calif.
Fenichel, Dr. Otto, 244 N. Gower Street, Los Angeles, Calif.

Kamm, Dr. Bernard A., 3727 Fillmore Street, San Francisco, Calif.
Tidd, Dr. Charles W., Beverly Medical Building, Beverly Hills, Calif.

Change of Office

Knight, Dr. Robert P., The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas (*President*).
Menninger, Dr. Karl A., The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas (*Secretary-Treasurer*).
Simmel, Dr. Ernest, 555 Wilcox Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif. (*Honorary President*).
Tidd, Dr. Charles W., Beverly Medical Building, Beverly Hills, Calif. (*Vice-President*).

WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Members

Anderson, Dr. Russell, 700 Cathedral Street, Baltimore, Md.
Evans, Dr. Andrew Browne, Medical Science Bldg., 1029 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Registrants (? Associate Members)

Drummond, Dr. Alan, National Training School for Boys, Washington, D.C.
Farber, Dr. Leslie, Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C.
Fisher, Dr. Charles, 517 Parkland Place, S.E., Washington, D.C.
Haertig, Dr. Elmer W., Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C.
Ingall, Dr. Sam, Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, Towson, Md.
Mernin, Dr. Mary T., Spring Grave State Hospital, Catonsville, Md.

Change of Address

Colomb, Dr. Anna C. D., Philadelphia State Hospital, Box 6000, Torresdale P.O., Philadelphia, Pa.
Graven, Dr. Philip S., 2108 Bancroft Pl., N.W., Washington, D.C.

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Owing to war conditions, enlistment of Members and Associate Members in the Army and Auxiliary Mental Services, it has not been possible to follow the numerous changes of location. The addresses given below can, however, be considered as reliable forwarding addresses. In certain instances we have inserted 96 Gloucester Place, London, W.1, as a forwarding address.

Associate Members

Evans, Miss M. Gwen, 17 Kent Terrace, N.W.1.
Hardcastle, Dr. D. N., 48 Warwick Road, Bishop's Stortford, Herts.
Ries, Mrs. Hannah, 96 Gloucester Place, W.1.

Change of Address

Bowlby, Dr. John, Combe House, Stinchcombe, Dursley, Glos.
Brierley, Dr. Marjorie, 1 Pearl Buildings, Station Road, Reading.
Bryan, Dr. Douglas, 17 The Chilterns, Brighton Road, Sutton.

Burlingham, Mrs. Dorothy, 20 Maresfield Gardens, N.W.3.
Eddison, Dr. H. W., Merafield House, Plympton, S. Devon.
Eidelberg, Dr. Ludwig, U.S.A. (Address not communicated).
Franklin, Dr. Marjorie, 57 Bainton Road, Oxford.
Grant Duff, Miss I. F., 48 Ladbroke Grove, W.11.
Heimann, Dr. P., 32 Eamont Court, Eamont Street, N.W.8.
Hitschmann, Dr. Eduard, 78 Larchwood Drive, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
Hopkins, Dr. Pryns, 1900 Garden Street, Santa Barbara, Calif., U.S.A.
Isakower, Dr. Otto, 7 West 96th Street, New York, U.S.A.
Isakower, Dr. S., 7 West 96th Street, New York, U.S.A.
Jones, Dr. Ernest, 96 Gloucester Place, W.1. (*President.*)
Kris, Ernst, 875 Park Avenue, New York, U.S.A.
Kris, Dr. Marianne, 875 Park Avenue, New York, U.S.A.
Macdonald, Dr. R. A., 39 Clifton Hill, N.W.8.
Matte Blanco, Dr. I., Phipps Psychiatric Clinic, Baltimore, Md., U.S.A.
Matthew, Dr. David, 96 Gloucester Place, W.1. (*Treasurer.*)
Mitchell, Dr. T. W., Wayside, Fordcombe, nr. Tunbridge Wells.
Riggall, Dr. R. M., Berkshire Mental Hospital, Wallingford.
Scott, Dr. W. Clifford, Wharncliffe Emergency Hospital, Sheffield 6.
Sheehan-Dare, Miss H., The Anchorage, Seaton, Devon.
Steiner, Dr. Maxim, 96 Gloucester Place, W.1.
Stengel, Dr. Erwin (Temporary), 96 Gloucester Place, W.1.
Stross, Dr. Josefine, 29 Welbeck Street, W.1.
Thorner, Dr. H. A., Westway Cottage, Jordans, Beaconsfield, Bucks.
Witt, Dr. Gerhard, 310 Riverside Drive, New York, U.S.A.

Office Bearer

(Omitted from last Bulletin)

Payne, Dr. Sylvia M., 143 Harley Street, W.1. (*Training Secretary*).

No information so far available from :

DANISH-NORWEGIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
FINNISH-SWEDISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
PALESTINE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
SENDAI PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
TOKYO PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY
VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

(Changes according to last year's report)

Associate Member

Meyer-Fournier, Mrs. Christine, 123 N. Plymouth Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.

Change of Address

Blum, Dr. Ernst, Waldau, Berne.

Blum-Sapas, Dr. Elsa, Saapa-talu, Vana-Kariste, Estonia.

Fink, Dr. S., The Commodore, King's Cross, Sydney, N.S.W., Australia.

IV. OBITUARY

Jacob, Dr. Gertrud, Rockville, Md., U.S.A.

Herbert, Dr. S., Manchester.

Stipriaan Luiscius, Dr. A. M. van, Utrecht.

Morgenstern, Mrs. Sophie, Paris.

We have reason to believe that this list is not complete. Owing to various circumstances, which will be readily understood, we have omitted obituary notices.

BIBL.
LONDIN.
UNIV.